

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

DECLASSIFIED

EO 11652

APR 11 1978

RETURN TO
The Albert F. Simpson
Historical Research Center
Maxwell AFB, AL 36112

544.01
44/10/20 -
45/05/21
V.2

VITAL DOCUMENTS

to

HISTORY

ST TACTICAL AIR FORCE
(PROVISIONAL)

20 OCTOBER 1944 - 21 MAY 1945

Cataloged

DECLASSIFIED

EO 11652

APR 11 1978

1026330

97753-4

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

APR 11 1978

549.01 V.L. 20 Oct 1944- 21 May 1945	RECEIVED HISTORICAL SECTION APR 10 1978
---	---



orig card
549.01
V.L.

APR 11 1978

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

7753-4
10263
100180

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Tab</u>
Minutes of Conference in the office of Lt. Gen. Carl Spaatz, CG, USSTAF, 7 Oct 44, to discuss problems in the transfer of units from the Twelfth to Ninth Air Force	I-A
Plan for "Air Support for Ground Forces in France", undated and unsigned	I-B
Msg A-239, Maj. Gen. John K. Cannon, CG, 12 AF, to CG, ABAP, 7 Sept 44	I-C
Interview with Brig. Gen. Edmund C. Langmead, D/CG for Adm, 1 TAF, and CG, I TAFSC, 5 June 45	I-D
Ltr, signed Lt. Col. Robert W. Green, Chief, Ops Sect, and Col. John J. O'Hara, Chief, Plans & Ops Div, IX AFSC, to CG, IX AFSC, <u>g.</u> 20 Sept 44, subj: XII Tactical Air Command	I-E
Minutes of Meeting at Caserta, Italy, on 27-28 Sept 44, to discuss the transfer of certain responsibilities from MTO to ETO	I-F
Ltr SHAEF (M) Air/35199/A-3, SHAEF to CG, 1 TAF, et al, 25 Oct 44, subj: Operational Control of French Air Forces Employed in Support of Sixth U. S. Army Group	I-G

USSTAF GO 81, 20 Oct 44	I-H
Msg, Maj. Gen. Ralph Royce, CG, 1 TAF, to Lt. Gen. Carl Spaatz, CG, USSTAF, 24 Oct 44; and Msg, same to same and Maj. Gen. Hugh Knerr, D/CG for Adm, USSTAF, <u>C</u> , 25 Oct 44/	I-I
Ltr 337, 9 AF to CG, 1 TAF, <u>et al.</u> , 27 Oct 44, subj: Minutes of Meeting to determine units which Ninth Air Force is to make available for transfer to First Tactical Air Force (Provisional), w/1 incl	I-J
Memo, signed Brig. Gen. Ned Schramm, D/CG for Ops, 1 TAF, to All Staff Sections, 1 TAF, 10 Feb 45. List of Units needed to make First Tactical Air Force self-sufficient	I-K
Ltr, USSTAF to CG's, 9 AF and 1 TAF, 28 Dec 44, subj: Duties and Responsi- bilities of Ninth Air Force and First Tactical Air Force (Prov), with Respect to Disarmament of the German Air Force	I-L
Ltr, Brig. Gen. Ned Schramm, D/CG for Ops, 1 TAF, to CG's, XII TAC, 42nd BW, and 1 CAF, 14 Mar 45, subj: General Plan for Tactical Air Cooperation with Sixth Army Group for Operation ECLIPSE	I-M
Msg, 1 TAF to CG, SHAEP (Air) <u>et al.</u> , 15 May 45	I-N
1 TAF Ltr of Instructions Number One, 1 Nov 44	II-A
1 TAF Ltr of Instructions Number Two 11 Nov 44	II-B

Report by 1 TAF to CG, 6 AG, 26 Feb 45,
 subj: Air Participation in the Re-
 duction of the Colmar Pocket, 20 Jan -
 9 Feb 45 IV-A

Ltr 1842/3-US, signed "Demetz" (Col. Demetz,
 AG/S, FFA), General de Lattre, C-in-C,
 FFA, to CG, 6 AG, 21 Apr 45, General
 Remarks Concerning Air Support Received
 by First French Army and Answers to the
 Questionnaire from Hq, USSTAF IV-B

Msg 5A/25, General de Lattre, CG, FFA to
 CG, 6 AG, 25 Jan 45 IV-C

Ltr 138/3-US, General de Lattre, C-in-C,
 FFA, to CG, 6 AG, signed "Valley", C/S
 FFA, 11 Dec 44 IV-D

Ltr SHAEF (M) Air/S.35102/A-3; SHAEF to
 AMC, 2 TAF, and CG's, 9 AF and 1 TAF;
 18 Dec 44; subj: Operation CLARION --
 Transmittal of General Plan V-A

1 TAF PR news release, 1 Apr 45, "Ten
 Big Days" V-B

1 TAF Ltr of Instruction Number Four,
 22 Mar 45 VI-A

1 TAF Ltr of Instructions Number Five,
 28 Mar 45 VI-B

Interview with Lt. Col. Roger Duhaze,
 AG/S French Section, A-2, 1 TAF,
 10 June 45 VII-A

Interview with Lt. Col. Francis Besnard
 and Lt. Col. Roger Duhaze, 23 June 45 . . . VII-B

Ltr, 1 TAF, to CG, WPAF, 18 Nov 44,
subj: Directive. VII-C

1st Ind, USSTAF to CG, 1 TAF, 20 Dec 44, . . . VII-D

Ltr 109/EM/3 PFA, Brig. Gen. Cornaiglion-
Molinier, CG, WPAF, to Maj. Gen.
Ralph Royce, CG, 1 TAF, 7 Jan 45,
subj: Lessons to be Drawn from the
First Allied Bombing Attack on the
Royan Sector VII-E

Ltr 287/PFO/Cab, Lt. Gen. de Larminat,
CG, WFF, to Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers,
CG, 6 AG, 13 Jan 45 VII-F

Memo, Maj. Gen. Ralph Royce, CG, 1 TAF,
to Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers, CG, 6 AG,
17 Jan 45, w/4 incls VII-G

Memo, 1 TAF, 3 Nov 44, subj: Operation
INDEPENDENCE VII-H

Memo 47/3/OP/T.S., signed by Brig. Gen.
Paul Gerardot, CG, 1 CAF, 24 Nov 44, subj:
Plan of Operations No. 3 VII-I

Msg BAX-25303, Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers,
CG, 6 AG, to General de Lattre, CG,
PFA, 25 Dec 44 VII-J

Interview with General Rene Bouscat, CG,
French Combat Air Forces, 25 June 45 . . . VII-K

Ltr, Maj. Gen. Ralph Royce, CG, 1 TAF,
to CG, 42 BW, 13 Jan 45, subj:
Operation and Administration of French
Air Force Units, w/earlier drafts VII-L

Interview with Maj. Gen. Robert M. Webster, CG, 1 TAF, 28 May 45	VII-M
Ltr 322, U. S. Component, AEF, to CG, USSTAF, 18 Nov 44, subj: Release of Officer Grades	IX-A
Msg D 446, 1 TAF to CG, USSTAF, 25 Apr 45 . .	IX-B
Index to First Tactical Air Force Or- ganizational Files Accompanying Manuscript	Misc. A
Functional Organization Chart Showing Channels of Ground-Air Cooperation as Visualized by G-3 (Air), 6 AG	Misc. B
Chapter 14, "Air Cooperation", <u>Final</u> <u>Report</u> , Sixth Army Group, July 1945 . . .	Misc. C
Ltr AG 373.2 C-Air, Seventh Army to CG, 6 AG, 18 Apr 45, subj: Comments on Air-Ground Cooperation, w/5 incls	Misc. D
First Tactical Air Force Policy Papers on Medium Bombardment Operations, 1 Jan - 3 Mar 45	Misc. E
Memo, XXI Corps G-2 (Air), "Air Reconnaissance: Visual and Photographic", 2 Mar 45	Misc. F
Ltr 322, USSTAF to CG, 1 TAF, 12 Dec 44, subj: Attachment of Units (No. 84) . . .	Misc. G

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

1-A

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

0704
0215

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

VITAL DOCUMENTS

to the

HISTORY

FIRST TACTICAL AIR FORCE (PROVISIONAL)

20 October 1944 - 21 May 1945

Volume II

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

[REDACTED] *Gen Royce*

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE
Office of the Commanding General
APO 633

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

MINUTES OF CONFERENCE HELD IN OFFICE OF GEN SPAATZ

DATE : 7 October 1944

PRESENT : Lt. Gen. Spaatz
Maj Gen. Royce
Maj Gen. Knerr
Maj Gen. Vandenberg
Maj Gen. Craig
Brig Gen Saville
Colonel Ervine
Commandant Blumenthal

Purpose of meeting to discuss problems in regard to transfer of units from the Twelfth Air Force to the Ninth Air Force.

Gen. Spaatz suggested that a Provisional Air Service Command be set up to take care of the additional tactical air units transferred from the Twelfth Air Force to the Ninth Air Force. Saville stated this would require a headquarters of approximately 12 officers and necessary clerks, etc. Gen. Knerr said this could be done without consulting Washington so long as no orders are requested from Washington. Gen. Langhade was suggested by Gen. Knerr as the man to head the provisional Service Command and this was agreed to by Gen. Spaatz and Gen. Royce. Gen. Spaatz said that so long as we are getting any portion of our supplies from the Mediterranean, there should be a representative from that theater working as liaison officer in this Provisional Service Command. Agreed that someone from Whitten's headquarters would act as Deputy to Langhade. This is to be discussed with those in Mediterranean and Gen. Knerr agreed to accompany Gen. Spaatz during his next conference with Gen. Baker to work out details. In the meantime Gen. Knerr is to work out the necessary details here. (See attached draft of General Order #2)

French Air Force problem discussed, particularly the problem of supply. When we supply them with American supplies, presume that supplies will go through our normal supply channels. Knerr stated that the French are now organizing a supply depot group for our equipment and when equipment they are getting from Mediterranean becomes exhausted, then we shall supply them through normal channels here. The British supplies for the French come direct through RAF channels. Saville stated that he felt their depot group would not be functioning before the end of 1945. Craig stated he thought their request for an air depot group had been turned down by the French. Col. Ervine felt this was not true. Gen. Spaatz said it is his idea that they need no help except guidance and otherwise they can organize themselves - Saville and Blumenthal agreed. Col. Ervine said he would check into this immediately and have an answer ready when Gen. Spaatz gets to the Mediterranean on his next trip. All the French combat groups have their own service squadrons, either in being or being formed, and the only thing they lack for sustaining themselves is this Air Depot Group.

Minutes - 7 Oct 44

- 2 -

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

Gen Saville stated the following points:

1. The French had planned to move their Air Defense Command Headquarters from Africa and redesignate it as the French Air Tactical Command.
2. The French have received some of their equipment for a signals battalion, but not enough to function properly.
3. The French have a fighter control squadron. For this they have received their VHF equipment on a minimum basis and if that equipment is brought in they can just stagger by.
4. The Aircraft Warning Battalion they have cannot perform its operational function with present equipment, but by substituting and swapping equipment, they can get by.
5. The French have also two Air Support Communications Squadrons, included in recent bids.
6. The French will require a Signals Construction Battalion or equivalent and Saville said no action had been taken to acquire this so far as he knew. He feels sure the French can supply the necessary personnel to get this going if equipment can be furnished to them.

Saville stated further that every effort should be made to get the Munitions Assignment Boards in Headquarters Army Air Forces Washington to go over list of essential units and unlock doors to those things which are needed to get this going and that this should be on the very highest priority. Gen. Spaatz asked how we could go about getting this equipment without going back to the U.S. for it and Gen. Knerr said that he felt sure that 70% of their needs could be made available from resources in the theater. Col. Ervine said that the list of necessary equipment is ready now with items needed for operational requirements. Gen. Spaatz said he felt we should make Langmeade responsible for getting this list and getting the supplies where needed to get quickest action. Saville said he would go over this list and then submit it to Langmeade.

Gen. Spaatz recommended setting up a Provisional Air Force. Gen. Knerr is to start work on this after tying in with Gen. Crawford at SHAEF to check carefully the legality of such a step. (Gen. Craig said it necessary to inform Washington only of what has been done - not what is wanted to be done.) Discussion as to name - agreed by all to First Provisional Tactical Air Force. Gen. Knerr is to get from SHAEF an order which places the French Tactical Air Command under the First Provisional Tactical Air Force and we can issue necessary orders on the American components. The actual issuance of this order is to be held until return from trip to Mediterranean, but details to be worked out here before discussing with Devers, Baker, and Cannon.

Gen. Spaatz asked whether or not the issuance of orders on certain units of 2nd Air Force could be accomplished by him. Gen. Knerr stated it can be done in accordance with GENERAL ORDER NO. 1, signed by Gen. Spaatz, dated 6 October. (Attached)

Minutes - 7 Oct 44

DECLASSIFIED 3 -
EO 11652

The Photographic setup is to be discussed on trip to Mediterranean.

Gen. Spaatz repeated Gen. Arnold's question as to whether or not enough fighters had been brought from the Mediterranean to France, and asked for comments on this so that he would know whether or not to ask for an additional group during next conference with Baker. Gen. Royce said the fighters are distributed as equally as could be done among the Armies on the basis of five American armies - 21 fighter groups - four to each Army and one extra - that extra one in this theater. It was agreed that we could not take another one from the Mediterranean and retain balance.

Gen. Saville brought up the question of the 47th Light Bomb Group which he stated is actually trained in night intruder work. He would like to trade one of B-26 groups presently assigned to him for the 47th Group which was left in the Mediterranean. Gen. Spaatz said this would be taken up during conference with Baker.

Gen. Spaatz brought up question of whether or not Saville could find fields for the three B-26 groups if brought to France. Saville said they would be based in the Istres area, and that Gen. Devers had said he had no objection to these fields being used by Saville. The problem is in finding the Aviation Engineers to prepare them for use. Saville stated that four battalions of Aviation Engineers could do the job. Vandenberg and Royce agreed that no aviation engineers can be removed from the work they are doing for the Ninth Air Force. Gen. Vandenberg said he wants to place his units as near the Rhine as possible, and Gen. Spaatz suggested that they do not leave the steel plank on present fields, but load it to move forward on a more or less "finish the War basis." Gen. Vandenberg has aviation engineers to take care of his requirements so if four battalions from U.K. go to Saville, both Vandenberg and Saville are taken care of.

Gen. Spaatz asked Saville to whom he would go for awards and decorations, etc - just what he considered his administrative channels - Saville said to Gen. Vandenberg.

Shortage of Signal Construction Battalions discussed. Gen. Spaatz asked if we could detach from the Eighth or Fifteenth Air Forces the construction battalions to take care of the Tactical Air Commands. Gen. Knerr said it could be done, but should not be done unless definitely on a very temporary basis. Gen. Vandenberg suggested we make our request to the theater - not through Air Force channels - since they are not Air Force battalions. Craig suggested that Signal Construction Battalions be requested from the U. S. Gen. Spaatz told Gen. Knerr to take this up with Crawford. Knerr said it has been tried and the answer is "No." Gen. Knerr said we could try to get one from the States through SHAEF, but he thinks the answer is "No." Gen. Spaatz said we could try Gen. Devers, and Saville stated he is sure the answer would be "No."

Gen. Spaatz stated that he had given a requirement for 100,000 tons of steel matting to Gen. Crawford for moving forward for the Ninth Air Force. Had suggested to Crawford that it be shipped on barges along canals. Asked Gen. Knerr

Minutes - 7 Oct 44

- 4 -
DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

Agreed to between Royce and Saville that no Bomber Command would be formed in the First Provisional Tactical Air Force.

Saville suggested inactivating present Tactical Air Commands and having only two - one with 12th Army Group and one with 6th Army Group, with an operational office with each group headquarters. CG, Ninth Air Force would be on level between SHAEF and Army Commander (Bradley), Tactical Air Commander would be on level with Army Group Commander (Bradley), and Wing Commanders would be on level with Corps Commanders. Gen. Spaatz said it might be a good plan for the next War, but is not something to even think about doing now.

Saville renamed the five units which have been questioned on move into France:

- Weather Detachment
- Interpretation Unit
- Det "D" of 849th Signal Intelligence Company
- ~~439th Signal Construction Battalion~~
- 3rd and 4th Photo Technical Squadrons

Gen. Spaatz said this would be discussed with Gen. Baker on next visit.

Discussion as to why the entire Twelfth Air Force is not moved to France, complete with Twelfth Air Force Service Command. Agreed to pursue this subject in next meeting with Baker before issuing any orders establishing the First Provisional Tactical Air Force or First Provisional Air Service Command.

CCB

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

I-D

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

AIR SUPPORT FOR GROUND FORCES IN FRANCE.

1. Each Army Group to be supported by an Air Force (Tactical).
2. Each Army to be supported by a Tactical Air Command.

12th Army Group--BRADLEY
9th Air Force---VANDENBERG.

6th Army Group--DEVERS
12th Air Force--CANNON

1st Army---HODGES 3d Army--PATTON 7th Army--SIMPSON 5th Army--CLARK 7th Army--PATCH

Tact. Air Cnds--QUESADA---WEYLAND-----??????

CHIDLAW

SAVILLE

3. Each Tactical Air Command to have a Recce Group and a certain number of Fighter bomber groups assigned but the latter to be shifted to the various Tactical Air Commands to meet the situation.
4. The Medium and light Bomber groups to be assigned as at present but in case of necessity to be given targets outside of their Air Force area.
5. French Air Forces to support the French land forces (both Fighter Bomber and Medium Bomber).
6. Each Recce Group to consist of one Photo Recce Squadron and three Tac R Sqdns and the necessary A. & B. photographic trains.
7. Each Tactical Air Command to be assigned one Wing Hqs for the purpose of controlling aircraft and operating warning systems, etc.

Wings now available--9th Air Force--5--one of which is an air defense wing.
12th Air Force--4--two of which are with coastal.

Total 9.

Two of these wings to be used to organize two additional Tac Air Commands

One from the 9th and one from the 12th.

9 minus 2 = 7 remain--less five (assigning one to each Tact Air Cmd)
2 remain--one may be left with Coastal and one to be Air
Defense Command.

23 Fighter Bomber groups now available
18 with 9th A.F.
5 with 12th A.F.

Two of these must be converted to Recce Groups as there are now
available only three such groups--2 with 9th and 1 with 12th.

21 Fighter Bomber Groups will remain.

Normal Assignment four Fighter Bomber Groups to a Tact Air Cmd--with
one such command having five. All groups to be available for
switching to any part of the battle front.

COMMAND--12th Air Force to remain in Italy and detach a Tact Air Cmd to
support Patch

UNLESS
Clark's Army moves to France, then 12th Air Force to move to
France in toto.

Until the latter can be consummated, units of the 12th in France
not to come under USSTAF administration as long as they are being
supplied through the Mediterranean ports.

Operational control of such units however to be under SHAEF as soon
as units are air linked (overlapping bomb lines--common targets--etc).

SHAEF will control air operations in France and lateral coordination
will be insured by bouncing intentions through Redline link that is
now established. Present established practice of numbering messages
consecutively will be employed.

18 Fighter Bomber Groups of 9th

Two to be converted to Recce.

16 Remain -- 5 to QUESADA
4 to WEYLAND
4 to ?
3 to SAVILLE

16

5 Fighter Bomber Groups of 12th

4 to CHIDLAW
1 to SAVILLE

5

= 21

Recce.

1 - QUESADA from 9th)
1 - WEYLAND from 9th) now
1 - CHIDLAW from 12th) existing

1 - SAVILLE from 9th) to be
1 - ~~Weyland~~ from 9th) converted

5

... THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526 ...

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

0 8 2 5

DEC 17 1973

IMMEDIATE FILE #

529

0826

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

I-D

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

INTERVIEW WITH BRIGADIER GENERAL EDMUND C.
LANGMEAD IN COLONEL T.J. BROGAN'S OFFICE,
HEIDELBERG, 5 JUNE 1945.

Officers Present: Colonel Brogan
 1st Lt. Grattan
 1st Lt. Stewart

G General, we have some early papers here. The first thing I want to ask you about is the relationship of First TAC to the air support system of ground forces in France. We have, first, a paper here I don't know the date of -- .

L Don't ask me to read any papers.

G It might possibly have proceeded from your office.

L Isn't it lovely to have pieces of paper without dates floating around! That piece of paper has nothing to do with the way things were organized.

B It was probably written around the 1st of July.

G (Reads from paper)

- B The Fifth Army was definitely out, before the move into France. They stripped the Fifth Army to make the Seventh. The Seventh was already in existence.
- L The people who ran the organizing of First TAC never saw that paper.
- G There is a Sixth A.G. directive dated 15 September, but the existence of the supporting air force was not assumed at that time.
- L That's correct. First TAC was conceived the first week in October. It was established then as something that was going to be formed.
- G (Lt. Grattan asks about the conference on the above)
- L I was there. There had been several preliminary meetings prior to that. One in Marseille and another meeting in Naples, I think. In August and September the previous conclusions were quite turned around, and they didn't abide by the prior meetings.

L (Asks for paper.) Let me see that. (Glances at paper -- Minutes of October 7 Meeting at St. Germain) No, I wasn't there. That's right. This was the next one. I missed this one with Craig.

G Who is Craig?

L He is Director of O., C., & R. in the Office of the Chief of the Army Air Forces. He came over here with General Mason.

G The arrangements were made out of a suggestion that a Provisional Service Command should be set up. Later on they suggested First TAC Provisional within the theater without consulting Washington. (Lt. Grattan then asks about the suggestion for one Tactical Air Force instead of the two previously suggested: General Saville's proposal at October 7 meeting.)

L That wasn't done.

G Was there any background?

- L The background was that Saville was trying to get command of the thing -- which Spaatz wouldn't accept.
- G The transcript is a little garbled. (Reads)
- L That was never accepted.
- G At the very end of this meeting there is a discussion as to whether the Twelfth Air Force should move into France.
- L That was at the time impossible because it took Combined Chiefs of Staff action to shift the Twelfth Air Force up here. Then they had a little period of dispute as to what forces had been committed to Southern France and what forces hadn't. Twelfth Air Force assumed the position that some organizations were only there temporarily. Those they withdrew to Corsica. Thus, certain organizations including Twelfth Service Command moved entirely out of France. The cut between ETO and MTO about 10 September and put a little more

French into the ETO; took the British out, too.

G What forces were considered?

L There was an agreement between Spaatz and Eaker about 15 September and at that time there was actually a physical move back of some service units.

B 416th or 417th Night Fighter Squadron was here and went back.

L Temporary loan basis. Those organizations were turned back. Then, that was when Spaatz really began to become interested. When he was in charge of supply. Now the reason why he couldn't get the Twelfth Air Force to come here intact . . .

Maitland Wilson's air officer recommends to General Eaker that he give up the whole Twelfth Air Force rather than take it to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Spaatz said 'we will take what we have got'.

G First TAC was formed out of this juggling of units, wasn't it?

1

L That's right. He let that ride until the Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting somewhere in the Mediterranean, around the 7th of March 1945, just before the two Groups were moved -- the 27th and 86th Fighter Groups. They issued another directive which was that the air forces in the ETO would be reinforced by elements of MTO. Details of that were agreed upon by the two commanders in late February or early March. At that time Spaatz said to Eaker, 'We ended up short certain units and we would like very much for you to give us more units' -- another night fighter squadron, two fighter groups, an air depot group, 1 service group and some other units, some ancillary units including a signal construction battalion, heavy. Those were the things which they thought they hadn't gotten the year before. That maladjustment caused Spaatz to ask for a clarification. This was corrected after the February conference, and it was agreed upon that air forces of ETO would be reinforced by MTO, and the details were worked out later between the commanders.

G Do you think it was a good idea to improvise this little air force at so late a stage of the war?

L O Christ yes! It was a terrific idea. Saville wired that conditions at present in XII Tactical Air Command "are rapidly becoming chaotic". The French were attached to Twelfth Tactical Air Command with Saville in charge, while they were coming up the Rhone. On 15 February Twelfth Air Force drew back. This was serious. Conditions rapidly did become chaotic. To secure for the Supreme Commander operational control of the French Air Forces and to supply the French with what they had to have couldn't be secured with an American commander in command. The Supreme Commander couldn't move Gerardot out and put Saville or Royce in at the head. Ninth could have run four tactical air commands very well. In fact, it tried to have very close control. It would say to one of the Commands, "You work with Third Army and when you need help from another TAC, and if they can't give it to you, then come to us."

1

L Ninth Air Force could have run the Ninth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Ninth and Twelfth Tactical Air Commands, just as easily as they could have run three. The only reason they didn't do so was because of the French Air Force, and that for this reason they needed First TAC (Prov.). Under the commitment made by de Gaulle all of the French Air Forces were available to the Supreme Commander. The Commander could pass the command to the First Tactical Air Force Commander, which he did do, too. SHAEF did give to General Royce command not only of the First French Air Force but of the French Air Force of the West. The guiding head of the French Air Force in the West was Royce. It wasn't for the direction of U.S. it was for the direction of the French Air Force.

G (Lt. Grattan asks for a further explanation.)

L Don't write that in the history if you are going to give it to the French.

G (Lt. Grattan expresses his desire and need for some mention of the above in the history.)

L Well, you could put it in the language of, "It might be assumed that an objective in the establishment of this was to do so and so"; or, "It might appear reasonable that --".

G I see. (Asks if he has a paper on the above.)

L I don't have the paper; never did have the paper by which de Gaulle made available the French Air Forces to the Supreme Commander, but he did so do. You could probably get it from SHAEF.

B Newspapers of the same date would have it.

L The French couldn't go by themselves, except through Air Marshal Tedder, Eisenhower's Deputy. The Nineteenth, Twenty-Ninth, Ninth and the French Air Commands were helping each other . . . The center of gravity so that we could give the maximum help then shifted to the middle to give the power there. . . Yes, we did; we shifted it down our way by calling in Twenty-Ninth TAC. Then we shifted our fighter bombers down. That type of

directive couldn't have . . . in addition to TAC Air Command. French were too much of a problem -- language, supply, communication difficulties. Ninth could have handled four but not four and a French. It was a very logical and profitable enterprise to establish this little provisional air force to work on the south flank of Ninth Air Force and to have nothing to do but look out for this southern flank.

G (Shows the General the chart secured from G-3, Sixth Army Group.) The people who run G-3, Sixth Army Group have put in this line to illustrate the direct support of First French Army by First French TAC, which was not approved by the General. (Lt. Grattan asks the General if he ever heard anything about a discussion on the above.)

L (Goes over to chart) Each Division screams for support. The only reason you want this fellow in here (he points to First TAC) is for the shifting of this force laterally and of this

thing directly to this fellow. The move being reached by a target laid on by SHAERF. The Army would never have given up any of their support for an instant. They didn't know that the rail ends were being tied all over Germany. You have to have flexibility over the Army's air force. Devers would turn to Royce and say, "Put everything you can on the Colmar Pocket." Royce would say, "You can have 20% for Seventh Army, and the other will go down somewhere else.

G Let's say it is no strategic thing. What does XII TAC do?

L They worked out the details of everything that was allocated under two divisions: (1) Pre-briefed target; (2) Those who were on call by the Controller. The details of who would be on call were worked out. All of that force was really under direction of the Seventh Army as well as were the Recce missions. The air force area was over the hill here. It was much more profitable to go 200 miles to make sure that there were no major movements. We would direct so much

on armed recon; so much in close support -- general objectives: on rails, highways, bridges; the rest on the controller's reserves to be adequate for specific pin-points. If you are going to have any tactical coordination whatever -- of course, that we can, if you are going to have the ability to shift and any lateral elasticity, or any ready means of directing them -- Bomber Command, Eighth Air Force, and Fifteenth Air Force. When we go after these rail systems and airfields and some days Army headquarters, just to break up communications. The First TAC to the south and the Ninth to the North. You couldn't get that type of coordination of Twelfth TAC, which was bound to the Seventh Army.

G --And on the direct support General Webster could take the expert recon information of Seventh Army and Twelfth TAC?

L We never tampered with that status at all. The next day we would get a report on what they hit.

G Has the mission of First TAC ever been stated?

L It wasn't politically expedient to do so.

1

G What about its mission with Sixth Army Group?

L There is nothing in writing.

G Did you ever see such a paper?

L (The General shook his head.)

G Well, General, there's another big question and that is the whole question of supply. When you were first made head of the Service Command, what was your biggest problem?

L Don't put it down. (The equipment of the French, particularly signal equipment. On the supply side, the French were like a sponge.)

G You had the problem of making adjustment from MTO to ETO supply channels.

L That wasn't particularly difficult. They simply drew on a depot in Compiegne instead of a depot in Naples. In the shift over some things were hung in air. There was a period of about 60 days, when requisitions, etc. were floating around loose.

G Do you think it was economical to have the Service Command headquarters the Air Force headquarters?

3

- 1
- L I am the world's poorest judge. Ask Colonel Brogan. He was the guy that made it that way.
- B This was the third air force I've worked under, and it was the smoothest working, administratively, of any headquarters I've ever been in. It was certainly economical in officers and EM man power.
- L Economical in energy, too. What was our strength?
- B 135 officers, 400 EM for the combined headquarters.
- L When split -- 250 officers, 800 EM. That doesn't include ancillary and service units. That's just headquarters and headquarters squadrons of the two units which made First TAC Air Force Headquarters. General Devers passed it on to me that conditions in Vittel were crowded. That was the motivating factor for the streamlined headquarters -- communications and housing accommodations in Vittel. This was the smoothest working organization which we could get. The ordnance officer could do all the ordnance work, for example.
- G The theory of having the two headquarters together, you accept as a principle that you approve of?
- 3

- L At this stage of the war, yes. When you are starting at scratch, you have to build a terrific air force -- a combat organization and a service organization, and you have to pull people from here and there, initially, to do all kinds of jobs. You have to do organizational building: -- school people -- You have got to teach people how to drive, to repair hydraulic systems, and on the other side you have to teach them how to fly airplanes. That is in the schooling stage. But when we were formed we were in the operational stage. Separation of commands was interfering instead of helping in the operational stage. You need one commander when facing the enemy. So at this phase of the war -- first five months of 1945 -- phase of bringing our power to bear against the enemy -- it was logical to bring the two commands together and bring them into the field.
- G They were going to bring the service, any weather they were in.

- 1
- L We went to Vittel to do a job. General Spaatz gave us a job. I drew the path and went ahead with the job. We had better contact and control with the interlocking headquarters. Our serviceability rating was higher than Ninth Air Service Command.
- B Planes in the air were higher, too.
- G Sixth A.G. has a paper complaining of the fact that our bombers were too far back. Also, a paper to indicate that the air force in MTO held up delivery of steel planking to ETO, signed by General Wilson. Was this an issue that came into your office?
- L We argued a little bit. We weren't held up so much by steel planking. The thing that was needed most was transportation.
- B There was some difficulty about getting our General Arnold Wilson to move it.
- G Transportation history of First TAC was tied in with the 311th Ferrying Squadron. What about that?
- 1

L You would never get that story. ATC was pushing USSTAF and accusing USSTAF of being gypped by the British at Istres. A squadron was put down there, because the only way SHAeF would approve moving an outfit in there was for it to be an organizational necessity.

G Could say it was a scrap between MAF and ATC?

L That is not one of the chapters of our history to be proud of, by the way.

G ATC moved a detachment in just after the Ferrying Squadron moved out. ATC was down there when I was there in February. There were all kinds of planes there, even a few Russian C-47's.

L The place was big enough for everybody. I thought the dispute was kind of silly when I went down to look at the place.

G Are there any other leads on this transportation problem?

L Little Leo Moran would be a good man to talk to about transportation. He was the guy that was on the telephone all day long moving things. We didn't run out of gasoline. We didn't run out of ammunition. We didn't run out of bombs until the whole theater ran out of bombs. Transportation was difficult.

G When did the theater run out of bombs?

B March.

L 500 -lb. G.P.'s and 1000 - lb G.P.'s. — We had run out of certain types, only. Didn't run out of all bombs. Just certain types. Then when we moved up to Germany we couldn't move much because we didn't have rail passage to Saarbrücken and Kaiserslautern. XII TAC said, "We will be content with gas and ammunition." By that phase of the war need for bombs had fallen off. They were mostly interested in road strafing then. After moving into the Rhine, we had only gas. Have you got our sortie record? The rate of sorties brought up from November, December, January, by graph?

- G Haven't got graphs on it. Will have to get it ourselves from Stat. Control. Should be graphs; no other way to show it. Did you have any such charts?
- L Threw it away the other day.
- B Service Command or Ordnance Maintenance may have it.
- L Ordnance ought to have bombs and ammunition. Supply ought to be able to give you supply. Don't know where you can get sorties.
- B Maintenance would have it.
- G There ought to be a lot of this stuff in Stat. Control.
- L Boys, that's about all.
- G Thanks for your explanations, General.
- L Have you got any other questions?
- S Regarding the Letters of Instruction, why was there a gap in Letters of Instruction between November and March?
- B Due to two breaks.

L Saville dropped the Letters of Instruction when he came in. Put in detailed operation of 12nd Bomb Wing itself. Next Letter of Instruction was put in when Webster came in. We had a little abnormal period of about 21 days when nothing was done right.

B I think Letters of Instruction were suspended at the time of Ardennes. Had to do it by telephone and teletype. About that time the Germans started their push through the Ardennes Forest; suddenly in December they started kicking up. The Germans would put in a division in the line and move part of it out right away. In the middle of December we thought we had 82 divisions facing us. The plan for moving our headquarters to Phalsbourg was nipped in the bud by the advance of the Germans. We moved back the advanced command post about December 29th. Snow held them up all through January. By the end of January the Bastogne incident had been sort of clarified. On the first day of February the sun came out. In March we proceeded.

S Have you any suggestions as to the best breakdown of the phases of our history?

L When we moved to Vittel, they couldn't tell us what orders there were. We spent the time till about November 15 figuring out what we had. Spent November and December getting a staff together. Staff not complete until about 15 January. On the 15th of January we were a completed and going concern. Up until 20 October, you could call it a policy discussion phase. Twentieth October to January 10: construction phase, at which time we had a complete staff. In all that time we didn't do too much fighting. Fields were in bad shape. Outfits were way back in Lyon. P-47 outfit in Dole. Finally, got in position in December. January was bad because of snow. In February we started to fight.

G Operation CLARION came in February.

L February and March were operational.

G We intended to break down our operational account to correspond with Ground Forces activities. What do you think about breaking them down according

to our own internal history?

L I suggest you follow the Ground Forces break-down, since this is a tactical air force. By the way, when did they clean out the Colmar Pocket?

G February 8.

S When the Army asked for air support and the Tactical Air Command couldn't supply it, was there a lateral shift or did it go through SHAEF?

L What did happen was this. Saville up at Twelfth TAC would have to give the Seventh Army Commander what he wanted or turn him down. If he turned him down, then it came up at the next Commanders Conference which was held every Thursday at SHAEF, at which time if Tender and Spatz couldn't get a decision they would do something about it.

G Lt. Grattan asks if they might see the minutes of these conferences.

L Go up and ask the historian at USSTAF to let you read them.

S Is there anything else in our Air Force outstanding, that sets it apart?

L Ought to mention that conditions of living were very difficult and we did have a very high morale in spite of the fact that, being provisional, we couldn't make any promotions, which seems to be a necessary factor as far as morale goes. (The morale was good through a very, very bitter winter with no heat. We won the war under extremely difficult conditions. Very difficult conditions. As different as Heidelberg is from the rest of Germany.

... . THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

I-2

1
THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

HEADQUARTERS
IX AIR FORCE SERVICE COMMAND

DECLASSIFIED

EO 11652

[c. 20 Sept 1944]

SUBJECT: XII Tactical Command

TO : Commanding General, IX Air Force Service Command, APO 149, US Army.

1. The following information was obtained at a meeting held at Lyon 19 September. Among those present were:

Lt. Gen Devers, Sixth Army Group
Maj Gen Edwards, Mediterranean Allied Air Force
Brig Gen Nugent, Ninth Air Force
Brig Gen Thomas, XII Air Force Service Command
Brig Gen Saville, XII Tactical Command
Brig Gen Newman, IX Air Force Engineer Command

2. a. Planned composition of XII Tactical Command in addition to its Headquarters:

1 P-47 Group, American from Twelfth Air Force
1 P-47 Group, French from Twelfth Air Force
1 Spitfire Wing, French from Twelfth Air Force
2 Medium Bomb Groups, French from Twelfth Air Force
3 Fighter Bomber Groups, American from Ninth Air Force
1 Tac Recon Squadron, Spitfire, French from Twelfth Air Force
1 Night Fighter Squadron, Beaufighter, American from Twelfth Air Force
1 Photo Recon Squadron, P-51 (?), American from Ninth Air Force

The need of the latter organization now being determined by Colonel Hall of Ninth Air Force.

b. French Medium Bomb Groups are organized under American T/O having three squadrons per group.

c. Service for each group minus separate squadrons consist of:

1 Service Squadron
1 Ordnance S/M Squadron
1 QM Trk Company

d. Signal Service is provided by two signal battalions, one of which is heavy, the other a bastard outfit organized to suit the command.

e. Elements of an Air Depot Group plus two QM Truck Companies are now operating as an intramit depot in the Marseille area. These units are scheduled to be withdrawn to Italy prior to 10 October.

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

3. Combat units now operating with the XII Tactical Command above those mentioned will be withdrawn prior to 10 October.

4. Seventy Spitfire Mark V and Mark IX are now assigned to the French Spitfire Wing & 1/2 Tac Rec Sqd. Ten Mark VIII Beaus are used as night fighters.

5. a. To date, no supplies of any type or class have been received through Army or Com Z sources. Food, MT fuel, Avn gas, oil and ammo are being furnished by air, resulting in a very precarious conditions. Rail service is expected to reach Lyon/Dijon by 1 October according to Gen Devers, however his G-4 expects this to be nearer 10 October. This service is expected to result in delivery of 9000 tons daily. The Army States its requirements to be 6000. Gen Thomas estimates the air force requirement to be 1100 tons daily. No arrangement has been made to assure the above allocation.

b. Pipe lines for delivery of MT fuel only now under construction but are far short of usable distance.

c. Gen Thomas stated that Com Z on the 17th of October had only 52 trucks in the Marseille area and as a result were completely squamped. He explained this was a result of the rapid advance of the Sixth Army Group, it's being planned that Marseille would be occupied on D plus 30 whereas the advance on that date was some 300 miles beyond.

6. The present supply system is as follows:

a. 50 sorties daily by B-24s from Poggia, Italy delivering avn gas to Lyon. These planes carry empty drums and upon landing are able to pump into these drums some 700 gallons of gas. Bombs have also been delivered by B-24s in some cases.

b. 52 C-47 aircraft are also furnished by Mediterranean Air Force. These are used to deliver food, MT fuel, bombs, ammo, avn gas and oil from Istres, and airfield on Lake Berre, northwest of Marseille. This field is supplied by avn gas in 50 gallon drums (no bulk) unloaded at Port De Bouc and delivered from ship side by one of the QM Trk Cos with the Depot elements.

c. On the beaches some 50-60 miles east of Marseille are some 2 million gallons of aviation gas, 1000 tons of bombs and ammo and "millions" of rations. This is being delivered to a railhead by the other truck company with the depot and then by rail to Istres, a train of 400 tons moving every other day. At present some 600000 gallons of gas and 300 to 500 tons of bombs and ammo are located at Lyon. No attempt has been made to locate bulk fuel storage.

d. Gen Thomas stated that ETOUSA had provided for the delivery of common items of supply direct from the US and that Med Air Force had provided for the delivery of Air Corps items in the same manner.

7. The units scheduled to remain with the XII Tactical Command are disposed of as follows: Medium bomber groups at present non-operational are located in the Marseille area waiting the arrival of service squadrons, S/M Squadrons and Truck Companies. These groups will then move forward and occupy Lyon/Bron and Amberine (NE of Lyon). These moves after 1 October. The French P-47 group is

- 3 -

DECLASSIFIED
EO 13526

is now located at Amberline minus its service units. These are now reported on the beach. The American P-47 group is now located on a grass field at Bousnières (SW of Besaçon), weather preventing satisfactory operation. All other units are operating from fields south of Lyon, obtaining supplies from Lyon/Bron.

8. Engineers of the Twelfth Air Force will complete the following projects and depart for Italy prior to 10 October at which time the Ninth Air Force will be responsible for maintenance.

- a. Steel plank - Ambastien for Medium Bombers.
- b. Complete repairs at Lyon/Bron for Medium Bombers.
- c. Complete repairs at Dijon for Fighter Bombers.
- d. Complete repairs at Dole/Tavaux for Spitfires/Tac Recon.

- (a. will depend on train service, steel plank now at Marseille.
- b. suitable for operation now.
- c. operational 29 September.
- d. operational 24 September.)

Occupying units have not been determined, advance parties will be required for prestocking.

9. Gen Devers stated the composition of the Sixth Army Group to be: Seventh American Army of 4 divisions with 5 more divisions due. "B" French Army of 9 divisions.

10. Liaison aircraft and parts for Army are furnished Army depots for distribution by Med Air Force. No interest is taken in maintenance or other supply. Gen Edwards stated that in his opinion replacement aircraft for the French and units transferred from Med Air Force would continue to be furnished through Med Air Force.

11. Provisional POL truck companies are now being formed, some 87 refueling units having been furnished the Sixth Army Group. It may be possible to obtain some for use by the air force.

12. Gen Newman reports that 3 fields in the Nancy area will be available 1st October for the 3 fighter bomber groups scheduled for transfer to the XII Tactical Air Command from the IX and XIX Tactical Air Commands. Gen Nugent was informed that the movement of these 3 groups would affect the commitment made to Gen Vandenberg by the Service Command; however, to the extent of affecting operation of the 3 transferred groups. From the above, it will be noted that XII Tactical Air Command will occupy 2 airfields in the Lyon area, it is recommended this area also support an Air Depot Group.) 3 airfields in the Dijon area and 3 airfields in the Nancy area, all operational on or about 1st October.

13. No fourth echelon maintenance is being attempted. Only a vague picture of maintenance could be obtained. Gen Thomas stated however some of the groups had battle damage aircraft. While a true picture is not reflected by the following, some indication of operational ability is shown. These figures are after two days non-operation due to weather.

- 4 -

324 Fighter Gp 80%
27 Fighter Gp 54%
111 Fighter Gp 76%
79 Fighter Gp 60%
Night Fighter 90%

Each service squadron has organized a mobile unit similar to our mobile RAR unit for use as a clean up team.

14. Gen Devers stated the transfer of the XII Tactical Air Command to the Ninth Air Force to be effective 15 September. On this basis and other commitments Gen Thomas' headquarters is located at Aix (north of Marseilles). He states plenty of accommodations are available at the hotel in which he is located. Aircraft can land at the airfield Aix/Marseilles. He desires that we send officers of the special staff sections to become familiar with the setup and take over that he may depart prior to 10 October. It was expressed that this was a duty of USOTAF but that it would be up to us to arrange.

15. Hq. Sixth Army Group now at Lyon.
Hq. XII TAC now at Vesoul
Hq. Continental Base Section now at Lyon.
Hq. XII AFSC now at Aix.
Hq. French "B" Army now at Besancon.
Hq. Seventh American Army now at Lure.

16. Summary:

- a. We at the present time are being supplied and maintained by lines of communication originating from NW France.
- b. Twelfth Air Force has established lines of communication from S. France for support of their units. Supplies to their units have in the most part come from Italy but arrangements have been made for direct deliveries through Marseilles from U.S.
- c. Supplies from Italy will continue only until such time as IX AFSC can make other arrangements.
- d. Withdrawal of Air Force service units other than those being transferred to IX AFSC make it imperative that personnel be dispatched to take over duties now being performed by these units.

17. Recommendations:

- a. That representatives of IX AFSC and USOTAF be sent at once to contact 12th Air Force and arrange for transfer of duties.
- b. That all duties at Marseilles and those involved in movement of supplies to and from that area to forward areas be assumed by USOTAF.
- c. That 2nd AADA establish as soon as possible a TAD in Nancy/Dijon area (more desirable in Nancy area) operated by one ADG for support of XII TAC.
- d. That strong representation be made to Ninth AF for movement of Medium Bomber Gps being transferred to the Ninth AF to an area more conveniently located to present Bomber Command installations in order that they may be properly supported.

- 5 -

e. That Lt. Col. Shea be dispatched as member of part to contact 12th AF in order that detailed information may be secured on transfer of service units.

f. That Lt. Col. Shea upon completion of mission assigned in Para g above, be assigned for duty as Liaison Officer from this Headquarters with XII TAC.

g. That a statistical officer also be sent as member of party in order that arrangements may be made for A/C inventory and establishment of reporting procedures.

ROBERT W. GREEN
Lt. Col., A.C.
Chief Operations Section

JOHN J. O'HARA, JR.
Colonel, A. C.
Chief Plans & Operations Div

... THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526 ...

3
THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

7740
0857

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
APO 650

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

MINUTES OF MEETINGS HELD AT CASERTA ON 27-28 SEPTEMBER

1. On 27-28 September a conference was held at Caserta Italy for the purpose of discussing mutual problems in connection with the transfer of certain Air Force units and administrative and supply responsibilities from MTO to ETO. The following were present at this conference:

Maj Gen I. H. Edwards, DCG, AAF/MTO
Brig Gen I. W. Ott, USSTAF
Brig Gen A. W. Harriner, Dep AGO in C, MAAF
Brig Gen A. Thomas, CG, XII AFSC
Gen L. P. Whitten, CG, AAFSC/MTO
Col T. M. Lowe, DC/S AAF/MTO
Col W. H. Eaton, A-4, AAF/MTO
Col D. H. Baker, DC, IX AFSC
Col J. J. O'Hara Jr, PFO, IX AFSC
Col J. M. Reynolds, Sup Div, IX AFSC
Col Jerome Preston, USSTAF
Col C. L. Gran, XII AFSC
Lt Col B. A. Harcos, Actg A-3, AAF/MTO
Lt Col G. M. A. DeChasse, FAF, Liaison, MAAF
Major C. E. Penix, Pers, USSTAF

2. A list of units to be transferred to the Ninth Air Force and XII TAC was considered. A message dated September 26 from USSTAF stating their absolute minimum requirements was considered. Colonel Baker, the representative of the Ninth Air Force, presented strong representations that a Signal Company Service Group be transferred with the other service elements. However, this was not agreed to by the representatives of AAF/MTO, since it was not included in the message from USSTAF setting forth their minimum requirements and the unit is urgently needed in MTO. It was then agreed that the following listed units would be transferred:

Hq & Hq Sqdn, XII Tactical Air Command
Hq & Hq Sqdn, 64th Fighter Wing
Hq & Hq Sqdn, 324th Fighter Group
317th Fighter Sqdn
318th Fighter Sqdn
319th Fighter Sqdn
111th Tactical Reconnaissance Sqdn.
1st Air Service Sqdn
1722d Ordnance Supply & Maintenance Co
1755th Quartermaster Truck Co
927th Signal Battalion (SP) Tactical Air Command
328th Fighter Control Sqdn
582nd Signal Air Warning Battalion
593d Signal Air Warning Battalion
82d Fighter Control Sqdn
2d Tactical Air Communication Sqdn

- 2 -

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

346th Signal Company Wing
895th Military Police Company, AVN
13th Photo Intelligence Det
439th Signal Heavy Construction Battalion

It was further agreed that the following detachments will be maintained in MFO on a Detached Service status pending adjustment by higher headquarters:

Weather Detachment consisting of:
Two (2) Type "A" Stations
One (1) Type "B" Section
Detachment "D", 849th Signal Intelligence Co

The above lists include all units requested by General Spaatz in message of September 26th except the Headquarters Squadron, 90th PRG. It includes a Signal Construction Battalion, a Detachment of the 849th Signal Intelligence Company, the 895th Military Police Company and Weather Detachments which are in addition to the original commitment made by the Twelfth Air Force.

3. The request from USSTAF for the transfer of the Headquarters Squadron, 90th PRG for conversion to a Headquarters Reconnaissance Group was not favorably considered by AAF/MFO. Under instructions from the War Department, this unit is to be kept intact and available for early redeployment. It was pointed out by representatives of AAF/MFO that the Twelfth Air Force is also short one (1) Reconnaissance Group Headquarters and it will be necessary to employ the same Group Headquarters to control the activities of the Photo Reconnaissance units serving the Twelfth Air Force and the "X" TAC.

4. All of the above units except a portion of the 895th Military Police Company are now in France. It was agreed that they would all pass to the full control of the Ninth Air Force and XII TAC at once. It was further agreed, that the remaining service units in France would be released and returned to MFO not later than October 15th with the exception of the 38th Air Depot Group and attached units in the Marseilles area.

5. Procedures for the supply and maintenance of French Air Force units transferred to the Ninth Air Force and XII TAC were discussed and explained to the representatives of USSTAF and the Ninth Air Force. A letter is being dispatched to the Commanding General, USSTAF, setting forth in detail the status of these units and their service support. In this letter, it is pointed out that these French units will be self-sufficient up to and including third echelon maintenance and supply. Two (2) service groups are now either in France or enroute thereto. However, a French Air Depot Group is not, as yet, available. Authority to compose and equip such a unit has been requested of the Munitions Assignment Board. When this authority is received AAF/MFO accepts the responsibility of equipping the unit which, under present plans of the French Air Force will actually be organized in southern France. This letter also includes information as to the supply and lend-lease procedures for the supply of French units.

6. Certain plans and procedures for the supply of former Twelfth Air Force units transferred to the Ninth Air Force during the interim period until full supply responsibility can be assumed by USSTAF and the Ninth Air Force were

DECLASSIFIED

EO 11652

- 3 -

a. USSTAF assumes the responsibilities of depot supply functions in the Marseilles areas as of 21 October, AAFSC/MTO is to leave its present equipment (with a few exceptions) in the Marseilles area. USSTAF is to ship replacement equipment by water directly to Italy. USSTAF is to send by air one-half of the necessary personnel immediately so that one-half of the AAFSC/MTO personnel may be returned to Italy. Balance of USSTAF personnel will follow within four (4) to five (5) days, after which time AAFSC/MTO can completely withdraw from southern France.

b. USSTAF would request AAF/MTO to establish any ship tonnages necessary for shipments into Marseilles. AAF/MTO will establish these tonnages with AFHQ and signal USSTAF. USSTAF will requisition direct on the United States against these established tonnages. After southern France is taken over by SHAEF (15 November tentatively), USSTAF will follow the same procedure it follows in the U. K. and no further action will be necessary by this headquarters.

c. AAFSC/MTO will provide a 75-day level of all spare parts for all American Air Force and French Air Force planes sent to southern France from this theater, with the exception of P-39's. AAFSC/MTO will get a clearance from the U. S. on any future commitments of P-39 parts, and, after taking into account Italian and perhaps Russian requirements, will send the balance to France. A minimum of a 75-day level will be sent to France, and, in all probability, the level will be much higher.

d. Up until 1 November replacement aircraft necessary for the 384th Fighter Bomber Group and the 111th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron transferred to France from this theater would be supplied from this theater. It was further agreed that a cable would be dispatched to Washington by this headquarters asking that all future replacement aircraft for these two units be sent to the U.K. instead of to MTO. Replacement of French aircraft will come through French sources in North Africa for the time being.

e. That the responsibility for any necessary air supply in southern France would pass to USSTAF as of 15th October.

7. At this conference no individual was present from MTO authorized to represent all air transport services therein. Several agencies furnish independent carrier service.

a. Certain problems that must be resolved in the near future include:

(1) The establishment of regularly scheduled flights north of Marseilles for the purpose of forwarding passengers, cargo and mail to destinations subsequent to delivery at Marseilles by MTO air transport agencies.

(2) The responsibility for the operation of the air terminal at Marseilles (Marignane); MTO is making every effort to coordinate the necessary engineer, air traffic and surface transportation problems presently involved at this airport.

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652 - 4 -

(3) Responsibility for overlapping air transport service between ETO and MTO between Rome, Naples, Algiers and such terminal points in ETO as will be designated by SHAEP.

b. It is recommended that:

(1) SHAEP be requested to appoint an agency authorized to represent all air transport carriers operating in ETO to confer with MTO on all inter-theater air transport matters.

(2) Effective on October 19th, when all other services are to be withdrawn from southern France, responsibility of MATS for air transport service and at a terminal or terminals designated as ports of entry in southern France, which terminal or terminals will then be operated by ETO.

(3) A meeting be held in Caserta at an early date between representatives of agency appointed in (1) above and representatives of MAAF to coordinate current problems and to determine a basis for future operations.

/s/ T.M. LOWE
/t/ T.M. LOWE
Col., A.C.,
Deputy Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:

1- Air C-in-C
1- ea Officer Present
5- MATOUSA
5- MAAF
5- AAF/MTO
5- AAFSC/MTO
5- USSTAF
5- NINTH AF
5- IX AFSC
5- TWELFTH AF
5- XII AFSC
5- XII TAC
5- MATS

... . THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526 . . .

I-3

3
THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

7731
0862

DECLASSIFIED JCI Memo 17 Jan 73

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE (MAIN)
AIR STAFF

REF : SHAF(M)Air/35199/A-3

25 October 1944.

SUBJECT: Operational Control of French Air Forces
Employed in Support of Sixth U.S. Army Group.

TO : C.G., Ninth Air Force (3).
Etat-Major, l'Armee d'Air Francais, Boulevard Victor, Paris (3).
C.G., First Tactical Air Force (Prov.) (6).

1. Units and elements of the French Air Force operating in support of the Sixth U.S. Army Group are placed under the operational control of the Commanding General, First Tactical Air Force (Prov.).

For the Deputy Supreme Commander:

J. M. ROBE
J. M. ROBE,
Air Vice Marshal,
Deputy Chief of Staff (Air).

Copy to: C.G. United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe (2)
C.G. Sixth U.S. Army Group (2)
A.M.C., Second Tactical Air Force
SHAF Mission to France (2)
C.G., Twelfth U.S. Army Group
H.Q., M.A.A.F. (3)
Air Ministry, Whitehall
C.G., U.S. Army Air Forces
SHAF (Main)
Secretary, General Staff (3)
G-2 Division
G-3 Division
G-4 Division
A-2 Division
A-3 Division
A-4 Division
Signal Division
Engineer Division
Air Staff Ops. Records (2)
Air Signals Division
French Air Force Liaison Officer (2)

... THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526 ...

I-H

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

7755
0864

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC AIR FORCES
IN EUROPE
Office of the Commanding General

Auth: CG USSTAF
Init: RPS
Date: 20/10/44

GENERAL ORDERS)
NO.....81)

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

20 October 1944

SECTION I - FIRST TACTICAL AIR FORCE (PROV)

1. The First Tactical Air Force (Prov) and the Hq & Hq Sq (Prov) First Tactical Air Force (Prov), with the concurrence of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, are established with station at Vittel, France. The Hq & Hq Sq (Prov) First Tactical Air Force (Prov) is organized utilizing personnel and equipment assigned to the Hq & Hq Sq, 63rd Fighter Wing and such additional personnel as may be later attached.

2. The following listed units are attached, initially, to the First Tactical Air Force (Prov):-

a. Hq & Hq Sq (Prov) First Tactical Air Force (Prov) (Hq & Hq Sq, 63rd Fighter Wing).

b. Hq & Hq Sq, XII Tactical Air Command.

(1) Hq & Hq Sq, 64th Fighter Wing

324th Fighter Group

317th Fighter Sq

318th Fighter Sq

319th Fighter Sq

1722d Ordnance S & M Co

1955th QM Truck Co Avn

82d Fighter Control Sq

582d Signal A/W Battalion

328th Fighter Control Sq

346th Signal Co Wing

895th HP Company Avn

Detachment, 12th Weather Sq

Det "D", 849th Signal Intelligence Co

13th Photo Intelligence Det

415th Night Fighter Sq

(2) Hq & Hq Sq, 42d Bombardment Wing

324th Signal Co Wing

17th Bombardment Group

34th Bombardment Sq

37th Bombardment Sq

95th Bombardment Sq

432d Bombardment Sq

320th Bombardment Group

441st Bombardment Sq

442d Bombardment Sq

443d Bombardment Sq

444th Bombardment Sq

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

C #21, Hq US Strategic Air Forces in Europe, 20 Oct 1944 (Cont'd)

Hq & Hq Sq, 310th Service Group
1093rd Eng Fire Fighting Platoon
1057th Signal Co Service Group
1111th M Co Service Group
1264th M Truck Co
2008th M Truck Co
1667th Ord S & M Co
1644th Ord S & M Co
51st Service Sq
304th Service Sq

c. Such additional Army Air Force units as may be attached.

d. French Components as may be authorized by the French authorities.

3. The administration of the First Tactical Air Force (Prov) will be implemented through the Commanding General, US Strategic Air Forces in Europe, except such authorities as may be delegated to the Commanding General, First Tactical Air Force (Prov). The issue of supplies and equipment from theater depots will be based upon Tables of Organization and Equipment of the regularly constituted and activated units attached to the First Tactical Air Force (Prov). These instructions supersede the instructions contained in General Orders No. 1 Headquarters, US Strategic Air Forces in Europe (Main), 6 October 1944.

4. Major General Ralph Royce, O-3731, USA, is announced as Commanding General, First Tactical Air Force (Prov).

5. Brigadier General Edmund C Longmear, O-14738, USA, is announced as Commanding General, I Tactical Air Force Service Command (Prov).

By command of Lieutenant General SPARTZ:

E. P. CURTIS,
Brigadier General, U S Army,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

/s/ Harris F. Scherer,
HARRIS F. SCHERER,
Colonel, AGD,
Adjutant General.

CORRECTED COPY - DESTROY ALL OTHERS

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE
Office of the Commanding General

.....
: AUTH: CG: USSTAF: :
: DATE: 20 OCT 44 :
: INITIALS: :
:

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

AFG 633, US Army,
20 October 1944.

GENERAL ORDERS)
:
NO.....81)

SECTION II - ENGINEER ORDERS (PROV)

6. a. The Engineer Command (Prov) US Strategic Air Forces is established with station at St Germain en Laye, France.

b. The following units, assigned as indicated, are attached to the Engineer Command (Prov) US Strategic Air Forces in Europe for operations:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ASSIGNMENT</u>
1st Engr Regt (Avn) (Prov)	IX Engr Command
831st Engr Bn, Avn	ASC, US Strategic Air Forces in Europe
851st Engr Bn, Avn	ASC, US Strategic Air Forces in Europe
876th A/B Engr Avn Bn	IX Engr Command
877th A/B Engr Avn Bn	IX Engr Command
878th A/B Engr Avn Bn	IX Engr Command
973d Engr M Co	IX Engr Command

c. Colonel Seaton Schroeder, O-912502, CE, is announced as Commanding Officer of the Engineer Command (Prov) US Strategic Air Forces in Europe, in addition to his other duties.

7. a. The Engineer Command (Prov) First Tactical Air Force (Prov) is established with station at Vittel, France.

b. The following units, assigned as indicated, are attached to the Engineer Command (Prov) First Tactical Air Force (Prov):

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ASSIGNMENT</u>
923d Engr Regt (Avn)	ASC, US Strategic Air Forces in Europe
829th Engr Bn (Avn)	ASC, US Strategic Air Forces in Europe
847th Engr Bn (Avn)	ASC, US Strategic Air Forces in Europe
859th Engr Bn (Avn)	ASC, US Strategic Air Forces in Europe

c. Lt. Colonel Houghton R. Hallock, O-20612, CE, is announced as Commanding Officer of the Engineer Command (Prov) First Tactical Air Force (Prov), in addition to his other duties.

11/17/74
0133
CORRECTED COPY DESTROY ALL OTHERS

8. a. The Allocation for operations of the battalions of the following Engineer Commands is vested in the Commanding General, US Strategic Air Forces in Europe:

- (1) The Engineer Command (Prov) US Strategic Air Forces in Europe
- (2) The Engineer Command (Prov) First Tactical Air Force (Prov)
- (3) IX Engineer Command

b. Priorities for the construction load are to be determined by the Commanding General, US Strategic Air Forces in Europe, through the Commanders of the units noted in 8a (1), (2) and (3) above and the Staff Engineer, IX Troop Carrier Command.

By command of Lieutenant General SPALTZ:

E. P. CURTIS,
Brigadier General, US Army
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

[Signature]
MERRIS F. SCHNEIDER,
Colonel, AGD.,
Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION: F Plus

- 5 cys TAG
- 15 cys CG, ETO
- 15 cys CG, EDATC
- 5 cys CG, 302 WG
- 20 cys CG, 9th AF
- 20 cys CG, 12th AF
- 20 cys CG, XII TAC
- 20 cys CG, First TAF (Prov)
- 15 cys CG, 1st AF
- 20 cys CG, Engr Cnd (Prov) USSTAF
- 20 cys CG, Engr Cnd (Prov) First TAC (Prov)

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

... . . . THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

I-I

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

0869

TIME FILED	MESSAGE CENTER NUMBER RL 1	HOW SENT Radio (GED)
* Use line for use of message center only		Submit to Message Center in duplicate
MESSAGE		PRECEDENCE
DEGREE OF SECRECY	Deferred	Priority
Restricted	Confidential	Secret
	Routine	Priority
		Op Priority
		Urgent
		X OED
Writer will initial and		Writer will initial and
FROM 1ST T.A.F.		DATE OCT 24, 1944
TO: USSTAF FOR SPAATZ		
1ST TAF---CY2		
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX		
<p>ARRIVED HERE YESTERDAY AND HAVE CONFERRED WITH 6TH ARMY GROUP, 7TH ARMY, TWELFTH TAC AND 3RD CORPS OFFICERS. PRESENT GREAT NEED OF THIS ORGANIZATION IS AIRFIELDS. REQUEST THAT ENGINEER HEADQUARTERS TO BE ASSIGNED THIS COMMAND BE DISPATCHED IMMEDIATELY. IF COL SHILLING IS TO BE MY ENGINEER OFFICER, HE SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO ARRIVE HERE AT EARLIEST DATE TOMORROW IF POSSIBLE. PRESENCE IS URGENTLY NEEDED TO START SURVEYS SO AS TO DETERMINE LINE OF ACTION AND TO PLAN DISPOSITION OF AVIATION ENGINEERS TO BE ASSIGNED THIS COMMAND. SCARCITY OF FIELDS AND LOW SOGGY CONDITION OF THE TERRAIN MAKES EXTENSIVE SURVEY IMPERATIVE.</p> <p>ROYCE..</p>		
AUTH TO BE ADJUTANT	TIME SIGNED	SIGNATURE & GRADE

[REDACTED]
HQS. USSTAF ATTENTION GENERALS SPAATZ AND KNERR.

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

ORGANIZATION IS PROCEEDING O.K. BUT THERE IS A LACK OF A PROPER ORDER TRANSFERRING THE PERSONNEL ALREADY HERE MOST OF WHOM ARE PROBABLY NOW CARRIED AWOL BY THEIR OFFICIAL HEADQUARTERS. ASSUMPTION OF OPERATIONAL COMMAND IS HELD UP ONLY BY SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS AND THERE IS THE GREAT NEED OF A WELL TRAINED SIGNAL CONSTRUCTION BATTALION IMMEDIATELY. TO SCRAP UP BITS AND PIECES TO SEND HERE TO ORGANIZE AND TRAIN WILL DELAY OUR ORGANIZATION. INSPECTION OF LANDING FIELDS IN THIS AREA NOW BEING BUILT HAS BEEN COMPLETED AND I FEEL THAT TANTONVILLE, OCHEY, TOUL, LUNEVILLE AND AZELOT SHOULD ALL BE ASSIGNED TO THIS FORCE. AS SOON AS THOSE FIELDS ARE COMPLETED THE ADDITIONAL FIGHTER BOMBER GROUP SHOULD BE ASSIGNED. THE RECCE GROUP IS NOT COMPLETE AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH INITIAL AGREEMENT NINTH AIR FORCE SHOULD SEND THE ADDITIONAL SQUADRONS TO COMPLETE SAME AT ONCE. GENERAL DEVERS HAS INFORMED ME OF POSSIBILITY OF OPERATION HIATUS WHICH I AM STUDYING WITH ~~REXXXX~~ REGARD TO AIR PARTICIPATION. SUGGEST THAT THIS ORGANIZATION BE SPARED IN THAT EFFORT AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE DUE TO DISTANCES TO BE TRAVELLED AND LACK OF TRANSPORT.

SIGNED ROYCE

REDLINE

... . . . THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

I-J

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

0 8 7 2

HEADQUARTERS
NINTH AIR FORCE

Auth: CG 9th AF
Date: 27 Oct 44
Init: H L C
E-03-2

In reply refer
to: 337

AFM 220, US Army
27 Oct 1944

DECLASSIFIED

EO 11652

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting to determine Units which Ninth Air Force is
to make available for transfer to the First Tactical Air Force
(Provisional).

TO : See Distribution Below:

1. There are attached hereto copies of the minutes of a meeting held
in the office of the Deputy Commanding General for Administration, Head-
quarters, Ninth Air Force, for the purpose of determining those units which
the Ninth Air Force is to make available for transfer to the First Tactical
Air Force (Prov). Representatives of Headquarters, US Strategic Air Forces
in Europe, Headquarters, Ninth Air Force, and Headquarters, IX Air Force
Service Command attended.

2. It is anticipated that the recommendations of this conference
will be implemented by orders in the near future.

For the Commanding General:

Harold L. Carter
HAROLD L. CARTER
Lt Col, AGC,
Asst Adj General

1 Incl:

Incl 1 - Min of Meeting.
Hq, 9th AF, dtd 23 Oct 44

DISTRIBUTION:

- 6 - CG, USSTAF (Main) Col sitting
- 6 - CG, USSTAF (Rear) Col sitting
- 6 - CG, First Tactical Air Force (Prov)
- 6 - CG, All Comds
- 6 - 2d Officer Present
- 1 - E. Section Hq, Hq, 9th AF

*Noted
M. C. [unclear]
[unclear]*

HEADQUARTERS
NINTH AIR FORCE

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

AFD 626, US Army
26 October 1944

Minutes of meeting held at Headquarters, Ninth Air Force
at 1015 hours, 26 October 1944, for the purpose of determining
the units which the Ninth Air Force is to make available for
transfer to the First Tactical Air Force (Provisional).

PRESENT:

Brigadier General	VICTOR H. STRAHM	Dep CG, Hq, Ninth AF
Brigadier General	MYRON R. WOOD	CG, IX Air Force Serv Comd
Colonel	K.E. BITTING	Dir/Pers, Hq, USSTAF
Colonel	C.W. SCHOTT	Dir of Plans & Org
Colonel	J.J. O'NEARA	P&O, IX Air Force Serv Comd
Colonel	B.L. RIGGS	Director of Supply
Colonel	J.T. QUIRK	P&O, Movements Section

General Strahm opened the meeting by stating that the purpose of this conference was to determine the units which the Ninth Air Force is to make available for transfer to the First Tactical Air Force (Provisional), and to make firm such verbal and written instructions and agreements as have heretofore been issued or entered into by the Commanders concerned.

1. The first step was a general clarification as to what units were assigned to the XII Tactical Air Command when it came to the Ninth Air Force; secondly, what units had been assigned or attached by the Ninth Air Force from within the Ninth Air Force to the XII Tactical Air Command since its arrival here.

a. A check was made of General Order No. 81 which disclosed that the following units assigned to the XII Tactical Air Command at the time it came under Ninth Air Force had been omitted:

- (1) 111th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron
- (2) 1st Service Squadron
- (3) 927th Signal Battalion (Sep) TAC
- (4) 393rd Signal Air Warning Battalion
- (5) 2nd Tactical Air Communications Squadron
- (6) 438th Signal Construction Battalion (Hq)

The above listed units should be included as assigned to the XII Tactical Air Command and attached to the First Tactical Air Force (Prov) in future orders.

b. Consideration was then given to units of the Ninth Air Force which had been assigned or attached by Ninth Air Force Orders to the XII Tactical Air Command. These units are:

Min of Meeting, Hq, 9th AF dtd

(Cont'd)

DECLASSIFIED

EO 11652

Assigned Units

- (1) 50th Fighter Group
- (2) 371st Fighter Group
- (3) 1227th Military Police Company (Avn)
- (4) 2148th Engineer Fire Fighting Platoon
- (5) 2062nd Engineer Fire Fighting Platoon
- (6) 2138th Engineer Fire Fighting Platoon
- (7) 2161st Engineer Fire Fighting Platoon
- (8) 183rd Medical Dispensary (RS)
- (9) 187th Medical Dispensary (RS)
- (10) 302nd Airdrome Squadron
- (11) 324th Station Complement Squadron
- (12) 34th Photo Reconnaissance Squadron
- (13) 182nd Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron

It is the understanding of the members of this conference that these units, as listed above, now assigned to the XII Tactical Air Command, remain with the XII Tactical Air Command upon its transfer or attachment to the First Tactical Air Force (Prov), with the exception of the two Medical Dispensaries. These two units, less equipment, will be absorbed in the formation of a Field Hospital under agreement with US Strategic Air Forces in Europe.

Attached Units or Detachments

- (1) 13th Veterinary Section
- (2) Detachment YJ, 21st Weather Squadron
- (3) Detachment YJ, 40th Mobile Communications Squadron
- (4) Detachment YJ, 21st Weather Squadron
- (5) Detachment YB, 40th Mobile Communications Squadron
- (6) Detachment ZL, 21st Weather Squadron
- (7) Detachment ZL, 40th Mobile Communications Squadron
- (8) Detachment J, 21st Weather Squadron
- (9) Detachment J, 40th Mobile Communications Squadron

These units being required as supporting units of tactical units assigned to the XII Tactical Air Command, i.e., 371st, 324th and 50th Fighter Groups and the Provisional Reconnaissance Group, it was agreed that these units should continue to be attached to the XII Tactical Air Command.

c. The 186th Army Postal Unit is on temporary duty with the XII Tactical Air Command and should so remain, all conference members agreeing.

d. Consideration was now given to units of the IX Air Force Service Command which are in direct support of tactical units of the XII Tactical Air Command, which direct support was necessitated by the assignment of the tactical units transferred from the Ninth Air Force to the XII Tactical Air Command. These units consisted of three complete service teams. It was agreed by all members of the conference that three service teams should remain in support of the units of the XII Tactical Air Command and be attached to the I Tactical Air Force Service Command (Prov).

e. It is the understanding of all the members of the conference that one additional fighter/bomber group (P-47) was to be made available for assignment to the XII Tactical Air Command or attachment to the First

Min of Meeting, Hq, 9th AF dtd

(Cont'd)

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

Tactical Air Force (Prov). After discussion, the conference members decided it should be the 405th Fighter Group, now assigned to the XIX Tactical Air Command. This will necessitate an additional service team and ancillary units. It is assumed that this service team will come from the Ninth Air Force and should be the one unit is now supporting this group. It had been agreed by the Ninth Air Force that direct service support would be provided for tactical units made available to the XII Tactical Air Command or First Tactical Air Force (Prov). Therefore, on assumption of the assignment of the 405th Fighter Group, the service teams now supporting the tactical units, including the 405th Fighter Group, will be increased to four teams (2 Service Groups) as follows:

- (1) 312th Service Group, supporting 30th and 405th Fighter Groups, consisting of following units:

- (a) Hq & Hq Sq, 312th Service Group
- (b) 38th Service Squadron
- (c) 334th Service Squadron
- (d) 1445th Ordnance S & M Company (Avn)
- (e) 1813th Ordnance S & M Company (Avn)
- (f) 1109th Signal Company Service Group
- (g) 1243rd QM Company Service Group
- (h) 2210th QM Truck Company
- (i) 24th Mobile R & R Squadron

- (2) 33rd Service Group supporting the 371st Fighter Group and the Provisional Reconnaissance Group consisting of the following units:

- (a) Hq & Hq Sq, 33rd Service Group
- (b) 39th Service Squadron
- (c) 340th Service Squadron
- (d) 1490th Ordnance S & M Company (Avn)
- (e) 1444th Ordnance S & M Company (Avn)
- (f) 1048th Signal Company Service Group
- (g) 1242nd QM Company Service Group
- (h) 2204th QM Truck Company
- (i) 31st Mobile R & R Squadron
- (j) 873rd Chemical Company Air Operations

In addition to the above, the other ancillary units required to support the 405th Fighter Group are:

- (1) Detachment ZF, 21st Weather Squadron
- (2) Detachment ZF, 40th Mobile Communications Squadron
- (3) 2068th Engineer Fire Fighting Platoon

The above service units should be attached to the I Tactical Air Service Command (Prov), the detachments remain attached to the 405th Fighter Group and the Engineer Fire Fighting Platoon should be assigned to the XII Tactical Air Command.

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11653

Min of Meeting, Hq, 9th AF dtd

(Cont'd)

f. In order to provide proper indirect support for the four tactical groups, the following service units from the IX Air Force Service Command should be attached to the I Tactical Air Force Service Command (Prov):

- (1) Hq & Hq Sq, 88th Air Depot Group
- (2) 22nd Depot Repair Squadron
- (3) 88th Depot Supply Squadron
- (4) 1st Medical Supply Platoon (Avn)
- (5) 440th Qa Platoon Air Depot Group
- (6) 2242nd Qa Truck Company
- (7) 878th Signal Company Depot (Avn)
- (8) 1994th Qa Truck Company
- (9) 1933rd Qa Truck Company
- (10) 1476th Ord Med Auto Maint Plat (Avn)

g. During the period 18-24 October 1944, the following personnel and units of the IX Air Defense Command departed for the Vitelle area under verbal instructions of General Royce, with the understanding that this movement had been approved by United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe and concurred in by General Vandenberg:

- (1) 20 officers, 2 warrant officers and 66 enlisted men of Hq & Hq Sq, IX Air Defense Command.
- (2) Hq & Hq Sq, 71st Fighter Wing
- (3) 322nd Signal Company Wing

With reference to the twenty officers, two warrant officers and sixty-six enlisted men, which are to be transferred to the Hq & Hq Sq, First Tactical Air Force (Prov), it is recommended that the following share of the bulk allotment of the grades and ratings made available to the Ninth Air Force be transferred to the First Tactical Air Force (Prov) with these bodies:

Colonels - 1	Master Sergeants - 2
Lieutenant Colonels - 2	Technical Sergeants - 3
Majors - 2	Staff Sergeants - 9
Captains - 4	Sergeants - 14
1st Lieutenants - 4	Corporals - 18
Second Lieutenants - 7	Privates First Class - 9
Warrant Officers - 2	Privates - 9

The above allotment is based on the proportion of the number of bodies transferred to the First Tactical Air Force (Prov), compared to the total number of bodies provided for by the grades and ratings made available to the Ninth Air Force in its bulk allotment.

2. All members concur in the above transfers, assignments, and attachments of units and personnel and allotment of grades and ratings and recommend that orders be issued accordingly.

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

I-K

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

0 8 7 8

AG
AND FILE

HEADQUARTERS
FIRST TACTICAL AIR FORCE (PROVISIONAL)
APO 374 U.S. ARMY

Auth: CG 1st TACAF
Date: 10 Feb 45
Init: *[Signature]*
10 February 1945

MEMORANDUM

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

TO : All Staff Sections, this Headquarters.

1. The list of units needed to make the First Tactical Air Force (Prov) effective as an Air Force standing on its own feet was presented at a recent conference and the following units were designated to come from MAJF. No time was given as the orders must come from the Combined Chiefs for the transfer between theaters.

- 1 Ordnance Depot Co
- 1 Ordnance Maintenance Co
- 1 QM Company, Svc Gp
- 2 Signal Construction Bns. (H)
- 1 Signal AV Bn
- 1 Photo Tec Unit (T/O only for our Prov Gp)
- 2 QM Platoons ADG
- 1 Air Depot Gp
- 1 Aviation Engineer Bn

2. The following units were requested to come from USSTF resources to complete the request. The status is undetermined until a decision is reached to order them to us from the other Air Forces.

- 2 Airdrome squadrons
- 1 Mobile RAR Squadron
- 1 Engineer Aviation Maintenance CO AF
- 1 Engineer Dump Truck Company
- 1 Engineer Aviation P.F. Platoon
- 1 Ordnance Med Auto Maint Platoon
- 2 QM Co Svc Gp
- 2 QM Truck Co Avn (1 POL)
- 1 Chem Co Air Operations
- 1 Chem Depot Company
- 11 MP Companies
- 2 Weather Sq Dets
- 2 Comm Sq Dets
- 2 Sta Comp Squadrons

3. Two F/B Groups and one Service Group (complete except for MP's) are to come as follows:

Ground echelon (600 vehicles, 1150 men)
Leave Leghorn 14 February 1945
Arrive A-64 21 February 1945
90 C-47s (12 men and equipment in ea)
150 P-47s
Arrive A-64 15 February 1945

emo, 1st TAC/F, dtd 10 Feb 45, cont'd.

Service Gp complete in 200 C-47s
Arrive A-64 20 February 1945

4. The 371st Group and Y-1 will go to Ninth Air Force when the two above groups are operational.

By command of Brigadier General SAVILLE:

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

2370

Ned Schramm
NED SCHRAMM
Brigadier General, USA
Deputy Commander for
Operations

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

I-L

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

AUTH: CG: USSTAF
DATE: DEC 28 1944
INITIALS: *RSB*

DEC 28 1944

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

APC 633, U. S. Army

SUBJECT: Duties and Responsibilities of Ninth Air Force and First Tactical Air Force (Prov), with Respect to Disarmament of the German Air Force.

TO : Commanding General, Ninth Air Force, APC 696, U. S. Army, Commanding General, First Tactical Air Force (Prov), APC 374, U. S. Army.

1. References:

Reference is made to the following documents, which apply generally to the activities contemplated under this directive:

- a. Appreciation and Outline Plan, Operation "ECLIPSE".
- b. Memorandum No. 10 to Appreciation and Outline Plan, Operation "ECLIPSE".
- c. Operation "ECLIPSE" - Outline Air Plan (still in draft form).
- d. Chapters II, III, IV and V, SHAEF Military Occupation Handbook.

2. Purpose:

a. This directive outlines the immediate and continuing responsibilities of the Commanding Generals, Ninth Air Force and First Tactical Air Force (Prov), in planning for and executing primary disarmament and, ultimately, complete disarmament of the German Air Force. The Ninth Air Force will perform air disarmament functions in that area in which the Twelfth Army Group operates, the U. S. sector of Berlin and the U. S. area of Bremen-Bremerhaven. The First Tactical Air Force (Prov) will perform air disarmament functions in that area in which the Sixth Army Group operates, and such other areas as may be specifically designated.

b. Disarmament functions will not be allowed to impede tactical operations or efficiency; and will be carried out to the maximum practicable extent consistent with tactical considerations. During Operation "ECLIPSE", air disarmament activities will be performed under the policy guidance of the Commanding General, U. S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe, in accordance with applicable directives published by Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces.

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

c. This letter directive hereby rescinds letter, this Headquarters, dated 5 October 1944, to Commanding General, Ninth Air Force, Subject: "Duties and Responsibilities of Ninth Air Force with Respect to Primary Disarmament of German Air Force".

3. Definitions:

a. Primary Air Disarmament, as used herein, denotes those initial and immediate steps necessary (if not accomplished by the field forces during the progress of combat or occupation activity) to separate the German Air Force from its arms, aircraft and equipment, immediately upon the capitulation or capture of any portion thereof; and to effect preliminary control and disposal of German Air Force materiel captured.

b. Complete Air Disarmament denotes those steps required to render the German Air Force, or elements thereof, completely ineffective as a combat organization and to effect final disposition of personnel, equipment, installations, stores and facilities.

c. The term, German Air Force, as used herein, includes all German Air Force military personnel, para-military personnel (GAP), e.g. Heimat-Flak and Nazi Party Flying Corps (National Sozialistische Fliegerkorps), and German Air Force Flak personnel, posts, camps, stations, units, airfields, equipment, installations, establishments and activities forming an integral part of or in direct support of the German Air Force. The term German Air Force is not intended to include the Hermann Goering Panzer Divisions and German Air Force units operating as a part of the German Ground Forces.

4. Means:

a. Disarmament of the German Air Force, or elements thereof, in your respective spheres of responsibility, will be accomplished by using forces and materiel within your command or subsequently made available to you. Attached anti-aircraft artillery units will be used in performing this mission. Personnel and units of the Air Disarmament Command (Prov), with available equipment will be assigned in the near future to the Ninth Air Force and the First Tactical Air Force (Prov), respectively, for appropriate use in performing the functions of air disarmament. Attached hereto as Appendix "B" is a chart showing the control organization of air disarmament forces planned for the U. S. Zones in Germany. The Air Disarmament Command (Prov) will be inactivated effective 10 January 1945.

b. Units of the Air Disarmament Command (Prov) will be distributed as follows:

(1) To the Ninth Air Force:

DECLASSIFIED

EO 11652

Hq & Hq Sq, Eighth AFCC

one-half of 1110th Sig Co, Sv Gp

2nd Repl & Tng Sq

Hq & Hq Sq, 2nd CCRC Gp

Hq & Hq Sq, 4th CCRC Gp

4th Repl & Tng Sq

47th Sta Comp Sq

84th Sta Comp Sq

2069th Engr F/F Pltn (Avn)

(2) To the First Tactical Air Force (Prov):

Hq & Hq Sq, 1st CCRC Gp

1st Repl & Tng Sq

Hq & Hq Sq, 3rd CCRC Gp

3rd Repl & Tng Sq

4th Gunnery & Tow Target Flt (Sp)

2060th Engr F/F Pltn (Avn)

one-half of 1110th Sig Co, Sv Gp

34th Sta Comp Sq

c. The required support from field forces and Communication Zone sources will be arranged locally, if possible, and if not possible, requests therefor will be referred to this Headquarters.

d. To the extent practicable, use will be made of captured or controlled personnel and materiel in furthering air disarmament activities.

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

e. This Headquarters has agreed to the attachment of completely equipped Royal Air Force air disarmament formations to the Ninth Air Force for the execution, under the operational control of the Ninth Air Force, of air disarmament in those areas initially occupied by U. S. forces which are to be ultimately zones under United Kingdom control and jurisdiction.

5. Employment of British Units: The Royal Air Force units to be attached to the Ninth Air Force will be retained in England until such time as their services are required on the Continent and their entrance into areas in Germany has been cleared with the Twelfth Army Group. They will be employed in Number 3 and Number 4 Air Districts, British Zone in Germany. Attached hereto as Appendix "A" is a map showing the U. S. and British Military Districts in Germany and the projected areas of advance of the Allied Armies into Germany.

6. Employment of U. S. Units:

a. The Ninth Air Force and the First Tactical Air Force (Prov) will assume the operational direction of the employment of such air disarmament units or teams in the field as said Air Forces, respectively, may organize from the above designated units and bulk allotment. As the need for air disarmament develops, such air disarmament units or teams, so organized, will be employed as far forward as may be feasible in surveying and gaining experience at German Air Force factories, airdromes and installations cleared by the advancing field forces. The Ninth Air Force and First Tactical Air Force (Prov) are hereby charged with all planning for the execution of German Air Force disarmament in those Military Districts of the U. S. Zone of Occupation in Southwestern Germany as will fall in their respective areas during the primary phase of Operation "ECLIPSE". Under this concept, U. S. Military District No. 1 (Hessen-Nassau) plus a small strip of Northern Bavaria, will be the responsibility of the Ninth Air Force. U. S. Military Districts No. 2, 3 and 4 (Northern Bavaria, Wurttemberg, and Southern Bavaria, respectively) will be the responsibilities of the First Tactical Air Force (Prov). These Military Districts are shown on the map attached hereto as Appendix "A". In addition, the Ninth Air Force will furnish the air disarmament organizations required in the Bremen-Bremerhaven area and in the U. S. Sector in Berlin. At a later date certain units scheduled for redeployment will become available as hostilities cease and will be allocated to the Ninth Air Force and First Tactical Air Force (Prov). as the air disarmament function requires. During the secondary phase of "ECLIPSE", at a time designated by the Supreme Commander, the Twelfth Army Group is to assume command of the Sixth Army Group occupation forces in Germany and, collaterally, the Ninth Air Force will absorb the air disarmament units of the First Tactical Air Force (Prov). The Ninth Air Force will ultimately assume responsibility for all air disarmament in all U. S. Zones in Germany.

DECLASSIFIED

EO 11652

b. The Ninth Air Force and First Tactical Air Force (Prov) will so plan air disarmament activities that units and personnel will become available for disarmament functions specifically for the geographical Military Districts and areas eventually to be occupied by U. S. Forces. Such trained units and personnel should remain in the pertinent district and become the custodians of information and German Air Force records seized and gathered thereby or left behind by the advancing field forces.

7. Liaison:

a. To insure harmony and integration of plans for both current and future air disarmament operations, close liaison will be maintained at all times, as follows:

- (1) By the Ninth Air Force with the British Second Tactical Air Force, which is charged by Operation "ECLIPSE" with German Air Force disarmament in that area in which the Twenty-first Army Group operates, with Allied Naval Forces operating in the Bremen-Bremerhaven area, with the First Tactical Air Force (Prov) and with the Twelfth Army Group Headquarters.
- (2) By the First Tactical Air Force (Prov), with the Ninth Air Force and with the Sixth Army Group Headquarters.
- (3) The Ninth Air Force and the First Tactical Air Force (Prov) will establish and maintain liaison with the Military District Commanders' staffs, in their respective areas. Said staffs initially will be attached to the appropriate Army Headquarters. Both of said Air Forces will establish and maintain liaison with Communications Zone Headquarters.

b. Problems which cannot be solved locally, or which are not within your fields of authority, will be promptly and fully reported to this Headquarters, accompanied by appropriate remarks and/or recommendations.

8. Captured Facilities:

a. Appropriate steps will be taken to deny the German Air Force access to captured facilities. Allied Ground Force Commands will be requested for guard detachments where necessary. Facilities which may be required by Allied Forces will be retained in usable

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

conditions wherever practicable and not inconsistent with combat operations.

b. Airfields. Runways and facilities of captured airfields will be cleared of obstructions and retained in an operating condition whenever practicable, but will not necessarily include manning such installations with control and servicing personnel. Major repairs or restorations need not be accomplished except where desired to carry out tactical operations.

c. Utilities. German Air Force utilities systems, communications, maintenance, supply and service facilities are to be retained in functioning condition wherever practicable.

9. Captured Materiel:

a. Disarmament. When not accomplished by the Ground Field Forces, captured German Air Force materiel, which includes aircraft, bombs, rockets, flying-bombs, explosives, chemicals, small arms and other equipment will be neutralized and rendered ineffective to the extent practicable. The extent of German Air Force disarmament and the care of property involved will be contingent upon available resources, the local situation and combat considerations.

b. Aircraft. Aircraft captured intact will be immediately grounded and rendered inoperative by the removal of fuel pumps, control surfaces, propellers, electrical systems or other major components which will effectively immobilize such aircraft. Aircraft will be cleared from runways and parked in areas under guard if practicable. Parts or components removed will be properly tagged and stored. Where practicable, aircraft guns, bombs, ammunition, gun and bomb-sights, cameras, bomb racks, gun turrets, rockets, radio and radar equipment will be removed and stored.

c. Ground Weapons. Field pieces, mortars, rifles, Anti-aircraft guns, mines, ammunition, chemicals and other weapons or devices associated with German Air Force installations will be neutralized or rendered inoperative. Component parts removed will be properly tagged and stored.

d. Rocket and Jet Materiel. Rocket or jet propelled weapons, projectiles, related equipment and launching sites will be disarmed, or rendered inoperative by the removal of component parts. Parts removed will be properly tagged and stored, and location records will be kept.

e. Motor Vehicles. Where the field forces have not taken action, captured vehicles will be rendered inoperative and parked in pools under proper guard. German Air Force units immobilized

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

immobilized during Operation "ECLIPSE", but not taken as prisoners of war, may be allowed to retain a minimum number of vehicles for essential administration and supply. Movements of such retained vehicles will be strictly controlled.

f. Disposition. Disposition policies are covered in Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Administrative Memorandum Numbers 4 and 5, and Chapter V, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Military Occupation Handbook. Supplemental policies and more detailed instructions are in the process of formulation in this and higher headquarters and will be furnished when available.

10. Industrial Plants:

U. S. Army Air Forces units engaged in air disarmament operations will participate in neutralizing the activities and securing the premises and records of factories, laboratories, and other research and scientific establishments engaged in German aeronautical matters, and in the collection of intelligence material from such establishments. In addition, they will be responsible for action to secure the disposal of finished aeronautical war material manufactured or held by such establishments, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 9f. The U. S. Air Forces will lend technical assistance to, and cooperate with, Ground Army commanders as circumstances indicate and permit. Pending announcement of further disposal instructions relating to captured German Air Force industrial plants and depots, air disarmament activity will include such surveillance and control as may be feasible.

11. Intelligence Objectives:

The gathering of intelligence will be executed with the general aim of obtaining complete, detailed information of the organization, strength, disposition, location, characteristics, operations, tactics, control techniques, facilities, installations and supporting industry of the German Air Force. Intelligence is particularly desired, as follows (but need be searched for and reported only to the extent that personnel and means are available while hostilities continue):

a. Location of all operational Gruppen, numbers and types of aircraft then in such Gruppen, names of commanding officers and particulars of the Luftgau responsible for supply.

b. Lists of all German occupied or controlled airfields, landing grounds or other bases within the areas described in paragraph 2a, giving map references, stating whether obstructed or mined and indicating state of serviceability; also the names of commanding officers thereof, specifying authority to whom responsible.

DECLASSIFIED

EO 11652

c. Lists of all German Air Force units and holdings of the following types located within the areas described in paragraph 2a, specifying locations and higher formations by which controlled:

- (1) Flak units, indicating operating personnel by type (military, civilian or Heimatflak).
- (2) Non-operational units and establishments at which there are aircraft, specifying numbers and types of aircraft.
- (3) Stocks of fuels and oils (including diesel oil) of five hundred (500) tons and more, specifying the approximate extent and number of holdings.
- (4) Ammunition, (including bomb, flying-bomb and rocket propelled weapons), depots and dumps and stocks of chemicals and chemical warfare weapons, specifying approximate extent and nature of holdings.

d. Lists of all aviation production, assembly, repair or research establishments within the areas described in paragraph 2a engaged in work for the German Air Force, specifying locations and nature of work being carried out.

e. Diagrams of all German Air Force wireless transmission, radio transmission and very high frequency carrier point to point facilities, including the exact locations thereof.

f. Outline of facilities for and location of all radio and radar transmission stations used for jamming, warning, or radio counter measure purposes or electro-magnetic intelligence purposes located in the areas described in paragraph 2a.

g. Diagrams of all telephone, teleprinter and cable circuits, showing exact locations of main trunk and repeater stations, together with details of the number of circuits, carrier systems, etc.

h. Diagrams showing the layout and function of the German Air Force radar Anti-aircraft gun laying organization, showing types of stations and whether static or mobile, including exact locations.

i. Lists of all other German Air Force signal units, detachments and facilities within the areas described in paragraph 2a, indicating locations and names of their senior officers and scientists.

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

j. Documents covering detailed frequency allocations to all German Air Force wireless transmission, radio transmission and radar installations, both ground and air.

k. Documents covering the detailed allocation of call and code signs used by German Air Force units, both ground and air.

l. Copies of all codes and cyphers in existence or available, which have been, are or were to be, used by the German Air Force.

m. All books, papers and records showing doctrine and execution of combat operational efforts, wherever found.

n. All records, charts and other data relating to weather and any other meteorological information.

o. All records, papers and documents pertaining to aviation, medicine, especially those relating to care and health of the fliers, and research processes concerning oxygen and personal equipment.

12. Materiel Desired by U. S. Army Air Forces:

In addition to the aircraft, equipment, guns, small arms, ammunition and weapons, hereinafter mentioned, all German Air Force items having special intelligence value, such as aero-medical, radio, radar, armament, chemical warfare, electrical, personal flying and photographic equipment, engines, engine accessories, scientific and research instruments and materials, turbo-superchargers and turbine wheels, special aircraft and related equipment of experimental, unusual or new design, encountered by your units, wherever located, will be carefully guarded and held unmolested and intact pending further instructions. Such items having intelligence value will be made the subject of a flash report to this Headquarters (Attention: Director Technical Services, THRU: Director of Intelligence) giving appropriate details briefly; and will be delivered only to properly authorized representatives of Air Technical Section (Director, Technical Services, Air Service Command), U. S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe. Attention is invited to Headquarters, U. S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe letter, dated 7 November 1944, to Commanding General, Ninth Air Force, Subject: "List of Enemy Equipment Desired by Wright Field", which carried tabulation of German Air Force technical and research materiel desired by the U. S. Army Air Forces have been furnished both the Ninth Air Force and First Tactical Air Force (Prov).

13. Administration:

a. Preservation and Disposition of German Air Force Documents and Records. The information and data mentioned above

DECLASSIFIED

EO 11652

[REDACTED]

in paragraphs 11 and 12, and all records, charts, plans, documents and data pertaining to German Air Force aircraft, aircraft spares, materiel, motor vehicles, aircraft guns, weapons, ammunition, instruments, aviation war production plants, stocks, research institutions and scientific centers, will be preserved and safeguarded pending further instructions. To the extent possible, after receipt or seizure of any of the above documents or records, a report will be made to this Headquarters showing the general nature and quantity of such documents and records and where they may be located. In addition, so much of the information and data mentioned in paragraph 11 as can be furnished readily and speedily will be dispatched to the Director of Intelligence, this Headquarters. Records, information and data so dispatched should be listed on the report mentioned above as having been sent to this Headquarters.

b. Personnel Records. As a basis for demobilization of the German Air Force units at the proper time, personnel records which may be available will be utilized if feasible. One record which will be of importance to preserve will be the Soldbuch (pay data card), which records essential data of each individual's military service. Another record to be preserved in the event units are taken intact is the Wehrpass (individual service record). In connection with the above it should be noted that this directive does not cover the subject of demobilization of the German Air Forces. Separate instructions will be published on this subject at a later date.

c. Orders to German Air Force. Orders other than those of a trivial or temporary nature given to German Air Force commanding officers are to be noted in writing and copies delivered to such commanders. Wherever practicable a receipt should be obtained.

d. Records. It is essential that a record system be maintained in order to assemble a journal covering execution of air disarmament as achieved by your command. Reporting and record forms should be established locally pending the preparation of standardized forms in this Headquarters.

e. Property Records. To the extent practicable, physical inventories will be taken of captured German Air Force stores, stocks, installations, facilities, supplies and holdings. A central consolidated record of these inventories will be maintained. Common user items will be diverted from Air Force channels to Communications Zone, at the lowest practicable level. These diversions will be of both the records and the physical items. However, a record of these diversions will be maintained. To facilitate the taking of inventories, common items of stock will be concentrated at points to be determined by the respective Air Force. Items of interest to the Director of Technical Services will be reported immediately to that office through the Director of Intelligence. As inventories for an area or installation are completed, such in-

DECLASSIFIED

EO 11652

[REDACTED]


ventories will be forwarded to Director of Supply, Headquarters, U. S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe for further action. All issues of German Air Force materiel will be in accordance with current directives. Records of such issues will be maintained.

14. Suggested Amendments:


As experience is gained in the execution of air disarmament in the field, amendments to the foregoing instructions may become desirable. Comment and suggested amendments may be submitted to this Headquarters at any time.

By Command of Lieutenant General SPARTZ:

F. I. ANDERSON
Major General, U.S.A.
Deputy Commander, Operations



DECLASSIFIED
EO 13526



THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

I-M

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

0886

Copy No:

40

Reg No. 132

HEADQUARTERS
FIRST TACTICAL AIR FORCE (PROV)
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff A-3

E-F-0

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

Auth: CG 1 TAC AF:
Date: 14 March 45:
Init: KEF
R. E. F.:

A.F.O. 374, U.S. Army
14 March 1945.

SUBJECT: General Plan for Tactical Air Cooperation with Sixth Army
Group for Operation ECLIPSE.

TO : Commanding Generals:

XII Tactical Air Command, A.F.O. 374, U.S. Army,
42nd Medium Bombardment Wing, A.F.O. 374, U.S. Army,
First French Air Corps.

1. PURPOSE:

To designate the tactical missions and probable deployment
of the First Tactical Air Force (Prov) upon collapse or surrender of
Germany.

2. GENERAL INFORMATION:

Operation ECLIPSE will become effective upon an announce-
ment of a date to be known as "A" Day. "A" Day is defined as fol-
lows:

a. When the German Government and/or the German High
Command formally signs an instrument of surrender,

OR

b. When the major portion of the German Forces opposing
us has capitulated or has been overpowered.

3. ASSUMPTIONS:

a. It is assumed that the Sixth Army Group on "A" Day
will be deployed generally along the RHINE between MAINZ and the SWISS
Border.

DECLASSIFIED

EO 11652

Ltr., Hq. 1st TAC AF, subj; "Gen'l Plan for Tactical Air Cooperation with Sixth Army Grp., for Opns., "ECLIPSE", cont'd:

b. That the Sixth Army Group will promptly secure the STUTTGART area and rapidly penetrate to NURENBURG, and thence to MUNICH.

4. MISSIONS:

The First Tactical Air Force (Prov) to continue to furnish air cooperation to the Sixth Army Group in its advance and occupation of assigned areas by maintaining a tactical air threat to the German Forces in contact with, flanking, or astride the axis of advance; conducting frequent air reconnaissance and air demonstration flights over Allied Prisoner of War Camps in the area of operations; and being prepared for offensive action against possible sporadic resistance.

a. Commanding General, XII Tactical Air Command will:

(1) Continue to provide air effort and cooperation to the 7th Army in its advance and occupancy of the NURENBURG - REGENSBURG area and the MUNICH area.

(2) Be prepared for forward displacement of units to cover the advance of the 7th Army and the final deployment of the entire Command in the above areas.

(3) Be prepared to cooperate with the 7th Army in the occupation of BAVARIA or other assigned areas.

b. Commanding General, First French Air Corps will:

(1) Continue to provide air effort and cooperation to the First French Army in its advance and occupation of enemy territory.

(2) Be prepared for forward displacement of units to cover the advance of the First French Army and the final deployment of the entire Command in the Occupational area.

c. Commanding General, 42nd Bomb Wing will:

(1) Execute air missions as outlined in paragraph 4., above, covering the advance and occupation of the assigned areas by elements of the Sixth Army Group.

Ltr., Hq. 1st TAC AF, subj: "Gen'l. Plan and Tactical Air Cooperation with Sixth Army Group for Operations "ECLIPSE", cont'd:

(2) Be prepared to move the Wing, including French Air Force units under its operational control, to the KARLSRUHE - STUTTGART - BRUCHSAL area.

(3) Be prepared to furnish air effort to elements of the Sixth Army Group in their advance and occupation of enemy territory.

By command of Major General WEBSTER:

NED SCHRAMM,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Deputy Commanding General,
For Operations.

OFFICIAL:

Ralph E. Fisher
RALPH E. FISHER,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Ass't., C/S, A-3.

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11653

DISTRIBUTION:
(Special)

Copies No:

CG, XII Tactical Air Command	-	1-10
CG, 1 French Air Corps	-	11-15
CG, 42nd Medium Bomb. Wing	-	16-23
CG, USSTAF	-	24-25
SHAEP (FWD)	-	26-27
CG, Ninth Air Force	-	28-29
CG, 6th Army Group	-	30-33
1st TAC AF (Staff)	-	34-40

... THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526 ...

I-N

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

0000

Original

DRAFT
HEADQUARTERS
FIRST TACTICAL AIR FORCE (TROV)

DECLASSIFIED
W/O **EO 11652**

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

SIGNATURE OF ORIGINATOR

AUTHENTICATED BY:

ASST ADJUTANT GENERAL

PRECEDENCE
URGENT
OF
PRIORITY
ROUTINE
DEFERRED

DATE: 15 May 1945

TO : ACTION (1) CG, SHAFT AIR
" (2) CG, USSTAF
" (3) CG, NINTH AIR FORCE ADV
" (4) CG, NINTH AIR FORCE MAIN
" (5) CG, IX AIR FORCE SERV COMD
" (6) CG, EIGHTH AIR FORCE

NO : ACTION (7) CG, 42ND BOMB WING
" (8) CG, I TRO AF SERV COMD
" (9) CG, XII TACTICAL AIR COMD (ADV)
" (10) CG, XII TACTICAL AIR COMD (REAR)
" (11) CG, ETOUSA
" (12) CG, ETOUSA SID

AT ZERO ZERO ZERO ONE HOURS TWO ONE MAY HEADQUARTERS FIRST TACTICAL AIR FORCE PROVISIONAL CLOSES PERMANENTLY AT HEIDELBERG GERMANY PD AT THAT TIME ALL UNITS AND INDIVIDUALS ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED TO FIRST TACTICAL AIR FORCE BECOME ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED TO TWELFTH TACTICAL AIR COMMAND EXCEPT FIRST TACTICAL AIR FORCE SERVICE COMMAND WHICH REMAINS AT SCHWETZINGEN PD UNITS AND INDIVIDUALS ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED TO FIRST TACTICAL AIR FORCE SERVICE COMMAND BECOME ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED TO NINTH AIR FORCE SERVICE COMMAND PD TWELFTH TACTICAL AIR COMMAND REAR AT DARMSTADT WILL BE AUGMENTED AS OF TWO ONE MAY BY SUCH PERSONNEL AS MAY *be needed* ~~ON ABLE SERVICE ON ABLE ONE ON ABLE FOUR, REDEPLOYMENT CMA AND PART OF SIGNAL SECTIONS~~ *FROM* FIRST TACTICAL AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS PD ALL CORRESPONDENCE AND MESSAGES PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED TO HEADQUARTERS FIRST TACTICAL AIR FORCE SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO COMMANDING GENERAL TWELFTH TACTICAL AIR COMMAND *MAIN* ~~REAR~~ LOCATED AT DARMSTADT GERMANY PD ALL PRESENT FIRST TACTICAL AIR FORCE SIGNAL FACILITIES AT HEIDELBERG REMAIN IN OPERATION WITH TIELINES AND MOTOR COURIER SERVICE TO DARMSTADT FOR PURPOSE OF PASSING CORRESPONDENCE AND MESSAGES TO TWELFTH TACTICAL AIR COMMAND REAR PD IN ADDITION CERTAIN DIRECT SIGNAL CHANNELS ARE BEING ESTABLISHED FROM DARMSTADT CMA DETAILS WILL BE GIVEN SEPARATELY TO SIGNAL OFFICERS CONCERNED PD TELEPHONE CODE NAME TWELFTH TACTICAL AIR COMMAND *MAIN* ~~REAR~~ IS GEORGIA REAR WHICH WILL CONTINUE TO BE AVAILABLE OVER ALL PRESENT TELEPHONE MEANS

18 May 45

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

II-A

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

HEADQUARTERS
FIRST TACTICAL AIR FORCE

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

Auth: 03
Init: 127
1 Nov 44
Copy No: 36

1 November 1944.

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number One.

TO : XII Tactical Air Command.
French Tactical Air Command.

1. a. See current Intelligence Summary.

b. (1) Twelfth Army Group is regrouping, upon completion of which it advances to the RHINE with all three armies.

The Sixth Army continues the offensive, destroys the enemy in the zone and advances to the RHINE; first phase, the capture of STRASBOURG and clearing the West of the RHINE. Directive for subsequent phases will issue later. Sixth Army Group will protect the South flank of Twelfth Army Group.

(2) The Ninth Air Force supports the advance of the Twelfth Army Group.

2nd TAF supports the advance of the Twenty First Army Group.

2. The First Tactical Air Force (Prov) supports the continued offensive of the Sixth Army Group by furnishing close and direct support missions to the Seventh Army and the First French Army.

3. a. XII Tactical Air Command will support the Seventh Army by:

- (1) Bombing vital highway and railroad bridges.
- (2) Cutting railroad lines on inner and outer lines of interdiction.
- (3) Providing assault area cover, air support missions, armed reconnaissance and night fighter operations.
- (4) Conducting photo reconnaissance to obtain target information and results of bombing attacks on targets.

b. The French Tactical Air Command, under the operational control of the XII Tactical Air Command, will support the First French Army by conducting missions outlined in 3a above within the limit of its capabilities.

X. (1) 03 XII Tactical Air Command will continue operational control of the French Tactical Air Command.

(2) Until further notice air operations against RHINE River Communications targets will be first priority and air operations against enemy installations and communications between the RHINE and the front line will be 2nd priority.

(3) CG XII Tactical Air Command is responsible in keeping this Headquarters informed of plans to accomplish the above missions and of results obtained.

4. Administrative Instructions will be issued separately.

5. Signal Instructions will be issued separately.

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

By Command of Major General ROYCE:

NED SCHRAM,
Brig. General, U.S.A.,
Deputy CG for Operations.

OFFICIAL:

Ralph E. Fisher
RALPH E. FISHER,
Colonel, GSC,
Assistant Chief of Staff, A-5.

DISTRIBUTION:

	Copy Nos
CG XII TAC	1-10
CG French TAC	11-15
USSTAF	16-17
SHAEP Main (Air)	18-20
9th AF	21-22
6th Army	23-28
1st TACAF & File	29-40

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

11-B

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

HEADQUARTERS
FIRST TACTICAL AIR FORCE

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

E 77 E-F/Y
Auth: OG
Init: RFA
11 Nov 44
Copy No. 36

APO 374, US Army
 11 November 1944

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number Two.

TO : Commanding General, All Tactical Air Command.
Commanding General, First French Air Corps.

1. a. see current Intelligence Summary.
b. (1) No change.
(2) No change.

2. The First Tactical Air Force (Prov) supports the continued offensive of the Sixth Army Group by furnishing close and direct support missions to the Seventh Army and the First French Army.

3. a. III Tactical Air Command will support the Seventh Army by:
- (1) Bombing vital highway and railroad bridges.
 - (2) Cutting railroad lines on inner and outer lines of interdiction.
 - (3) Providing assault area cover, air escort, air support missions, armed reconnaissance, and night fighter operations.
 - (4) Conducting photo reconnaissance to obtain target information and results of bombing attacks on targets.
 - (5)
 - (a) Conducting reconnaissance of oil installations, facilities, and fuel dumps on a high priority basis with the aim of attacking and destroying these targets.
 - (b) Conducting reconnaissance for troop concentrations, fortified positions and command posts with particular emphasis on the AV Corps front.
 - (c) Conduct reconnaissance for operational landing fields.

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

The First French Air Corps will support the First French Army by:

- (1) Bombing vital highway and railroad bridges.
 - (2) Cutting railroad lines on inner and outer lines of interdiction.
 - (3) Provide assault area cover, air escort, air support missions and armed reconnaissance.
 - (4) Conducting photo reconnaissance to obtain target information and results of coming attacks on targets.
 - (5) (a) Conducting reconnaissance of oil installations, facilities and fuel dumps on a high priority basis with the aim of attacking and destroying these targets.
(b) Conducting reconnaissance for operational landing fields.
- X. (1) The First French Air Corps is relieved from the operational control of the XII Tactical Air Command upon receipt of this letter.
- (2) The 42nd Bombardment Wing (Medium) consisting of the 17th and 320th Groups are assigned for operational control to the XII Tactical Air Command. This wing is expected to be operational at Dijon in the near future.
 - (3) The 31st and 34th Medium Bombardment Groups (French) are assigned for operational control to the First French Air Corps. These groups are expected to be operational at Lyon in the near future.
 - (4) Specific operational instructions for the employment of the medium bombardment force as a unit or on special tasks will be issued by this Headquarters.
 - (5) Maximum close support will be given to the main effort of the Sixth Army Group as first priority and interdiction from the front line to include the RHINE will be given second priority.
 - (6) The CG, XII Tactical Air Command, and CG, First French Air Corps are responsible for keeping each other and this Headquarters informed daily of plans to accomplish the above missions and of results obtained.

4. Administrative instructions will be issued separately.

5. Signal Instructions will be issued separately.

By Command of Major General ROYCE:

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

NED SCHRAM,
Brig. General, U.S.A.,
Deputy CG for Operations.

OFFICIAL:

Ralph E. Fisher
RALPH E. FISHER,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, A-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

	Copy Nos
CG XII TAC	1-10
CG First French AG	11-15
USSTAF	16-17
SHAEP Main (Air)	18-20
Ninth AF	21-22
Sixth Army Gp	23-28
First TACAF & File	28-40

... THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526 ...

IV-A

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

HEADQUARTERS
FIRST TACTICAL AIR FORCE (PROV)
APO 374

D-Y-1

A-2
File
4
241000

26 February 1945.

SUBJECT: Reduction of the Colmar Pocket.

TO : Commanding General, Sixth Army Group, APO 25, U S Army.
(Att: Staff Historian)

Attached are three copies of the history of the Air participation
in the reduction of the Colmar Pocket.

For the Commanding General:

THOMAS G. KRONBERG,
Major, AG,
Asst Adjutant General.

1 Incl.
Report as indicated
(in trip)

AIR PARTICIPATION

IN THE

REDUCTION OF THE COLMAR POCKET

20 Jan to 9 Feb 1945

SITUATION

During the period just prior to 20 January 1945, the German Air effort in the Alsace area had been limited to reconnaissance and defensive patrols with an occasional armed recon in insignificant numbers.

The enemy lines of communication leading into the Colmar pocket including the bridges across the Rhine as well as the rail and road nets on both sides of the river had been under air attack intermittently for several weeks. The two road bridges, one at Breisach and the other at Neuenburg, were damaged and unserviceable. The rail bridges at these two points, however, were still usable and the enemy was known to have at least fifteen ferry sites in operation, together with a considerable amount of pontoon bridging equipment. Air operations had hampered the flow of supplies and reinforcements into the pocket but there was no indication that the enemy had been seriously embarrassed.

PLANS

The general plan for air participation in the reduction of the Colmar pocket was based upon army cooperation missions against field fortifications, guns, and troop concentrations to facilitate the advance of the ground forces, and interdiction of lines of communication to prevent reinforcements from reaching the pocket, movement within the pocket or withdrawal from the pocket. During the latter phases of the operation and for several days after the final evacuation, the air effort included measures to prevent the redeployment of those troops which were successful in escaping across the Rhine.

PREPARATION

In conjunction with Sixth Army Group, wire facilities, both speech and teletype were constructed to French Army Headquarters and to Headquarters First French Air Corps from Headquarters Sixth Army Group and Headquarters First Tactical Air Force (Prov).

An American cryptographic team was provided for Advance Headquarters First French Air Corps. A small French Signal Center team operated the switchboard, teletype machines, and one French point to point radio station.

Two American radio stations were installed at First French Air Corps (Adv) to work with XII TAC and Headquarters First Tactical Air Force (Prov).

Existing XII TAC Control Centers, Main Fighter Controls, and their wire and VHF/FM intercommunicating links all functioned normally and effectively.

Air Participation in the
Reduction of the Colmar Pocket.
20 Jan to 9 Feb 1945.

OPERATIONS

During the period 20 January to 9 February, a total of 217 missions involving 1980 sorties were flown by the XII TAC and the First CAF in connection with the reduction of the Colmar pocket. Although there were several days during this period when weather seriously curtailed air operations, respectable results were achieved. Enemy movements by road and rail were seriously hampered on both sides of the Rhine. 7 bridges were claimed destroyed and 13 damaged. 19 marshaling yards were attacked and 98 rail cuts effected, as well as 36 road blocks. ~~254~~ railway cars were destroyed and 472 damaged by bombing and strafing. 114 motor vehicles were claimed destroyed and 143 damaged. On army cooperation missions 2 gun positions were claimed destroyed and 10 damaged. 18 tanks were destroyed and 6 were damaged. In attacks against defended villages, 403 buildings were claimed destroyed and 64 damaged.

On the basis of P.W. Interrogation and examination of captured targets it is evident that the effect of the Air Operations reduced the effectiveness of enemy resistance, contributed to the toll of prisoners by disrupting the withdrawal and materially reduced the combat effectiveness of the troops who succeeded in crossing the Rhine.

During the 21 days of this operation from 20 January through 9 February, generally poor weather conditions prevailed and thus limited the utilization of the air power available. On only seven days was it possible to fly over 100 sorties due to the weather but on each day an effort was made to fly as many sorties as possible. The best day was 8 February when 329 sorties were flown against communications east of the Rhine and against troop concentrations. Weather was such on seven of the days that only a few reconnaissance planes were airborne.

The Commanding General of the 3rd Infantry Division congratulated units of this Air Force for the effort they had rendered on several occasions in helping to reduce the Colmar pocket and in particular on the work they did on 26 January when Thunderbolts attacked road and rail transportation so effectively that a German counterattack which was then in progress was completely stopped. Again on the 29th of January enemy troops were strafed, and self-propelled gun and tank fire was materially reduced by bombing and strafing. This enabled Allied Troops to advance, clear the area, and take many prisoners.

REDUCTION OF COLMAR POCKET

SUMMARY OF CLAIMS

20 Jan to 2 Feb 1945

	<u>XII PAC</u>		<u>I ST PAC</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>	
	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
1. Sail Cuts		56		12		28
2. Marshalling Yards		12				12
3. Tunnels		1				1
4. Road Blocks		15		21		36
5. Locomotives	2	32			2	32
6. RR Cars	180	354	74	118	254	472
7. Barges	2	0	1	0	3	0
8. Motor Transport	101	22	15	44	114	145
9. Tanks	18	6			18	6
10. Horse-drawn Vehicles	4	35			4	33
11. Gun Positions	2	2		1	2	10
12. Buildings	340	35	63	2	403	64
13. Enemy Aircraft			1	1	1	1
<u>MISSIONS</u>		115		104		217
<u>SORTIES</u>		1,083		207		1,290

SUMMARY OF DAILY MISSIONS

XII TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

20 Jan to 9 Feb 1945

DATE	MISSION NUMBER AND TYPE	OBJECTIVE ATTACKED	EFFECTIVE BOMBES	BOMBES EXPENDED ON TARGET	REMARKS AND CLAIMS
20 Jan	1-Arm Recce	V-5513	12	12.6	Blde 1-0-1 H/T 6-0-3 Barge 2-0-0 Pier 1-0-0 Gun Position 0-0-1
	1-Pre-Briefed	Bridge V-7215	8	8.4	Blde 2-0-0
22 Jan	1-Pre-Briefed	RR Bridge W-029391	16	7.1	RR Bridge 0-0-1 2 Rail Cuts
	1-Arm Co-op	Crossroad at Mulhouse		nil	11 s/c non-effective due to weather
	1- " "	Crossroad at V-7910	8	4.2	Loco 0-0-1
	1- " "	Railroad at V-9012	12	12.5	Loco 0-0-2 RR Cars 12-0-18
	1- " "	Sasbach Area	4	2.1	Blde 2-0-0 3 Rail Cuts Unobserved 1 s/c lost to unknown
	1- " "	Gun Position V-5143	10	5.0	Unobserved
	1- " "	RR Bridge at W-029390	11	5.3	Bridge 0-0-1
23 Jan	1-Arm Recce	Fischbach Area	9	4.4	Blde 11-0-2 H/T 11-0-2 1 Rd Block
	1-Arm Co-op	Woods V-5049	10	5.0	Unobserved
	1- " "	Buildings V-7034	10	5.0	Unobserved
24 Jan	1-Pre-Briefed	Bridge W-015417	15	6.1	Bridge 1-0-0 1 Rd Block
	1-Arm Recce	V-9445	10	5.0	Unobserved
	1-Arm Co-op	Winden	12	9.0	Blde 1-0-2 1 Rail Cut
	1-Tactical Recce	Strasbourg Area	2	nil	
26 Jan	1-Tactical Recce	Strasbourg Area	2	nil	
29 Jan	1-Arm Recce	Merriesheim	7	2.0	Tanks 1-0-0 Blde 10-0-0 H/T 0-0-2 1 Rd Block
	1-Pre-Briefed	Offenburg H/Y	6	3.0	Blde 1-0-0 RR Cars 0-0-20 H/Y attacked - 1
	1-Arm Recce	Troops V-53249	9	4.5	Unobserved

Page 2 - Summary of Daily Missions - XII Tactical Air Command - 20 Jan to 9 Feb 1945.

DATE	MISSION NUMBER AND TYPE	OBJECTIVE ATTACKED	EFFECTIVE SORTIES	BOMBS EXPENDED ON TARGET	REMARKS AND CLAIMS
29 Jan (Cont)	1-Arm Recce	Munzenheim Area	8	4.0	Bldg 1-0-0
	1- " "	Gun Position V-87474	7	3.5	Unobserved
	1- " "	N/Y V-770875	10	5.3	N/T 1-0-0 RR Cars 4-0-0 Loco 1-0-0 Bldg 1-0-0
	1-Tactical Recce	Strasbourg Area	2	nil	N/T attacked - 1
	1-Arm Co-op	V-0055	7	1.3	Unobserved
	1- " "	Tanks V-575458	11	2.5	Bldg 2-0-0, 2 Rd Blocks
	1- " "	Woods V-783048	8	4.0	N/T 1-0-0
	1- " "	Woods V-803535	12	6.0	N/T 1-0-1
	1- " "	Freiburg Area	11	5.8	Unobserved
	1-Tactical Recce	Colmar Area	4	nil	
	1-Photo Recce	Freiburg N/Y	1	nil	
30 Jan	1-Tactical Recce	Strasbourg Area	2	nil	
1 Feb	1-Arm Recce	Reishelm Area	7	3.7	Bldg 2-0-0
	1- " "	Balsenheim Area	9	4.7	Bldg 10-0-0
2 Feb	1-Arm Recce	Town V-205872	8	4.0	Loco 0-0-2 Gun Pos 1-0-0 N/T 1-0-0 2 Rail Cuts
	1-Arm Recce	Neustadt N/Y	14	5.5	Bldg 1-0-0 Loco 2-0-0 AFV 15-0-0 RR Cars 0-0-50 N/T 5-0-7 1 Rd Block 1 N/T attacked
	1-Arm Recce	Neuf Breisach	8	3.0	Unobserved
	1-Arm Recce	Breisheim Area	14	5.9	Unobserved
	1-Arm Recce	Train V-113423	12	6.4	Bridge 0-0-1 RR Cars 0-0-24 Loco 0-0-3 2 Rail Cuts 1 a/c lost to flak
	1-Arm Recce	N/Y V-135052	11	5.9	Bldg 1-0-0 RR Cars 10-0-15 2 Rail Cuts N/T attacked - 1
	1-Arm Recce	Obernheim Area	10	5.4	Bldg 5-0-4 N/T 0-0-3 RR Cars 0-0-12 2 Rd Blocks
	1-Arm Recce	Road Junction V-8936	8	4.2	N/T 4-0-0 N/T 0-0-27 10 horses killed
	1-Arm Recce	Breisheim Area	10	5.1	Bldg 2-0-0

Page 3 - Summary of Daily Missions - XII Tactical Air Command - 20 Jan to 9 Feb 1945.

DATE	MISSION NUMBER AND TYPE	OBJECTIVE ATTACKED	EFFECTIVE BOMBS	ROCKETS EXPENDED ON TARGET (24 rockets)	REMARKS AND CLAIMS
2 Feb (Cont)	1-Arm Recce	Fort W50387	12	1.0	M/T 7-0-27 Bldg 0-0-1 HDV 1-0-5 RR Cars 0-0-30
	1-Arm Recce	Railroad W-6878	12	9.0	12 Rail Cuts M/T 3-0-0
	1-Arm Recce	Railroad W-0462	11	8.0	5 Rail Cuts RR Cars 2-0-0
	1-Arm Recce	Neustadt M/Y	12	12.0	Bldg 5-0-2 RR Cars 10-0-0 Bldg 0-0-2 Gun Pos 0-0-2 M/Y attacked-1
3 Feb	1-Arm Recce	Neuf Breisach Area	11	5.0	Bldg 20-0-0
	1- " "	W-1077	12	8.0	RR Cars 7-0-6 Loco 0-0-2 Bldg 1-0-0 2 Rail Cuts
	1- " "	Freiburg M/Y	10	10.0	Bldg 15-0-0 M/T 0-0-11 1 Rd Block M/Y attacked - 2 1 a/c lost to flak
	1-Arm Co-ss	Breisach M/Y	12	6.5	1 Rail Out M/Y attacked - 1
	1- " "	M/Y W-1261	2	1.0	M/Y attacked - 1
	1- " "	Neuf Breisach Area	12	6.5	Unobserved
	1-Photo Recce	Breisach Area	2	nil	
4 Feb	1-Arm Recce	Railroad V-940212	14	5.0	Bldg 4-0-3
	1- " "	Railroad W-6604	16	6.0	Bldg 2-0-0 1 Rail Out
	1-Pre-Briefed	Breisach Bridge	12	6.4	Bridge 0-0-1 Bldg 0-0-2 2 Rail Cuts 1 Rd Block
	1- " "	RR Bridge W-51244	8	8.0	RR Cars 0-0-10 Loco 0-0-1 Bldg 0-0-1 Bridge 0-0-1 3 Rail Cuts
	1-Arm Recce	Offenburg M/Y	11	11.0	Loco 1-0-1 RR Cars 20-0-0 M/Y attacked - 1
	1-Pre-Briefed	Breisach Bridge	12	6.5	Bridge 0-0-1 1 Rd Block
	1-Arm Co-ss	Neuf Breisach M/Y	12	6.5	RR Cars 16-0-10 Bldg 1-0-1 M/Y attacked - 1
	1- " "	V-849366	10	5.4	2 Rd Blocks
5 Feb	1-Arm Recce	Breisach M/Y	14	8.0	Bldg 4-0-0 M/T 6-0-0 RR Cars 12-0-0 AFV 1-0-0 M/Y attacked - 1

Page 4 - Summary of Daily Missions - XII Tactical Air Command - 20 Jan to 9 Feb 1945.

DATE	MISSION NUMBER AND TYPE	OBJECTIVE ATTACKED	EFFECTIVE BOMBS	BOMBS EXPENDED ON TARGET	REMARKS AND CLAIMS
6 Feb (Cont)	1-Arm Recon	Bridge W-149849	12	12.0	RR Cars 0-0-52 Loco 0-0-9 Bldg 0-0-1 Tank 1-0-0 N/T 1-0-0 1 Rd Block
	1-Arm Co-op	W-2275	12	6.0	1 Rail Cut N/Y attacked-1 Bldg 0-0-1 Bridge 0-0-1 Loco 1-0-5 5 Rail Cuts
	2-Tactical Recon	Colmar Area	4	nil	
8 Feb	1-Arm Recon	Staufen	16	6.0	Bldg 10-0-0 N/T 0-0-8 1 a/c lost to unknown
	1- " "	W-025505	16	6.0	RR Cars 16-0-0 Bldg 1-0-0 N/T 9-0-0 6 Rail Cuts
	1- " "	Staufen	16	6.0	Bldg 50-0-30 RR Cars 1-0-29 Loco 1-0-0 N/T 1-0-12
	1- " "	Kroningen	16	5.7	Bldg 10-0-0 N/T 4-0-16 2 Rail Cuts
	2- " "	RR Bridge W-251244	23	22.9	Bldg 1-0-0 Tunnel 0-0-1 5 Rail Cuts 1 Rd Block
	2-Pre-Briefed	RR Bridge W-27863	24	24.0	Bridge 0-0-1 1 Rail Out
	1-Arm Co-op	N/Y W-0872	12	12.0	RR Cars 21-0-30 Bldg 0-0-1 N/Y attacked - 1
	2-Pre-Briefed	RR Bridge W-149843	27	15.2	Bridge 2-0-1 N/T 1-0-0 Loco 0-0-3 RR Cars 0-0-19 Gun Pos 0-0-1 Bldg 4-0-1 N/Y attacked - 1
	1-Arm Co-op	RR Junction W-025505	11	5.5	Loco 1-0-1 6 Rail Cuts
	1-Medium Bomber	RR Bridge W-149226	27	53.2	
	1-Arm Co-op	RR Bridge Y-554126	12	6.0	Bridge 1-0-0 1 Rail Out
	1-Medium Bomber	RR Bridge W-149571	24	48.0	
	1-Tactical Recon	Humburg Area	2	nil	
	1-Photo Recon	Radolfzell N/Y	1	nil	

Page 5 - Summary of Daily Missions - XII Tactical Air Command - 20 Jan to 9 Feb 1945.

DATE	MISSION NUMBER AND TYPE	OBJECTIVE ATTACKED	EFFECTIVE BOMBERS	BOMBS EXPENDED ON TARGET	REMARKS AND CLAIMS
9 Feb	1-Arm Recon	Railroad at Kempten	16	6.0	Gun Pos 1-0-0 HDV 2-0-0 Bldg 14-0-0 H/T 9-0-7 RR Cars 0-0-6 1 Rail Out
	1-Arm Recon	M/Y V-975248	16	6.0	Unobserved
	1- " "	Breisach	13	5.0	Bldg 45-0-0 Dmn 0-1-0 1 HC
	1- " "	Railroad at V-922160	6	1.2	Loco 1-0-4 H/T 22-0-0 RR Cars 13-0-3 1 Rail Out
	1- " "	Railroad at V-940211	9	4.9	Loco 0-0-1 RR Cars 0-0-5 2 Rail Outs
	1- " "	Railroad V-040800	12	6.3 (18 rockets)	5 Rail Outs
	1- " "	Railroad V-2554	12	5.3	2 Rail Outs
	1- " "	Rottweil M/Y	12	12.0	Loco 1-0-1 Bldg 1-0-0 4 Rail Outs H/Y Attacked-1
	1- " "	Tuttlaring M/Y	12	5.3	Loco 0-0-3 RR Cars 0-0-14 Bldg 5-0-0 H/Y Attacked-1
	1- " "	Villingen M/Y	12	12.0	Bldg 5-0-0 RR Cars 4-0-0 H/Y Attacked - 1
	1- " "	Bridge V-251204	11	10.5	M/T 4-0-0 HDV 1-0-0 RR Cars 0-0-1
	1- " "	RR Bridge V-149849	12	7.2	Bridge 0-0-1 Bldg 9-0-0 M/T 1-0-0 Gun Pos 0-0-5
	1-Medium Bomber	Railroad at Frenkenstadt		nil	2 Rail Outs H/Y Attacked-1
	1- " "	RR Bridge V-251204		nil	22 a/c non-effective-weather
	1- " "	RR Bridge V-149849	11	61.5	19 a/c " " "
	1-Tactical Recon	Nuenburg Area	2	nil	

SUMMARY OF DAILY MISSIONS - FIRST FRENCH AIR CORPS

20 Jan to 9 Feb 1945

DATE	MISSION NUMBER AND TYPE	OBJECTIVE ATTACKED	EFFECTIVE DROPS	TONS EXPENDED ON TARGET	REMARKS AND CLAIMS
21 Jan	1-Tactical Recon	Mulhausen Area	2	nil	
22 Jan	1-Medium Bomber	Nürnberg RR Bridge	31	56.5	
	1-	Bridge V-899132	20	34.5	2 Aircraft lost to Flak
	1-Fighter Sweep	Mulhouse Area	10	nil	
	1-Arm Co-op	Battenheim	8	6.0	
	1-	Road Junction V-7715	7	2.5	
	1-	" " V-760124	8	3.8	
	1-Arm Recon	Bridge V-6616	8	1.0	1 Rail Car 2 Rd Blocks
	1-	Canal V-7512	8	1.0	1 Rd Blocks
	1-	Vehicles near Muehlhausen	6	2.5	Unobserved
23 Jan	1-Fighter Sweep	Freiburg Area	8	nil	
	1-	Freibach Area	4	nil	RR Cars 0-0-50 Bldgs 0-0-3
	1-Tactical Recon	Colmar Area	2	nil	2 Rd Blocks
24 Jan	2-Fighter Sweep	Colmar-Freiburg Area	24	nil	
	1-Arm Co-op	V-769460 City - V-880230 Mont	31	12.1	Unobserved
	2-	Houssen	16	7.5	Unobserved. 1 a/c lost-flak
25 Jan	2-Tactical Recon	Freibach-Colmar Area	4	nil	
26 Jan	2-Fighter Sweep	Sollweiler	19	nil	
27 Jan	7-Fighter Sweep	Colmar-Offenburg Area	54	nil	M/T 2-0-22, RR Cars 0-0-20
28 Jan	1-Arm Co-op	Sennheim, Urschenheim	20	3.5	15 Troops Killed
					Bldgs 2-0-0.
1 Feb	1-Arm Recon	Donauschingen	17	7.2	Pontoon Bridge 0-0-1
2 Feb	1-Fighter Sweep	Colmar Area	14	nil	Unobserved
	1-Arm Recon	V-687238 V-6461 Army Bldgs	74	25.0	Sum 1-0-0
	1-Pre-briefed	V-867227 V-720312 Army Bldgs	33	16.0	Unobserved

Page 2 - Summary of Daily Missions-First PAC - 20 Jan to 9 Feb 1945.

DATE	MISSION NUMBER AND TYPE	OBJECTIVE ATTACHED	EFFECTIVE SORTIES	BOMBS EXPENDED ON TARGET	REMARKS AND CLAIMS
4 Feb	1-Pre-Briefed	Pontoon Bridge V-666202	11	3.6	Bridge 1-0-0
	1- " "	" " V-666272	11	3.9	Bridge 0-0-1 W/T 6-0-0
	1- " "	" " V-670170	8	3.0	Gun Position 0-0-1
	1- " "	" " "	8	5.0	Unobserved W/T 0-0-1
	1-Arm Recce	Siengen - City	8	5.0	Unobserved
	1- " "	Village at V-692194	11	5.3	1 Rail Out - Fires Started
	1-Arm Co-op	Road at V-694194	10	5.0	Unobserved
	1-Tactical Recce	Hardt Forest Area	2	nil	Unobserved
4 Feb	2-Fighter Sweep	Strasbourg Area	25	nil	Uneventful
	5-Arm Recce	Schwingen Area	47	10.0	Wdg 17-0-0 2 Rail Outs
	5-Arm Recce	Kenzingen Area	35	8.0	2 Rd Blocks
	5-Arm Recce	Kenzingen Area	35	8.0	RR Cars 24-0-10 W/T 1-0-20
	5-Arm Recce	Kenzingen Area	35	8.0	Factory 1-0-0
	2-Tactical Recce	Strasbourg Area	4	nil	
7 Feb	1-Tactical Recce	Hardt Forest Area	2	nil	
8 Feb	2-Medium Bomber	Freiburg W/Y	36	61.8	1 a/c lost to flak
	1-Recon	" "	11	nil	2/A 1-0-1
	2-Arm Co-op	Lahr-Freiburg Area	42	16.6	W/T 2-0-1 Wdg 1-0-1
	1-Pre-Briefed	RR Station Stauffen	12	6.0	1 Rail Out 1 Rd Block
	1- " "	" " Freiburg	12	12.0	Wdg 1-0-0
	1- " "	" " West of Freiburg	11	11.0	Bridge 1-0-0 RR Cars
	1- " "	" " "	11	11.0	50-0-0 1 Rail Out
	1- " "	" " "	11	11.0	Wdg 0-0-2 RR Cars 0-0-38
	1- " "	" " "	11	11.0	3 Rail Outs
	1-Arm Recce	Freiburg-Mulhausen Area	38	17.5	Bridge 1-0-1 Wdg 0-0-2
	1-Arm Recce	Freiburg-Mulhausen Area	38	17.5	W/T 2-0-0 3 Rd Blocks
1 Feb	1-Fighter Sweep	Mulhouse Area	13	nil	
	2-Arm Co-op	Reidlingen & Ruten	63	22.0	Wdg 41-0-1 Barges 1-0-0
	2-Arm Co-op	Reidlingen & Ruten	63	22.0	3 Rail Outs 3 Rd Blocks

... . THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

IV-B

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

1ere ARMEE FRANCAISE

Ba/10

STAF-MAJOR

CP, 21 April 1945

3me BUREAU

No 1842/3-33

FROM: General d'Armee de LATTRE de TASSIGNY, Commander-in Chief,
First French Army.

TO : Commanding General, 8th Army Group.

REF.: Your letter of 3 April 1945.

The following are forwarded herewith:

1. General remarks concerning air support received by First French Army.
2. Answers to the questionnaire from Headquarters of the Strategical Air Force in Europe.

By Colonel DELATTRE
Asst Chief of Staff

/s/ DELATTRE

GENERAL REMARKS CONCERNING AIR SUPPORT

RECEIVED BY FIRST FRENCH ARMY

1) Perfecting within recent months of methods of air support have made generalizations on close support assignments possible.

The initial experiments in November 1944 by the 1st (French) Air Corps on 3rd D.I.A. front were very encouraging. Since then, progress has definitely been made in the results attained. The fighter-bomber, really put to use, is a powerful, flexible weapon which can intervene effectively to the immediate profit of the ground fighter.

The system in effect at the present time, consisting

- 2 -

of attaching an advance fighter CF to each major unit is now working smoothly.

The remarks on details concerning close support appear in the enclosed reply to the questionnaire from Headquarters of the Strategic Air Force in Europe.

2) The task of immediate support, during a given operation, should not interrupt attacks on the areas to the rear of the battlefield, depots, or communications lines. From this condition arises the necessity of having sufficient aerial means for an important operation.

3) It must be recognized that aerial superiority was won and maintained over the First French Army front in a thorough manner. Troops were able under all circumstances to carry out their movements and fight practically without fear of enemy aircraft. Supply convoys were never disorganized; dumps were hardly ever destroyed or even damaged.

4) Weather conditions, particularly unfavorable during the winter, considerably reduced aircraft activity, particularly at the time of operations at BELFORT and in the ALSACE Plain. However, they were aggravated until January, as far as the 1st (French) Air Corps was concerned, by the location of its units; fighter-bombers were based at ALBERNI, while the zone to be attacked was BELFORT, MULHOUSE, and the RHINE; two zones with very different climatic conditions.

5) The destruction of the CHALATHE and the NEUF-BRISACH bridges as requested for the first time on 14 September 1944, was considered by the Allied command only in November. Despite the numerous and very meritorious attacks by the Wing of French Marauders, no real results were obtained. The reason for this is to be found in the extremely powerful flak defending these objectives. It seems that the "mediums", in view of their limitations (effective altitude, in particular, from 3,500 to 4,000 meters) cannot provide satisfactory results on heavily defended targets. First French Army had requested the use of heavy bombers which, flying at a higher altitude and operating in mass formation, could have succeeded where the "mediums" failed. This principle was admitted by the Allied command, but the attacks were not made.

Destruction of these bridges, had it been accomplished, might have curtailed the length of enemy resistance in the ALSACE pocket.

REMARKS CONCERNING FIRST FRENCH ARMY

AIR SUPPORT

- 3 -

REMARKS CONCERNING FIRST FRENCH ARMY

AIR SUPPORT

IN THE COURSE OF VARIOUS OPERATIONS

Invasion of Southern FRANCE (15-20 August 1944):

In this phase, two French divisions enter the line - 3rd D.I.A. and 1st D.M.I. (the latter having relieved the 3rd Inf Div (US) on 19 August). The Army benefits from the general plan for aerial action for Seventh Army.

Few requests are made, with the exception of requests for reconnaissance and attacking of several batteries.

Bombing of the SAINT MANDRIER batteries is requested and carried out 20 August by medium bombers (little result; after this intervention, the Navy has to come back).

Advance up the RHONE Valley:

The only missions for the benefit for First French Army are armed reconnaissance carried out, a priori, against enemy routes of retreat; these are very profitable attacks by which the enemy loses a considerable amount of material.

Operations for Reduction of the COLMAR Pocket:

1) Ground Operations Plan:

To launch powerful offensive actions in the direction of BRISACH, aiming at the total reduction of the ALSACE pocket.

The converging actions of this offensive will begin in the South on D Day with the aim of:

-- taking CERNAY to open the means of access of North of the THUR,

-- reaching the ILL at ENNISHHEIM, in order to widen the cleared areas around LUTHERHOUSE and to capture the industrial and mining zone extending North of the city, as well as to capture the river crossings between ENNISHHEIM and BEYERSHEIM.

Subsequently, these actions will extend to the North

- 3 -

- 4 -

as of D plus E, in principle, with the aid of outflanking COLMAR on the North and capturing the COLMAR canal crossings in the WICKERSCHVILLER - MARCKOLSHEIM area.

These actions will be completed by general exploitation in the BRISACH direction, and should thereby tend to seal the COLMAR pocket; then liquidate it.

2) Means:

In the South: I Corps. Mission: 1) Protecting itself on the right in the LUTTERBACH - RATTENHEIM direction, on the left on the Eastern spurs of the VOSGES, to concentrate its attack means on the THANN - SPACH le BACH attack front and bring its efforts to bear along the ASPACH le HAUT - WILHELSHEIM axis. 2) To continue its attack in the directions: WITELSHHEIM - ENSSISHEIM; - CERNAY - NEQUISHEIM.

In the North: II Corps. 1) Operating in the two directions of: GUEMAR - MARCKOLSHEIM; OSTHEIM - JERSHEIM. To break through enemy dispositions on both sides of the COLMAR Communal Forest, while at the same time protecting itself in the South opposite COLMAR in the ROUSSEN area. 2) To continue its attack toward NEUF-BRISACH, attempting to reduce COLMAR in an East-West attack. 3) When these results have been obtained, to hold itself in readiness for exploitation in the directions: NEUF-BRISACH - CHALAMPE; NEUF-BRISACH - ENSSISHEIM; COLMAR - ROUFFACH.

3) Aerial Missions Requested:

a) Continue intervention over the BRISACH bridges and crossings farther to the North.

b) Beginning on "D" Day -

-- destroy the CHALAMPE crossings and keep them out of use.

-- attack insofar as possible the zone of enemy depots reported in the Northern portion of the HARDT Forest (quadrilateral of ROGGENHOUSE-- BLUESHEIM - LUNHOUSE.)

c) Follow up as closely as possible the breakthroughs by the Army Corps on their attack fronts, details for aerial intervention by the Air Force to be arranged directly by Corps and Commanders of supporting air forces.

I Corps: First French Air Corps (spec-

- 4 -

- 5 -

ially assigned to this operation).

II Corps: XII TAC.

d) Beginning D plus 3, in cooperation with attack by II Corps:

-- attack the BASSACH crossings and keep them out of use.

-- attack the MARCKOLSHEIM fortifications;

-- possibly, and by request, attack the bridges at SCHOENAU - RHINAU and OTTENHEIM.

4) AIR OPERATIONS PLAN FOR SUPPORT OF THE TWO CORPS:

Support for I Corps:

General Plan: Furnish I Corps maximum close support, while at the same time intervening at assembly points for enemy reserves and interdicting access to reserves.

- a) 1 - 16 planes to bomb the CERNAY strong points.
- 2 - Beginning at 0830 hours, an eight-plane patrol to be dispatched every half-hour for intervention against battlefield targets of opportunity. Such patrols will contact F.F.C. and will remain under its orders for 30 minutes. They will be assigned secondary objectives and armed reconnaissance routes studied in advance in case the F.F.C. has no target to assign them.

Armed reconnaissance route: SOULTZ - COLMAR - ENGISHEIM - SATTENHEIM - (V.735.135) - HARDT Forest - NEUF-BRISACH - COLMAR. Special surveillance of exits from the HARDT Forest - Priority order for strafing: armor, self-propelled guns, vehicle concentrations, troop concentrations.

3 - List of secondary objectives, in priority order:

<u>Priority</u>	<u>Objectives</u>	<u>Priority</u>	<u>Objectives</u>
1	: Crossroads V.794.108	5	: Roadbridge V.662.160
2	: Crossroads V.780.139	6	: Roadbridge V.702.188
3	: Ammo dump V.882.280	7	: Roadbridge V.651.238
4	: Ammo dump V.885.235	8	: Village of GRISSEIM V.892.194

- 6 -

Village of
BREMEN V.916.240
Village of
HARTHEIM V.920.265
Village of
GRENZHAUSEN V.932.298

b) The Commanding General, XII TAC, is requested to have his fighter-bombers attack the following targets:

1. Tank Repair Shop, V.641.182.
2. CP at V.640.144.
3. Crossroads, V.794.108.
4. Crossroads, V.780.139.
5. Roadbridge, V.662.160.
6. Roadbridge, V.702.188.
7. Roadbridge, V.641.218.
8. Railbridge, W.010.939.
9. Railbridge, W.029.391.
10. Railbridge, W.258.240.
11. Railbridge, W.258.240.
12. Rail cut between MULHEIM and FREIBURG.
13. Rail bridge W.075.325.
14. Village of GRISSHEIM, V.892.194.
15. Village of BREMGARTEN, V.916.241.
16. Village of HARTHEIM, V.920.265.
17. Village of GRENZHAUSEN, V.932.298.

It is requested that patrols undertake armed reconnaissance upon completion of the bombings:

- 1) Along the BASEL - OFFENBURG railway.
- 2) Along the RHINE from BASEL to V.996.765.
- 3) Along the roads leading from the railway to the Rhine and in particular approach roads to the villages of: GRISSHEIM, V.892.194; BREMGARTEN, V.916.241; HARTHEIM, V.920.265; GRENZHAUSEN, V.932.298.

Strafing targets, in order of priority, are:

Rafts and woods on the RHINE.
Troop concentrations.
Vehicle concentrations or columns.
Trains.

Support for II Corps: Similar plan made.

Results obtained: Aerial action was considerably hampered by bad weather (snowstorm, in particular, which prevented all sorties during the first two days of the operation).

The main efforts of fighter-bombers alternated be-

- 7 -

tween the Southern and Northern Sectors, depending upon the evolution of the situation and the intentions of the command.

Interesting results were nonetheless obtained: Major units of First French Army for the first time benefited from extensive close support and were won over to the idea presented by this support as well as the possibilities it offered.

Air support effectively participated in the reduction of the ALSACE pocket, and harassing of routes and RHEINE crossings considerably hampered the enemy's retreat.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING AIR-GROUND COOPERATION

1. In the course of operations, First French Army has not had to request the Air Force for a complete neutralization of enemy ground defense (as was the case during the Seventh Army's attack on the Siegfried Line).

On several occasions, repetition of attacks was requested, particularly against villages transformed into strongpoints.

2. Effectiveness of attacks against the following targets:

a) Light armored vehicles:

Vulnerable to bombing attacks (fragmentation bombs in particular) and to machine-gunning.

b) Armored vehicles and tanks:

The P-47's weapons are ineffective against heavy armor; explosive bombs are effective if they are direct hits or fall within the immediate vicinity (destruction of tracked vehicles). During the operations for the reduction of the ALSACE pocket, five tanks were neutralized by aerial attacks. There have been no attacks on First French Army rocket-launching tanks.

c) Fortified points (fieldworks):

Fieldworks must be completely levelled, and great density of bombs necessary.

d) Casemates:

A direct hit must be scored; casemates are very small targets. As an experiment, attacks were made with the HAPPAIR bomb (see paragraph 4).

- 8 -

e) Battery positions:

Hits must be direct or in the immediate vicinity for equipment to be destroyed or damaged. Therefore, means brought to bear must be considerable. Fragmentation bomb attacks are effective against personnel. A battery which has been attacked generally moves to another position; this represents a gain.

f) Buildings:

Attacks are very effective with explosive bombs weighing 500 pounds or incendiary bombs weighing 250 pounds.

g) Bridges:

Bridges are very hard targets for fighter-bombers to hit; attacks often result in cutting roads or railways lying at the extremities of the bridge. Bridges are more suitable targets for mediums, or even for strategic aircraft.

h) Troops:

Very effective results have been obtained by fragmentation bombs and machine-gunning. (Many POW interrogations and testimony of civilians liberated localities disclose that German troops were much more afraid of machine-gunning than of bombing in the battlefield area).

i) Depots in the forward area:

Effective results have been obtained against fuel and ammunition dumps by means of high explosive bombs or 250 pound incendiary bombs.

j) Fortified villages:

Results have been effective with the explosive bomb and the incendiary bomb.

k) Minefields, barbed wire, and other defenses:

First French Army has had no experience with this type of attack, but it would seem that the only method to follow consists in levelling the terrain, thereby many tons of explosive bombs.

3. In most cases, bombing of fortified villages has facilitated their occupation by forcing the enemy to withdraw.

If attacks are made in too great strength, constructions

- 9 -

are completely demolished. This may obstruct the roads and create deep craters which, in the final analysis, constitute obstacles in the path of our troops and our tanks; this is all the more the case since these obstacles lend themselves with ease to antitank defense construction and action by enemy infantry units which have decided to resist.

4. Effectiveness of MAFAM attacks.

Only a little experience has been gained with regard to the use of MAFAM bombs. Their incendiary power is clearly considerable and more far-reaching than that of the usual incendiary bombs, but they must be dropped from a very low altitude and by very small dives, thereby entailing some loss as far as precision-bombing is concerned; hence making them less effective against small-sized targets or targets heavily defended by flak. On the other hand, the morale effect of these bombs on the enemy must be terrifying.

An initial test was made by the First (French) Air Corps on four villages on the right bank of the Rhine which were set ablaze.

A second experiment was made on 14 March 1945 against three casemates two km West of GRISHEIM (867.190). Each casemate was attacked by three planes, each with two bally tanks, the whole flight of nine planes attacking simultaneously in close formation.

An artillery piece fired a signal smoke shell over the target at the time of the planes' attack, and there was no flak reaction. A direct hit was made on one of the casemates and another was partially hit, but the actual results of the attack are not known, however.

It would seem that this type of attack must be particularly effective against works already partially hit by the artillery, the ruins of which may be sheltering reinforcements or ground troops.

5. Concentrated bombing causes the enemy serious losses when he is attacked while in a village, barracks or hutment. On the other hand, losses must be light when he is dug into ground fortifications.

6. Repeated air attacks undoubtedly reduce the enemy's combatants' potentialities and contribute to an increased number of prisoners.

7. First (French) Air Corps, at the time of the operation to

- 10 -

reduce the COLLIER pocket, had at its disposal only 125 fighter-bombers (theoretical number). This would have not been enough to constitute strong support for the whole of the Army front. Additionally requested was the support of 12th MAC, which worked with the II Corps, while the First (French) Air Corps supported I Corps.

8. In the majority of cases, the flying of friendly aircraft over enemy batteries interrupted fire. However, this is not an absolute rule. When ground fighting is in progress, such flights, owing to complete Allied air superiority, are nearly uninterrupted, and batteries are allowed to continue their fire.

9. In the same manner, such flights are not held up by small arms fire during combat.

10. The morale of our troops is always helped when in combat they are present during an air attack conducted by fighter-bombers (a very impressive and spectacular performance); this is particularly the case when the troops see that the enemy immediately to their front is undergoing the attack.

11. a) It is difficult to give the number of artillery pieces which can have their usual missions eliminated in preference to counterbattery fire against enemy flak. The question depends upon the result which is desired of aerial attack for the next immediate step in operations.

If the Air Force is requested to attack a target, the reason is either that the target is out of artillery range or that a high concentration of fire is desired within a minimum period of time. (100 tons of bombs can be dropped in one minute by a formation of 50 Marsauders, whereas to obtain similar material results, concentration of fire by 100 155mm batteries would be required.)

In short, if decisive results are expected from an aerial attack, it must be effective and must therefore not be unduly hampered by enemy flak. In this case, the amount of means to be loaned, and for a short time only, to counterbattery against enemy flak can be considerable.

On a lesser scale, counterbattery fire can be employed to facilitate close support fighter-bomber attacks in a heavily defended area.

b) In several instances First French Army flak batteries were successfully used for counterbattery in coordination with medium bomber attacks on the CHALANÇON bridge.

- 10 -

- 11 -

12. When the matter concerns an important operation requiring an aerial intervention plan, the ground army recommends the targets to be attacked. Indeed, the ground army's situation enables it to appreciate more readily than any other agency what, from a ground point of view, will hamper or halt its advance. This (aerial intervention plan) is studied in close liaison with the Air Corps, which approves or disapproves it, on the basis of its means at that moment, information concerning enemy flak, and the technical characteristics of the targets. A final aerial intervention plan is adopted which reconciles the two points of view as much as possible and which determines what priorities are to be given targets.

For an important operation, part of the available air power is allotted to close support of the battle zone, and the other portion is allotted to bracketing the battlefield and attacking communication lines lying to the immediate rear. The Air Corps then selects the targets which can be attacked with maximum effectiveness, while Army G-2 furnishes it with all pertinent information in that connection.

13. Time required by the Air Force Command to initiate an aerial operations plan parallel to the ground operations plan offers no difficulty. Moreover, changes can be made in the aerial intervention plan up to the last moment, if they are justified and required by changes in the ground operations plan, or by new information concerning enemy capabilities.

14. The classic targets are still the same. It is to be noted, however, that during the operations for reduction of the ALENCE pocket, the ground forces often requested patrols operating in close-support to machine-gun, a priori, the edge of woods or the sides of main trails. Pilots usually dislike to attack objectives which they do not see, and feel that the results are very small. That is not the opinion of the ground forces, who believe such missions very rewarding. As a matter of fact, troops, vehicles, armor, equipment, and weapons are camouflaged in the edges of woods and beside principal woods trails. Machine-gunning has, indeed, often proved most effective, and it has been possible to witness its results after the ground has been taken. It is understood, of course, that these attacks should be made close enough to the front lines so that ground troops can profit by them.

15. By attaching advance fighter CIs to the Corps and Division CIs, the Air Forces have considerably reduced delays in the intervention of support aircraft. The following must be taken into account:

- 11 -

- 12 -

-- An average time of 15 minutes for sending requests for aerial missions from the Regiment concerned to the Corps' Air Support Group.

-- Two or three minutes to order execution of the mission by planes already aloft.

-- Ten minutes (approximately) to carry out the mission, or a total of 30 minutes (on the average) in the eminently favorable case that the planes are already aloft.

These delays cannot be cut down except below the Divisional echelon; hence, there is a necessity for excellent telephone communications between Regiment and Division and employment of air combat priority.

16. 17. 18. The Bomb Safety Line can be set up without difficulty. This line, moreover, can be established during an offensive fairly well ahead of forward elements (particularly if the area is one in which armored elements capable of advancing rapidly are operating); nor need this in the least hamper aerial intervention. Close support work, which has been generalized upon, is, in fact, carried out between the Bomb Safety Line and the Close Safety Line. If intervention is to be timely within the Bomb Safety Line, it is always possible to establish a special Bomb Safety Line which is valid for an attack upon a target.

19. It is difficult to determine minimum distances between friendly forward elements and objectives justifying aerial attack. Basically, this depends upon: the terrain, the ease with which crews can locate and identify the target beyond any doubt, and the training of the personnel for this type of work.

a) Fighter-bombers:

If these are operating in close support, in liaison with the F.F.C., and the terrain offers no particular difficulties, the minimum distance under the best conditions can be from about 6 - 800 meters (machine-gunning has been very effective for this distance for the First French Army).

b) Medium bombers:

1,500 meters - 2 kilometers minimum, on the condition that the target has been indicated by smoke shells when the formation of bombers appears.

- 12 -

- 13 -

c) Heavy bombers:

Distance of from two to three kilometers with the same reservations.

20. Bad weather considerably hampered action by the supporting Air Force for the BELFORT break-through and the operations to reduce the ALSACE pocket. Obviously, it would be desirable to undertake an important operation only with the assurance of aerial support; hence, with favorable weather conditions. This was not possible for the First French Army.

21. During bad weather which makes intervention by fighter-bombers technically impossible within the Bomb Safety Line, it is certain that the simple fact of an ordinary flight by our planes has a judicious effect on the morale of friendly combat troops, who are often weary after having fought for several days under difficult conditions and under the threat of counterattacks. In short, these are "aerial morale" missions which, if they need not be the rule, can be assigned in certain cases (aircraft without bombs).

On the other hand, the enemy -- who is haunted by fighter-bombers in view of Allied air superiority -- certainly experiences the greatest unhappiness in being flown over by planes which constitute a constant menace, create and atmosphere of insecurity and pin him down to one spot.

It remains understood that such flights cannot take place except at a minimum ceiling not requiring the planes to run any risks from light flak, and thereby out of proportion with results to be achieved.

22. The ground troops do not always have targets to offer the Air Force, but this in itself is not inconvenient. A patrol arriving in its assigned zone and place at the disposal of an F.F.C. always has a secondary or even third objective. If at such a moment, the Corps or Divisions have no objectives which can be profitably attacked, it is not necessary that the mission be carried out at any price; only the thought of results should count, and a good secondary objective is almost always worth much more than a poor target of opportunity (even if the secondary objective is not of concern directly to the Major Unit).

23. One excellent practice adopted by the First (French) Air Corps is that of ordering patrols out on armed reconnaissance; however, before carrying them out, the patrols

- 13 -

- 14 -

contact the F.F.C. and remain at its disposal for a given period (for instance, a period of 30 minutes).

If this period expires without the Major Unit on the ground's having any target, the patrol resumes its liberty of action and carries out the armed reconnaissance provided for.

24. First French Army has never had occasion to employ medium and heavy bombers in close support.

It would seem that during an offensive, their use would be justifiable only for breaking through a fortified front by dropping a considerable amount of bombs on a small portion of the terrain, or during a defense, of stopping a powerful enemy attack if ground resources aided by fighter-bombers proved to be inadequate.

25. First French Army has had no experience in this connection. At 6th Army Group's request, it had been planned that two AA batteries would execute indication fire for the benefit of heavy bombers so as to mark their route, but the request was cancelled.

26. 27. No experience in this connection.

28. Use of signal panels on vehicles and armor is of interest; however, it is possible that the enemy uses the same panels, at least in the area of contact, for his own advantage. This possibility is all the more open to him, since he has practically no aviation capable of operating in support of his own troops.

Indicating targets by easily visible colored smoke, for close support work, is of interest and effective, particularly if the target is near the line of contact and found by pilots only with difficulty; this process implies perfect synchronization between the arrival of the planes and the firing of smoke shells, with good telephone communications between the F.F.C. and the artillery battalion designated for such fire.

The color of the smoke must be changed often, so that the enemy does not profit by this process.

29. The present system is giving satisfaction. The air support and advance fighter CF Networks and the telephone complement each other and in the event one fails, the other insures that annihilation is not a consequence.

- 14 -

- 15 -

30. Corps and Inf Div ground forces are kept up to date by the Army Air Support Group concerning aerial intentions and targets planned for each day.

31. The present organization into G-3 Air, G-2 Air, A.L.O. is perfectly sufficient to maintain operational liaison between Army, Corps, Division and airfields.

32. The present system of liaison with air units is satisfactory; however, it is indispensable for all A.L.O. attached to airfields to have a radio linking them with Army, since they cannot function properly without it.

33. A G-3 Air (Air Support) and a G-2 Air (Tac/R Officer) are justified only at Army echelon.

A G-3 Air is necessary at Corps, Division and Armored Division Combat Command echelon.

34. Until a month ago, First French Army was hampered by a lack of Tac/R aircraft. Groupe 2/33 certainly took the best part of its small equipment (eight; then six Spitfires, with only one photo reconnaissance plane; hence, only a maximum of four missions per day). With only one photo reconnaissance plane, it was impossible to make use of the few spells of good weather during the winter to fulfill all photo requests; when this plane was not available for some time, the help of XII TAC had to be requested.

At present, Groupe 2/33 has 16 Mustangs, which greatly increase its possibilities; a large and excellent amount of photo work has already been accomplished during the past few weeks for the Army.

35. Results of Tac/R missions are broadcast as soon as possible after return from missions; however, under the best conditions such broadcasts cannot be made until two hours after the departure of the mission; broadcasts are often filled with static (difficult to find good frequencies).

Succinct reports of Tac/R photo interpretation are also distributed by broadcasts about 2½ to 3 hours after landing. Delivery of photos to Corps or Divisions concerned is accomplished with minimum delay by vehicle or Piper Cub as often as possible.

36. 37. 38. Usually, when a battle is in progress or evolution of the situation is very swift, delays between requests for intelligence missions and results of such missions are too long for them to be of use to the immediate operation of

- 15 -

- 16 -

the Major Units in combat. However, the latter often require only instantaneous and very localized information.

Furthermore, intelligence received and the evolution of the tactical situation can change the requirements of the Army Command from the point of view of intelligence, or may even necessitate and entirely different course being given these missions.

To this end, requests for last-minute localized intelligence may be made by Major Units concerned through Advanced Fighter CPs. Such requests are confined to certain simple questions:

a) Sight reconnaissance:

1. What road activity is there between --- & ---?
2. Are there vehicle concentrations at -----?
3. Direction of road traffic between --- & ---?
4. Are tanks concentrated at -----?
5. Where is the spearhead of the friendly armored column? -----?
6. Are shots being fired at -----?
7. Are there explosions in the village of -----?
8. Is there any activity in the village of -----?
9. Are there indications of a counterattack toward ----- in -----?

b) Photo reconnaissance:

1. Condition of road bridge at -----?
2. Condition of rail bridge at -----?
3. Condition of crossroads at -----?
4. Is the village of ----- occupied?
5. Are there batteries at -----?
6. Are there defensive works at -----?

These requests are made of Tac/R aircraft upon their return from a mission.

In addition, of course, all important information which is urgently needed is flown by reconnaissance planes to the advance fighter CP.

If Army needs this type of information, it can request it from the Corps concerned or from the First (French) Corps, which will forward it on.

Reserved missions: By joint Army-Corps agreement during

- 16 -

- 17 -

the daily meeting, a certain number of missions can be reserved during the course of the succeeding day to meet new concerns of the Army commander or, with his consent, Corps commanders.

The order to launch these missions should be requested of Same Bureau of the Air Corps or by previous arrangement with the latter, directly at the tactical reconnaissance group.

39. Bad weather conditions, aggravated by the small amount of Tac/R at the disposal of First (French) Air Corps hampered the work of Major Ground Units, which particularly complained about the lack of Tac/R photos.

Requests for night intelligence missions in the BRISACH and CHALATRE sectors were not met. Army Group should have at its disposal a specialized unit for night reconnaissance.

No. experience with night photo work.

AG TRANSLATION 6THAG
T-1220 23 April 1945

DISTRIBUTION:

1 - SOS
3 - G-3 (action)
1 - Liaison
1 - File

A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

CARROLL W. STEWART
1st Lt., Air Corps

- 17 -

... THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526 ...

IV-3


THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

SECRET

CERTIFIED A TRUE COPY:

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY GROUP
AG MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE


HENRY V. CRATTAN
1st Lt., A.C.

JESO
FILED 250615A

URGENT

SC N 67/25
250945A
hrc

FROM: FIRST FRENCH ARMY

TO : CG 6TH ARMY GROUP FOR ACTION, GENERAL COMMANDING
FIRST FRENCH AIR CORPS FOR INFO

REF NO THIS MSG: 5A/25, 25 Jan 45

PERSONAL FROM GENERAL DE LATTRE

Cite 214/SECR.

I could see personally that air support given to the II French Corps during the 24 January was very poor.

The actual offensives of the First French Army are very important; because of the purpose and consequences which will result, it is capital that everything be put in action to obtain fast and complete success in which Air Corps action is an essential part. We ask you in consequence and instantly to do everything possible in order that Air Corps supports every day in a massive way the I and II Corps engaged in the hardest battles against an enemy who defends every inch of ground.

Organization of Air Corps in supporting offensives of the First French Army proves after experience of those 5 first days to be insufficient, which thing I told to the representative of General ROYCE the day preceeding the offensive, in particular the lack of liaison between General Commanding an Army and his Air Force Command. During those 5 days, I could see once General GERARLOS at command post of MONTBELIARD and since 3 days that I am in ALSACE forward command post I do not have any representative of the First French Air Corps with me, despite the promises.

I ask instantly that such situation which consequences can be very serious, cease as soon as possible.

ACTION: 6-3

INFO : SGS FR MISSION LIAISON FIRST TACAF AG RECORDS
MC IN 22024 25 Jan 45 1030A Ref No 5A/24 K/2K

... THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526 ...

IV-D

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

SECRET

ETAT-MAJOR
3me Bureau

CP, 11 December 1944

N° 138/ 3.US

FROM: General de LATTRE de TASSIGNY, Commander-in-Chief,
First French Army.

TO : Commanding General, Sixth Army Group.

I have the honor urgently to request your kindness in taking action to have all bombing resources and the Strategic Air Force itself directed upon RHINE crossing points.

Since the beginning of December the enemy has been able to bring up important reinforcements (tanks and infantry) into ALSACE. These reinforcements have permitted him to stiffen his resistance and to make a stand on the entire rim of the pocket, to establish and supply a dense Artillery disposition, whose fire has been particularly steady during these last few days against 36th Inf Div US.

As of this moment, an assault is under way by I Corps between DOLLER and THUR, having CERNAY as objective and the clearing of the NORTHWEST approaches to MULHOUSE.

Another assault will be launched by II Corps around 14 or 15 December to take COLMER.

If necessary, they will be followed by operations from NORTH and SOUTH toward BRISACH.

Success of all these operations can be counted upon only if the enemy is absolutely unable to supply and, more important, to reinforce his bridgehead, in ALSACE.

The mission of RHINE bridges destruction in First French Army zone of action has been given to 1st French Air Corps. However, its very limited number of medium

SECRET

SECRET

bombers allows it to use at the most only three 18-plane formations during good weather. More than that, a considerable proportion of those planes can take off with only a reduced load from the Lyon airfield; where they are at present based; they can be only incompletely covered by fighters.

Particularly unfavorable atmospheric conditions have permitted but three attacks on CHALAMPE and one on BRISACH, with reduced forces, since the end of October.

It must be emphasized that the bridges are defended by especially powerful AA.

So it is, that I deem it absolutely necessary to mount a mass attack upon these objectives, concentrating a maximum of means against them at the first clear weather to obtain decisive results in a minimum of time.

Weather conditions permitting, it would be opportune to carry out this operation before or about 14 December.

It must be followed by operations to keep the bridges cut, and as frequent attacks as possible over the railways and in general the bridgehead approaches on the BADEN bank.

Objectives of these operations were definitely pointed out on the map to Colonel DODGE, Chief of PLANS Section, General ROYCE'S Headquarters, upon the occasion of his recent visit to I Corps.

By General VALLUY,
Chief of Staff.

/s/ VALLUY

AG TRANSLATION
T-355 15 December 1944

CERTIFIED A TRUE COPY:

HENRY V. GRATTAN
1st Lt., A.C.

SECRET

- 2 -

13025 8.49

P.C., le 11 dicembre 1944

Le General d'Armes de LATTRE de TASSIGNY,
commandant en Chef la 1ere Armee Francaise,

Monsieur le General commandant
le 6eme Groupe d'Armees U.S.

J'ai l'honneur de vous demander instamment de bien vouloir intervenir pour que tous les moyens de bombardement et la "Strategical Air Force" elle-même soient appliqués sur les points de passage du RHIN.

Depuis le debut de decembre, l'ennemi a pu amener en ALSACE d'importants renforts (chars et infanterie) qui lui ont permis de raidir sa resistance et de faire front sur tout le pourtour de la poche, de constituer et de ravitailler un dispositif d'Artilerie stoffe dont les interventions ont ete, ces jours derniers, particulierement nombreuses devant la 36eme D.I.U.S.

Des maintenant, une action de force est engagée par le 1er C.A. entre DOLLER et THUR, avec pour objectif CERNAY et le dégagement des abords Nord-Ouest de MULHOUSE.

Une autre action de force sera déclenchée, vers le 14 ou le 15 décembre, par le 2eme C.A. pour s'emparer de COLMAR.

Elles seront suivies éventuellement par des actions menées du Sud et du Nord en direction de BRISACH.

On ne peut escompter le succes de toutes ces operations que si l'ennemi est dans l'impossibilite absolue d'alimenter et a plus forte raison de renforcer sa tete de pont en ALSACE.

La mission de destruction des ponts du RHIN dans la zone d'action de la 1ere Armee Francaise a ete confiee au 1er Corps Aerien. Toutefois, ses moyens tres limites en bombardiers moyens ne lui permettent de mettre en oeuvre, par beau temps, qu'un maximum de trois formations de 18 avions. De plus, une proportion importante de ces appareils ne peut decoller qu'a charge reduite du terrain de LYON sur lequel ils sont actuellement bases; ils ne peuvent etre qu'incomplètement couverts par la Chasse.

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

EXE 100 11653
DOD CAT: A

Les circonstances atmospheriques particuliere-
ment defavorables ont seulement permis, depuis la fin
d'octobre, 3 attaques de CHALAMPE, une de BRISACH, menees
avec des moyens reduits.

Il faut souligner que les ponts sont defendus
par une D.C.A. particulièrement puissante.

Aussi, j'estime absolument necessaire de monter
sur ces objectifs une action massive, en y concentrant,
a la premiere eclaircie, le maximum de moyens pour obte-
nir des resultats decisifs dans le minimum de temps.

Il serait opportun, si les circonstances atmosphe-
riques le permettent, que cette action soit effectuee avant
ou vers le 14 decembre.

Elle devra etre suivie d'operations d'entretien
des coupures et d'interventions aussi frequentes que pos-
sible sur les voies ferrees et, en general, les acces des
tetes de pont sur la rive badoise.

Les objectifs de ces operations ont ete precises
sur la carte au Colonel DODGE, Chef de la Section des Plans
de l'E.M. du General ROYCE, lors de sa recente visite au
1er C.A.



P. B. Le Général Valley chef E.M.
Régiment Valley

... THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526 ...

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

0846

JOINT HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE (AEF)
AIR STAFF

18 December 1944.

REF : MEMO(0)AF/1.5102/4-1.

DECLASSIFIED JCS Memo 17 Jan 73

SUBJECT: Operation "CLARENCE" - Transmittal of General Plan.

TO : Air Marshal Commanding, 2nd Tactical Air Force.
Commanding General, Ninth Air Force.
Commanding General, First Tactical Air Force (Provisional).✓

1. Transmitted herewith by officer courier for your study and consideration are copies of the proposed Operation "CLARENCE".

2. It is desired that an appropriate study of the targets in line with the proposed plan be accomplished without delay. The changes in the ground situation of the past forty-eight hours would indicate high possibility of an early implementation of this plan.

3. Heavy attacks on the larger marshaling yards have already destroyed a large proportion of the repair facilities of the German rail system. The objective of this plan is to follow up with the next important phase of a general rail paralysis by concentrating on small stations and marshaling yards to effect widespread destruction. The final complement to general paralysis will be achieved by strafing and bombing of all moving trains encountered. This plan to be completely effective may require two or three, or even more, repeat attacks.

4. It is desired that a brief result of your analyses of this plan reach this Headquarters by 22 December.

For the Deputy Supreme Commander:

D. E. SWEATMAN,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Deputy Chief of Air Staff.

17 December 1944

GENERAL PLAN FOR
MAXIMUM EFFORT ATTACK
AGAINST TRANSPORTATION OBJECTIVES

DECLASSIFIED JCS Memo 17 Jan 73

PURPOSE

The purpose of this plan is to outline a coordinated attack against strategic targets, particularly transportation, by all available American air forces. It is anticipated that the wholesale and widespread attack of rail and water transportation facilities will result in an immediate disruption of the enemy's lines of communication and transportation system in general. The impact of the attack will be of direct and immediate benefit to the ground forces. By making a simultaneous attack with all available forces, damage to the transportation system will be widespread, and it is hoped that the capabilities of the normal repair organization will be overwhelmed, with the resultant compounding of the length of time necessary to effect restoration of transport services. In addition, the enemy will be forced to resort to motor transport to carry out high priority movement and will thus be required to deplete his carefully conserved oil products.

There is also a distinct possibility that such an attack will precipitate a crisis among the railway workmen. Our continued pressure against transportation objectives plus this series of attacks, may well result in mass desertion from work.

In addition, a widespread attack of over 7,000 aircraft, extending over Germany as a whole and attacking lightly defended or non-defended transportation targets, will bring home the effects of the war upon German industry and people as no other method could do. The increasing instability of the German people and German industry may be pushed over the brink by these attacks. This operation should also result in a redeployment of flak by the Germans, with the resultant softening of enemy defenses when operations against the first priority system, Oil, are resumed.

CODE NAME

The code name for this operation will be CLARION.

DATE

It is not possible to fix an exact date for the beginning of this operation, but the air forces will be prepared to conduct operations on any date after 4 January 1945.

BOUNDARIES OF TARGET AREAS

DECLASSIFIED JCS Memo 17 Jan 73

This plan envisages widespread simultaneous attacks in Western and Southern Germany and Austria by all forces. Tentative boundaries between air forces are shown on Inclosure No. 1 and final boundaries will be adjusted at a later date, consistent with SHAER concurrence, and after detailed study of the capabilities of Strategic and Tactical Air Forces.

TARGETS

It is intended that the operations will be conducted so as to strike transportation targets over all of Western and Southern Germany and Austria in a coordinated operation.

Targets will be selected so as to cause the maximum dislocation and disablement of the enemy's rail and water transportation system, with due consideration to the fact that bombing forces will be directed to attack visually even though they have to attack as low as 1,000 feet. Targets can include bridges, viaducts, flyovers, junction points, marshalling yards, stations, signalling facilities, roundhouses and other repair facilities, canal gates and locks, and clusters of transport. In view of the proposed altitude of operations, undefended or lightly defended targets should be selected.

On the first attack, each target will be attacked if possible by a single formation of not to exceed six (6) aircraft, and targets will be chosen so as to insure such attacks over the entire area. Determination of the number of aircraft to be used on succeeding attacks will result from the operational experience obtained from the first attack.

PLANNING FACTORS

As stated above, it is intended that wherever possible the first attack on a specific objective will not be made by a formation of more than six (6) aircraft. This will insure even distribution of the effort and multiply the number of objectives attacked.

In general, destruction of facilities will be accomplished by all means available, using bombs and machine guns and NAPALM where warranted. It is desired to emphasize that low altitude attacks by heavy and medium bombers against undefended objectives, using the tremendous machine gun power in these bombers for strafing, will be accomplished.

Bombing will be conducted by employing visual sighting technique alone. It is not anticipated that the operation will take place unless there is a reasonable probability that not more than 5/10 to 7/10 low cloud cover with adequate ceiling and visibility will prevail in the target areas. However, operations will be conducted at an altitude which will permit visual bombing even though the formations are required to go below the low cloud. This will require adequate briefing as to flak defended areas, of all crews.

DECLASSIFIED JCS Memo 17 Jan 73

The planning of forces assigned to areas in western Germany should consider that the Fifteenth Air Force may be unable to operate due to weather. If this be the case, the Fifteenth Air Force should plan to attack its area shortly thereafter, but not before the Eighth Air Force has executed one attack.

The development of a scheme which will insure a maximum efficiency in the use of the forces is delegated to the Air Force Commanders.

The factors of proper timing of attacks of all objectives and even distribution of attacks over the entire area are re-emphasized.

SCALE OF EFFORT

Every effort will be made by all air forces to launch the maximum number of airplanes on these attacks.

COORDINATION

This operation will be dispatched by Headquarters U.S. Strategic Air Forces and will be coordinated to permit appropriate time over target for all forces.

PARTICIPATION BY ALLIED AIR FORCES

It is expected that the Second Tactical Air Force and the French units of the First Tactical Air Force (Prov) will be included in the final plan. It is hoped that the RAF Bomber Command will, weather permitting, make a standard attack on Ruhr objectives during the attack or on the nights preceding or following the attack to aid continuity of pressure and increase the dislocation of transportation.

1 Incl:

Map: Tentative Allocated
Target Areas.

... THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526 ...

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

First Tactical Air Force Story--for War Week.

FIRST TACTICAL AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS, EASTERN FRANCE: Here in the valleys of the Vosges mountains, where the deep winter snow blanket is beginning to turn into a surface of mud and slush, fighters, fighter-bombers and medium-bombers of the newest Allied air force--but one of the richest in veteran flyers--are pounding away at the Germans, running interference for the doughboys and pallies of the American Seventh and French First Armies.

The First Tactical Air Force, made up of both American and French tactical units, is a two-invasion air force--in it are outfits that flew on D-Day over Normandy and fought on through the Battle of France, and others which linked up with them after taking part in the southern France invasion.

Now, combined into a single striking force to fly in coordination with the French and U. S. troops of the Sixth Army Group, it is perhaps the most international aggregation of airplanes and men, bringing together some of the widest tactical air experience yet to be organized by the Allies.

Take for example the men who make up the air force. There are American flyers who have fought this war in nearly every corner of the world. Among the groups that came up from the Mediterranean is Col Leonard C. Loydon's famous 324th Fighter Group, which fought along with Marshal Montgomery's Eighth Army from shortly after El Alamein until the German capitulation in North Africa. A squadron from the 324th played a big part in the Palm Sunday Massacre of 1943, destroying over a third of the 74 German planes knocked out of the skies over Cape Bon that April afternoon.

Another American group, a B-26 outfit which has operated against targets in Italy and southern France as well as Germany, supplied the personnel to bomb Tokio on General Jimmy Doolittle's historic carrier-based raid. A few of the Tokio men are still with this group, the oldest medium-bomber outfit in the USAF.

1 add 1 week story

The French groups have a history dating even farther back. Many of the older French pilots fought the battle of France in 1939 and 1940. Outnumbered, beaten before they could get started, they nevertheless made the Germans pay a price for victory, and there are men flying against the Germans today with 10 or more Jerry planes to their credit, shot down in that early disastrous phase of the war.

Most of these French aviators escaped, in one way or another, to North Africa or England, and gradually, with the help of Britain and the United States, supplied the nucleus of trained manpower for the rebuilding of a French Air Force. These men, with many more younger flyers who have just finished their training in America, and in British schools, make up the flying personnel of the French First Air Corps and the French Atlantic Air Command, the French components of the First Tactical Air Force.

The planes they fly are even more varied than the men, with American, British, French and even German aircraft being used. The B-26 Marauder (medium-bomber), the P-47 Thunderbolt (fighter-bomber), the P-51 Mustang and P-38 Lightning (used for reconnaissance purposes) are the American planes used, and are flown by both French and American airmen. American pilots also are using the British Beaufighter, twin-engined night-fighter, for night intruder missions into Germany, and some of the French squadrons are equipped with British Spitfires.

Far to the west, flying against the Germans holding out along the Atlantic coast in the Lorient, St. Nazaire, La Rochelle and Royan areas, General Cornillon-Molinier's French Atlantic Air Command, under First Tac AF, is flying an even odder assortment, including German and French types. One that can be mentioned is the German Fieseler-Storch. These airmen of the "Forgotten War" also use German ammunition and German bombs, left behind by the Krauts in their scramble out of France.

2 add a second story

Besides the day-in-and-day-out hammering the fighter-bombers and medium-bombers of the First Tac AF have been handling the G-ran communications system since the air force went into operation, a number of more spectacular assignments have been carried out.

There was the "Lost Battalion" mission last fall, when more than 200 American soldiers of the 36th Division were cut off near St. Die for six days. For three days American Thunderbolt pilots of First Tac AF, battling fog and cloud as well as enemy fire, flew in at deck level over wooded, hilly country to deliver food, medicine, radio equipment, water and ammunition to the beleaguered doughboys.

On the first day, although the P-47 men made a desperate attempt to deliver the goods, the weather was completely unflyable and none of the bundles, packed in belly-tanks, landed in the designated area. One plane was lost and another, flown by Major John S. Leonard, 3610 Alabama Avenue North, St. Petersburg, Fla., hit a tree and barely staggered home.

Major Leonard, commander of the squadron which made the flights and hero of the undertaking, tried it again next day. Some of the bundles got through to their target, but the major's plane, flying low in search of the surrounded unit, was hit by ground fire, and Leonard bailed out at 300 feet. His chute snapped open just above some small trees, and he landed in one of them, dangling two feet from the ground, unhurt.

A French farmer was busy hoeing a few yards away. Glancing over his shoulder at Leonard, he nodded politely.

"Bonjour Monsieur," he said, and returned to his hoeing.

Major Leonard managed to extricate himself, and on the third day led a successful 15-plane mission. This time, in good weather, the unit was amply

NOTE

3 add warweek story

supplied and on the night after the following day the battalion was relieved.

On the first day when supplies were delivered, October 23, came the following message from the boys on the ground, via walkie-talkie:

"Thanks to our pals in the Air Corps. We eat today for the first time in three days."

The difficulties the weather put in the way of this mercy mission were not unusual; they were typical. Weather officers say that in the Vosges, where the main elements of First Tac AF operate, the worst weather on the western front prevails. And on the Atlantic coast, with weather "highs" and "lows" constantly fighting it out to see which rides the skies, it's usually worse. Thus, during these winter months since the organization of the air force, when it has cooperated in operations of such magnitude as the advance through the Belfort Gap and to the Siegfried Line, and the elimination of the Colmar pocket, First Tac AF's flyers often have had to battle to their targets through snow, rain, cloud and fog that a few years ago would have been considered impossible flying conditions. For a time the snow lay two feet deep in the Vosges region; yet a single two-day period was the longest time the air force went without flying because of it. And for one stretch of 34 days, from December 14 to January 16, inclusive, the French and American airmen were out every day--and some of those days were among the worst during the year. Nevertheless they managed to fly more than 10,000 sorties in the period, dropping 5000 tons of bombs, destroying 1,805 railway cars and damaging 4,430 more.

Such an achievement took men of the caliber of Major Leonard, men with guts, and there are plenty of them flying in this unusual air force.

Take for example Brigadier General Cornignion-Molinier, 47-year-old fighter pilot who heads up the French Atlantic Air Command. This black-haired vigorous leader was a high-ranking ace in the First World War, with a dozen

2

4 add warweek story

victories to his credit; a dare-devil experimental flyer in civilian life, even now, at an age that's practically patriarchal for flying fighter planes, he often leads his men in person, and has shot down two German planes in the present war. General Cornigilles-Wollander helped reorganize the Free French Air Forces in Libya, where he flew tactical missions coordinated with the British Eighth Army.

Another is Lt. Col. Harvey L. Case of Houston, Texas, red-headed leader of the "Jabolt" Thunderbolt group, and at 24, one of the youngest men to head a USAF combat group. Col. Skt Case led his outfit on D-Day over the beach-heads of Normandy; and they moved with the Third Army up through France, wrecking railway stock, hammering defenses, and killing Germans as they went. The name "Jabolt" they acquired from the Germans who dreaded it: it is a corruption of "Jabo," which in turn, is short for Jagdbomber, the Jerry name for fighter-bomber. The burly young colonel, who had repeatedly braved ground fire to shoot up German trains, transport and gun positions, had to fly 75 missions before he ever sighted an enemy plane--but out of that encounter he got a probable.

A group commander in a B-26 outfit, Col. Ashley Woolridge of Clearfield, Pa., led his group recently on marshalling yards at Offenburg, where the fighter-bombers in the morning had reported seeing a large concentration of railway cars--some 1500 of them. Col. Woolridge was flying his 97th mission that day. As far as anyone knows, he leads all Marauder men in this theater, and he has no intention of giving up flying while the war's going on.

There are plenty of others: the Alsatian lad, arbitrarily declared a German by the Nazis, who joined the Luftwaffe, fled in a stolen plane as soon as he learned to solo, and now flies a First Tac AF Spitfire, sometimes over his native province; the American P-47 pilot, 1st Lt. George V. McClintic of

5 add warweek story

Bayre, Okla., who, flying a sub liaison plane, led a pair of anti-aircraft fire which brought both of them down; the French school-teacher, imprisoned and carted off to Germany for teaching things the Nazis didn't like, who escaped to France, to Africa, and came back over Germany flying a P-47.

These men and thousands of others like them are on the job now of snipping away at the southwestern edges of Germany--and incidentally of rebuilding a powerful French Air Force, one which will help keep the German war-makers forever grounded.

"I'll tell you how it is," explained a high-ranking American officer in the First Tactical Air Force--a man who has had much to do with putting the French Air Force back in business--"I have a wife and a couple of kids. A strong French Air Force is going to help me get back to them a lot sooner."

- 30 -

... THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526 ...

VI-a

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

0058

HEADQUARTERS
FIRST TACTICAL AIR FORCE (PROV)
APO 374

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

E-F-7

AUTH: CG 1 TACAF
DATE: 22 Mar 45
INIT: KIT
COPY NUMBER: 7
22 March 1945

SUBJECT: Letter of Instruction Number 4.

TO : Commanding Generals, XII Tactical Air Command, APO 374,
US Army.
42nd Bomb Wing, APO 374, US Army.
First French Air Corps,

1. a. See current Intelligence Summary.
 - b. (1) Twelfth and 21st Army Groups continue current operations.
 - (2) Sixth Army Group continues to destroy the enemy west of the RHINE preparatory to establishing a bridgehead east of the RHINE.
 - (3) The Ninth Air Force continues to provide air cooperation for the Twelfth Army Group. XIX TAC continues to provide Armed Reconnaissance to the North of the Sixth Army Group Boundary.
 - (4) 2nd TAF continues to provide air cooperation for the 21st Army Group.
2. Until such time as the Sixth Army Group initiates an attack for seizing a bridgehead east of the RHINE, the First TACAF will employ its forces primarily on a railway interdiction program in preparation for subsequent advance of the ground forces. Primary objective is to disrupt rail facilities in critical areas and reduce mobility of enemy supplies and reinforcements.
3. a. The XII TAC will employ air effort by:
 - (1) Furnishing close cooperation to the 7th Army as required.
 - (2) Concentrating fighter bomber effort: interdicting all rail lines and performing armed reconnaissance in the following area: GERMERSHEIM, east to BRUCHSAL,

First TACAF, Ltr c. Instruction No. 4, 22 Mar 52, cont'd.

DECLASSIFIED

EO 11652

East to HEILBRONN, North along the main railroad to
ADLERHEIM, North to MILTENBERG, North to ADCHAPPE-
BURG, West to DIBBURG, West to DARMSTADT, West to GR.
GEMAU (all inclusive). Coordinate operations in the
northern part of this area with XII Tactical Air Com-
mand.

b. The First French Air Corps will employ air effort by:

- (1) Furnishing close cooperation to the First French Army
as required.
- (2) Concentrate maximum fighter bomber effort on inter-
dicting rail lines and conducting armed reconnaissance
in the following areas; with the major effort in the
Northern section: From GEMAUHEIM, East to BRUCHMEL,
East to HEILBRONN (exclusive), South to STUTTGART,
East to FLOCHINGEN, South to REUTLINGEN, Southwest to
DORFENHOFINGEN, Southwest to the RUINE, at REUTLINGEN
(inclusive).

c. The 42nd Bomb Wing will employ air effort by:

- (1) Conducting rail interdiction primarily in the area
assigned to the XII Tactical Air Command. Targets
will normally be vital bridges, rail embankments,
and marshalling yards.
- (2) Attacking armored vehicles repair shops and armored
vehicle supply depots.

4. Administrative instructions, no change.

5. Signal instructions, no change.

By command of Major General WEBSTER:

HERB SCHRAMM,
Brigadier General, USA,
Deputy Commanding General.

OFFICIAL:

Ralph E. Fisher
RALPH E. FISHER,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Ass't. C/S, A-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG XII TAC
CG 42nd Bomb Wg
CG First French Air Corps
CG Sixth Army Group

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

VI-B

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

HEADQUARTERS
FIRST TACTICAL AIR FORCE (PROV)
APO 374

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

S-F-1

AUTH: OG 1 TACAF:
DATE: 28 Mar 45
LIFE: 187
OF NO. 39
28 March 1945

SUBJECT: Letter of Instruction number 5.

TO : Commanding General, XII Tactical Air Command, APO 374, US Army.
Commanding General, 42nd Bomb Wing, APO 374, US Army.
Commanding General, First French Air Corps.

1. a. See current Intelligence Summary.

- b. (1) Operations of the Allied armies have as their objective the isolation of the Rhine. The plan of the 21st and 12th Army Groups is to effect a junction in the general area KASSEL - PADERBORN. Having effected a junction, 21st and 12th Army Groups will prepare for a further advance into Germany.
- (2) The Sixth Army Group continues the offensive protecting the right flank of the 12th Army Group advancing rapidly northeast in the zone of action and seizing ROHR ROHR hill mass.

BOUNDARIES:

Between 12th and 6th Army Groups: SAARBRUCKEN - METZ - NANCY - then along the railroad along the Moselle River to OBERKESSEL - MELLENHAIN - ALVER - OBERKESSEL - GERAU - FRANKFORT (all to 12th Army Group) - railroad north of Main River to MAIN - FULDA - MELLENHAIN (all to Sixth Army Group).

Between 7th Army and First French Army: SPEYER - HEILBRONN (both to the First French Army).

- (3) The Ninth Air Force continues to provide air effort to the 12th Army Group. The XII Tactical Air Command continues armed reconnaissance north of the Sixth Army Group boundary.
- (4) 2nd TAF continues to provide air effort to the 21st Army Group.

2. The First Tactical Air Force (Prov) provides coordinated air effort to the Sixth Army Group by the destruction of enemy defenses, installations, troops, communications, and supplies primarily in the zone of action of the 7th Army.

3. a. XII Tactical Air Command will employ air effort by:

- (1) Furnishing close air cooperation to the 7th Army.
- (2) Conducting armed reconnaissance in support of ground reconnaissance extending to the line BRUCHSAL - MELLERHAIN - GRALLSHEIM - ROTENBURG - NEUSTADT - BANGG - COBURG - ILSEN - MELLENHAIN.

162

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

First LCAF Ltr of Instruction No. 5, dtd 28 Mar 45 (cont'd).

- (3) Conducting night fighter operations. (an additional squadron, 417th Night Fighter Squadron, will shortly be available and operational from St. Dizier, A-64).
 - (4) Conducting counter air force operations.
 - (5) Conducting photo reconnaissance to obtain target information.
- b. First French Air Corps will employ air effort by:
- (1) Furnishing air cooperation to the First French Army as required.
 - (2) Conducting counter air force operations, particular attention being given to the SPUTIGART area.
 - (3) Conducting armed reconnaissance in the area of the First French Army primarily in the northern sector.
 - (4) Conducting interdiction of rail lines and highways at critical points so as to hinder enemy movement of supplies and personnel.
 - (5) Performing the necessary reconnaissance and defense patrols along the east bank of the RHINE.
 - (6) Furnishing additional fighter-bomber effort to the XII Tactical Air Command if required.
- c. 42nd Bomb Wing will employ air effort by:
- (1) Attacking ordnance installations and repair depots utilized in connection with armored vehicle repair, storage, and supply.
 - (2) Protecting the right flank of the main effort of the Sixth Army Group by interdicting communications along the general line STRASSBURG - SPUTIGART - GRALLSHEIM.
 - (3) Attacking POL refinery and storage installations.
- x. (1) The area of air responsibility between the XII Tactical Air Command and First French Air Corps is the boundary between the 7th and First French Armies extended east to GRALLSHEIM.
- (2) XII Tactical Air Command is normally responsible for furnishing fighter escort for US medium bombers; First French Air Corps is normally responsible for furnishing fighter escort to French medium bombers. In this connection, the Commanding General, 42nd Bomb Wing will select targets for the French medium bombers whenever practicable that are within the radius of action of spitfires acting as escort.

4. Administrative instructions, no change.

First TaCAF Ltr of Instruction No. 5, dtd 28 Mar 45 (cont'd).

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

5. Signal instructions, no change.

By command of Major General J. B. F. J. J.

C. S. G. G. G. G.,
Colonel, Air Corps,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

Ralph E. Fisher
Ralph E. Fisher,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Ass't. C/S, A-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

	copies:
CG XII T.O.	1 - 10
CG First French MO	11 - 15
CG 42nd Bomb Wing	16 - 23
USSTAF	24 - 25
SMC/Fwd.	26 - 27
Ninth Air Force	28 - 29
Sixth Army Group	30 - 33
First TaCAF (internal)	34 - 40

... . THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526 . . .

VII-4

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

0965

INTERVIEW WITH LT. COL. ROGER DUHAZE
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, A-2, FRENCH
SECTION, FIRST TACTICAL AIR FORCE

JUNE 10, 1945

Interviewers:

1st Lt. Fain
1st Lt. Grattan

F The first thing I want to know is how the Headquarters Detachment, French Section, was set up.

D Well, General Royce set it up when the French Air Corps was in his hands. He asked for us. It was supposed to be an entirely operational unit; we weren't to have anything to do with administration or supply. Just A-2 and A-3. General Langmead was very insistent that all administrative matters be handled by the Service Command, by Col. Buchet.

F Do you remember any early discussions, before the formation of First TAC AF, about what part the French were to play in it?

D Yes, there was one early in October.

F At Caserta?

D That's right. You should see Hartemann. He represented the French there.

G Wasn't it Commandant Blumenthal? From USSTAF?

D Yes, that's right. It was Blumenthal, from USSTAF.

F Were there any discussions, any high-level disputes, about whether the French would be an independent air force, or whether they would come under the Americans? -- Or as to how much control there would be?

D No, Not at all. It was always agreed that they should come under the American Air Force. You see, before the conference the French Air Corps was under XII TAC. That was the idea of the conference, to take them out of XII TAC.

F -- And put them on a level with it, instead of under it, and put a third, higher command, over it, so that the two units, which were the same, would be parallel?

D That's right.

G They were under XII TAC at the southern France landings, weren't they? They were called the Air Forces of the Rhine and Rhone.

D Yes, but it was the First French Air Corps. There was the 1st Fighter Group, 4th Group with three squadrons, one squadron of 3rd Group, and six Marauder squadrons.

F They were set up in Corsica, weren't they?

D Yes, they had to be under XII TAC there because they didn't have enough signals and supplies.

F So really they were moved up and given more freedom when they were taken out of XII TAC.

D Yes. It was always promised that they would be completely free, as soon as it was possible.

F Another thing. Later on, when the French Bomb Wing was placed under the command of General Doyle, were there any objections on the part of General Gerardot or anyone else?

D He hated it.

F Were there any documents, any correspondence, between Gerardot and Bouscat, for instance?

D No, it was all verbal; but he was furious.

F You see, I have a document here which lays out the plan whereby General Doyle was to run the French

Brigade. Let's see. You see, he wasn't even allowed to make transfers of group commanders without General Doyle's approval or of the wing staff.

D Well, he never had that power. It was the Air Ministry. He could only recommend. But, of course, it was always approved.

F Whose idea was the change?

D It was Col. Bouvard, the Assistant Chief of Staff of the French Air Force. First, General Royce wanted to set up a separate command --

F A bomber command?

D Yes, a bomber command. But he wanted the brigade, the French brigade, to be separate.

F Under the direct operational control of the First TAC AF?

D That's right. But they were too poor.

F So, Royce and Bouvard decided to put it under the 42nd Wing?

D Yes.

F What about the B-26 crews. Do you think that they

were any better, that their morale was any better, than that of the fighter pilots? It seems to me I have heard they were.

D Who told you that? Doyle?

F No, I think it was Lt. Grattan.

G No, it just seemed to me that there was a closer working relationship between the Americans and the French there. They really worked together -- Col. Gregory and Col. Bodet.

D Well, of course, that was because they were right together. With the Fighters, there was no close contact. They were rivals. But with the B-26's they were together, side by side, all the time.

F They really did work well, didn't they? It was really a friendly relationship.

D Oh, it was marvellous.

G What about the relationship between General Gerardot and General de Lattre? They didn't get along very well, did they?

D No, You see, both were very strong men; proud, ambitious, self-confident; that is, if you don't use

big words like egocentric.

G Didn't they reach a point where they wouldn't speak to each other, where General de Lattre wouldn't let Gerardot in his briefings?

D Yes, that's right. You see, he wanted to run the air force. I was sent down to see de Lattre, with Col. Gramrine, to straighten it out. It was about the Colmar pocket. The French had two Army corps, No. 2 coming from the south, and No. 1 from the north, and the First French Air Corps was supposed to support the south, and the XII TAC the north.

F What did de Lattre want to do?

D He wanted to command the U. S. and the French air forces, and be able to say who should bomb where.

G In other words he wanted to be able to ask for final target decision?

D That's exactly right. Col. Gramrine was wonderful. He said that General Gerardot was to get his orders from General Royce, and that he (de Lattre) could ask for targets.

F You mean the usual way, in an American air force; the ground asks for air, and if the air force sees

fit, it gives support; if it has something else that the air commander considers more important, it doesn't.

D Yes. Col. Crumrine said "That's the way General Royce says it's going to be, and that's the way it's going to be."

G He said it in English? Did de Lattre understand?

D Yes, he understood. He got absolutely red in the face. Then he said, "I am a full general. If General Royce wants to do this, why doesn't he come down here himself and see me, instead of sending a colonel?" Then I said something -- I don't know what it was -- and he became quiet. Then he said -- "You mean you want me to have another marriage with Gerardot?" I said, "Well, General, I think it would be a good idea." "All right, he said. "But will you promise me that he won't come in here every five minutes, and say, 'But sir! That's idiot, you fool!', when I ask for something?"

G What do you think was the reason for their dislike of each other? Was there any rivalry between them, dating back, I mean?

D No, no, it was nothing like that. Just a battle between two men, and the old jealousy between air and ground. We had better pay, lived better, better uniforms.

F In the war of 1939-1940, did the French Air Force work the way an American air force does now, with the ground asking for support, but the air commander making the decision?

D Of course. It was that way. The change started in 1922, when the air force became a separate arm, or branch of the Army. Then in 1929, they started the Air Ministry, and the air force was entirely separate. That made places for a lot of new generals, and a lot of people were jealous.

F The French Air Force is just about parallel to the RAF, then, isn't it?

D Almost exactly. Is there anything else?

F I wanted to ask you a few questions about the Western French Air Force.

D Oh, that. That was a silly business. Just something to make a job for a general. Or to make a general.

F Yes, General Royce asked for a general, didn't he, and they didn't have one, so they made Corniglion-Molinier a general.

D That's right. There never was any sense in it.

F Are there any papers showing how it was set up? I have documents referring to Independence, this one on Dec. 3, but nothing about how it was set up, or where it came from, or anything like that.

D You would surely find that at the Air Ministry.

G How did the French feel about General Royce and General Saville? I have heard some people in this headquarters say that the three weeks he was here were a period of confusion.

D Well, I don't know, but I think everyone liked Saville. I don't think that had anything to do with his leaving.

D (Col. Duhaze tells a story.)

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

VII-B

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

INTERVIEW WITH LIEUTENANT COLONEL FRANCIS BESNARD AND
LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROGER DUHAZE, 23 JUNE 1945, AT SAVERNE

Interviewer: 1st Lt. Fain

F I would like specially to ask you a few questions
about the French section.

B That is precisely what you must realize: that it
was really not a French section. Only in an
administrative way, for the purpose of handling
matters of persons in the section, was it a section.
It was simply a number of officers and enlisted men,
all assigned to different sections in the air force,
and under the orders of the chief of that section.
For example, Colonel Duhaize was in the A-2 section,
under the orders of Colonel Young.

F And what was the function of these officers?

D Why, it was to help the chief of each section in
whatever way they could.

F But did they engage in the actual operation of the sections, or were they just to be consulted on French matters.

D Well, that depended. In some cases they did the actual work, on others not.

F For example, in the A-2 section, the French officers didn't handle the reporting of the French operations, did they?

D No, they didn't. However, that was simply a matter that Colonel Young had decided. He had put Lieutenant Richard Breaud in the target section, for example; he might perfectly well have put him on as a reporting officer. That was a matter entirely up to the American section chief. We were at their disposal. Besnard was Colonel Fisher's French assistant, in A-3.

F You had a good deal to do with handling of the Western French Air Forces, didn't you?

D That was one of his main jobs.

F What in particular did you have to do, in that connection?

B Well, there was all the matter of planning the operation "VENERABLE" -- working out the use of the medium bombers and the Strategic Air Force.

F What did you think of the three American generals? In their relationship with the French, I mean?

B Webster, in his way, was fine. He gave every sort of help.

D You never knew what he was thinking.

B That's true -- never. But he was very good. Royce was perhaps our favorite. We were very fond of him. But I think that at first, at least, things were a little confused under him. Too many people were trying to run things.

D Everyone took charge, because Royce took charge of nothing.

It was a curious situation. What was this business of Putman being chief of Staff?

F He wasn't a flying officer, was he?

D He was really Royce's A.D.C., that's all. I never understood it.

F What about Seville?

D We liked him very well. He ran the TACAF like a TAC -- that is to say he commanded very personally, very directly.

F What progress do you think was made by the French Air Force, under First TACAF?

B From the point of view of administrative technique, and in the use of aviation, much progress. For instance, almost the whole system of modern fighter control, "scrambles", and so on, was learned while we were under TACAF. Or, at least, it was perfected.

F What about piloting?

B Not much progress, I should say. The best pilots in the French Air Force are still the older ones.

E Yes, all the really good pilots are the old ones -- men of thirty or more. So you cannot say much progress was made there. You know that Frenchmen have always been good pilots, but I do not think that the younger ones, now, are quite as good.

F Do you think the French Air Force is capable of standing alone now?

B Yes -- with some exceptions. Of course, France is very poor, so from the point of view of supply, we cannot go on without American help. Planes, equipment, food -- we need all those.

F But from the point of view of personnel?

B From the point of view of personnel, yes -- but with one exception. Signals -- we haven't enough personnel trained in signals. We need specialists in that field.

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

VII-3

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

0981

HEADQUARTERS
FIRST TACTICAL AIR FORCE (PAOV)
AFO 374

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

Reg. E-108
E-F-1

Auth: OG
Init: REF
Date 18 Nov
Copy no 9

18 November 1944

SUBJECT: Directive.

TO : Commanding Officer, Western French Air Forces.

1. Effective at 0001A hours, 20 November 1944, the air units to be under your command for the Operation INDOPACOM will be designated Western French Air Forces and is established as a separate command directly under this Headquarters.

2. a. Initially you will assume command of the following French Air units:

- (1) Dive Bomb Squadron VFB 1
- (2) Dive Bomb Squadron VFB 2
- (3) Group Patrie

b. Squadrons VFB 1 and VFB 2 have been directed to move from Fort Lyautey to the airfield at Cognac to begin arrival not before 25 November and to be operational 28 November.

c. Assignment of additional air support to the Western French Air Forces will be held in abeyance until more intelligence information is received.

3. a. Your mission is to provide close and direct air support and air reconnaissance to the Commanding General, Western French Forces in the reduction of German pockets astride the Gironde Estuary so as to enable the port of Bordeaux to be opened on or before 1 January 1945.

b. Effective without delay, you will employ the aircraft of Group Patrie to obtain essential information for ground and air operations. Bombing and strafing attacks by the Group Patrie will be made on targets of opportunity in the Gironde Estuary area within the capabilities of supplies and equipment immediately available.

c. You will establish liaison with the Commanding General, Western French Forces in order that maximum coordination may be maintained throughout the operation.

d. You will be responsible for the safeguarding and internal security of supplies and equipment at your air bases. You will call upon the Commanding General, Western French Forces for such provisions for security against external attack as is deemed necessary.

Ltr, Hq First TACAF, dtd 18 Nov 44, subj: Directive. (Cont'd).

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

4. a. You will submit daily on or before 0800A hours:

- (1) An Operational Summary (OPSUM) effective 21 November briefly outlining results of operations of each participating air unit to include A/C involved, number of sorties, type of mission, and results.
- (2) A summary of directives effective 20 November 1944 to lower air units for the succeeding day's operations based on intelligence information available, requests from the ground forces, and specific directives issued by this Headquarters.

b. Messages, reports, etc. between your Headquarters and this Command will be in the English language.

c. This Headquarters will provide the necessary Liaison Officers to your Headquarters.

5. a. The Service Command, First Tactical Air Force (Prov) is responsible for the coordination of logistical support to your air units.

b. Supply Liaison Officer, this Headquarters, will assist in all supply problems including requisitioning, procurement, salvage, and maintenance of stock levels. He will assure that proper channels are established to insure a smooth flow of supplies to your units. He will process requisitions for items that are not common.

c. Southern Line of Communications (SOLOC) is responsible for screening your requisitions, determining sources and setting up shipments to the port of SLE.

6. For Signal Instructions see Signal Plan for OPERATION INDEPENDENCE, this Headquarters, dated 15 November 1944.

7. Detailed plans based on this directive will be furnished this Headquarters not later than 3 December 1944.

By Command of Major General ROYCE:

RED SCRAW, U.S.A.,
Brig. Gen., U.S.A.,
Deputy CG for
Operations.

OFFICIAL:

Ralph E. Fisher
RALPH E. FISHER,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Asst. C/S, A-3.

Ltr, Hq First TACAF, dtd 18 Nov 44, subj: Directive. (Cont'd)

DISTRIBUTION:

	Copy No
CG, Western French Air Force	1-2
CG, USSTAF	3
CG, SHALF, Main (Air)	4
CG, Sixth Army Group	5
CG, Western French Forces	6-7
CG, First French Air Corps	8
French Liaison, First TACAF	9
D/C Administration, this Hq	10-11
Ops & File, this Hq	12-17

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

711-D

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

0085

1st Ind.

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652
DEC 20 1980

Hq, US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE (MAIN), APO 379, APO 393, US Army.

To: Commanding General, First Tactical Air Force (Prov), APO 374, US Army.

1. The following is a list of discrepancies noted in basic communication and is based on information furnished this headquarters by SHAFF, Mission, (France), Air Section, Rearmament Division. Their request of units to be attached your headquarters is indicated in letter, H, US Strategic Air Forces in Europe (S in), file 324, subject: attachments, dated 12 December 1944.

a. Units attached to First Tactical Air Force (Prov) not appearing in basic communication:

- (1) Hq & Hq Sq, 550th Air Defense Wing
- (2) 401st Mobile Hospital
- (3) 571st Signal Bn TAC

b. Units shown in basic communication not attached to First Tactical Air Force (Prov):

- (1) Hq & Hq Sq, First Fighter Wing (this unit is not presently planned for activation)
- (2) I/33 Photo Recon Sq - (this unit is not yet activated. SHAFF is sending a request to the MD for activation)
- (3) Hq & Hq Sq, 1st Bomb Wing (M) - (this unit is presently planned but no provision has been made for its activation)
- (4) 541st AAA Regiment
50th AAA AB Bn (SM)
51st " " " "
55th " " " "

2. The Western French Air Force has not been placed at the disposal of the CG, US Strategic Air Forces in Europe, and therefore should not be shown as attached to the First Tactical Air Force (Prov).

3. Hq & Hq Sq, 1st French Air Corps and Hq & Hq Sq, 1st French Air Corps, ASC, should be changed to read Hq & Hq Sq, 1st French Tactical Air Command and Hq & Hq Sq, 1st French Air Service Command.

4. For your information it is contemplated in the future that other French Air Force units will be made available to the CG, US Strategic Air Forces in Europe at which time they will be further attached to your headquarters.

By command of Lieutenant General SPATZ:

J. B. GORDON,
Colonel, AGD.

~~SECRET~~
SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
AIR STAFF

DECLASSIFIED JCS Memo 17 Jan 73
AFC 757
5 December 1944.

MEMORANDUM TO: Commanding General, First Tactical Air Force (Prov)
APO 374, US Army.

SUBJECT: List of French Air Force Units.

1. Following my letter of 1 December in which was enclosed a list of French Air Force Units: A revised list as of 1 December has been received from the Air Section of SHAEF Mission to France. This list includes:

- a. French units operating with US Forces, US equipment.
- b. French units not operating with US Forces, US equipment.
- c. French units operating with Allied Forces, British equipment.
- P. Copy of the revised list is forwarded for your information.

For the Deputy Supreme Commander:

H C McHINLEY,
Lt Col AGO,
Adjutant General.

1 Incl: List of Units (in dup)

... THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526 ...

VII-B

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

~~EXEMPT EO 13526~~

~~EXEMPT EO 13526~~

1°- Le préavis de survol de l'expédition m'est arrivé le 5 Janvier à 8 heures (c'est-à-dire 4 heures après le bombardement) par l'intermédiaire du P.C. Transmissions (1) des Forces Françaises de l'Ouest. Le retard dans l'arrivée du message jusqu'à mon poste de commandement ne m'est donc pas imputable contrairement aux observations que vous m'avez fait parvenir sous numéro E.2990 le 6 Janvier.

Il est indispensable qu'à l'avenir je sois prévenu directement pour que je puisse donner toutes instructions concernant le tir de la D.C.A. et l'alerte du terrain de COGNAC. Toutes dispositions ^{toujours été} ont/prises à l'intérieur de mon Etat-Major pour que les messages importants soient immédiatement exploités.

2°- L'examen de la photo ci-jointe en date du 6 Janvier montre que l'agglomération royannaise a été durement éprouvée. Toutes les habitations paraissent détruites entre la plage, la gare et la lisière N.O. de ROYAN.

Les objectifs militaires à l'intérieur du périmètre de la ville étaient très peu nombreux :

- Fort de ROYAN (non compris sur la photo) ,
- Golf Hôtel non touché,
- Coupole bétonnée près de la gare.

/.....

-3-

~~EXEMPTED FROM EO 13526~~
~~DO NOT RELEASE~~

La population civile de ROYAN a donc été sérieusement éprouvée sans résultats militaires importants. Les principaux points tenus par l'ennemi BELMONT, JAFFE, VALLIERES, St-SORDOLIN, objectifs qui vous ont été donnés sur un calque au 1/ 25.000 (1) n'ont pas été touchés par le bombardement.

3°- Je crois donc devoir saisir cette occasion pour tirer les enseignements suivants :

a)- Répartition des objectifs. Initialement il avait été convenu que les groupes basés en Angleterre prendraient à leur compte les objectifs de LA COUBRE et de la POINTE DE GRAVE. Par la suite vous m'aviez fait savoir que les seuls objectifs de LA COUBRE seraient pris à partie par ces groupes lourds. (Les renseignements que nous avons recueillis jusqu'à ce jour tendent à prouver qu'ils n'ont pas été atteints).

Par ailleurs, il ne vous échappera pas qu'il est essentiel de répartir entre les unités basées en Angleterre et mes propres Forces Aériennes les objectifs dont la destruction doit être obtenue avant le jour de l'attaque et qu'un programme commun doit être arrêté dans ce but.

/.....

(1) - dont vous trouverez ci-joint un nouvel exemplaire.

-4-

De même, l'effet moral des bombardements massifs que vous êtes seul en mesure de déclencher doit être utilisé par les forces terrestres pour l'exécution de coups de mains, de destructions et de passage d'agents.

Le croquis ci-joint donne le détail des objectifs du secteur de ROYAN qui pourraient être assignés aux prochaines expéditions.

b)- Sécurité des équipages. Les terrains de COGNAC, TOULOUSE, BORDEAUX pourraient être balisés et servir de terrains de secours aux équipages en difficultés. D'autre part si je pouvais disposer d'un ensemble RADAR - IFF, l'identification par la D.C.A. des avions amis permettrait d'éviter toute méprise. Il est à noter que chaque nuit volable, des avions allemands survolent notre région pour atterrir à ROYAN-MEDIS ou à LA ROCHELLE-LALEU.

c)- Défense du terrain de COGNAC.

Toutes ces précautions m'apparaissent indispensables pour que soient efficaces, le cas échéant, les mesures de défense prises sur le terrain de COGNAC. et qui ont pour but de s'opposer, avec le faible armement dont je dispose :

- au débarquement de troupes parachutées ; vous n'êtes pas sans ignorer que de nombreux agents ont été parachutés en différents endroits. Quelques uns ont même

-5-

été arrêtés sur des terrains occupés par les Américains (cas de CHATEAUDUN). Dans la nuit du 4 au 5 Janvier 1945 8 membres d'équipages britanniques ont sauté en parachute aux environs de COGNAC et ont été arrêtés par le service de garde du terrain. Ils auraient pu payer de leur vie le fait que nous n'avions pas été prévenus.

- au bombardement du terrain. D'après des informations de source sûre l'Amiral allemand commandant la place de ROYAN aurait demandé par radio le 31 Décembre que le terrain de COGNAC soit bombardé par la Luftwaffe.

2/01419/121/01416

COPIE à :

- Mr. le GENERAL, Inspecteur Général de l'Armée de l'Air et Commandant les Forces Aériennes Engagées PARIS
- Mr. le GENERAL, Chef d'Etat-Major Général " AIR " PARIS
- Mr. le GENERAL, Commandant les Forces Françaises de l'Ouest COGNAC

calque
au
1/ 25.000°
non
joint.

... THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526 ...

VII-2

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

TOP SECRET

2 Pages
Page 1

TRANSLATION

~~EXEMPT~~ EO 11652

H. R. 13 Jan 1945

H* 287/770/cab

General de LAMBINAT
Commanding the 877

to

Lt General D E V E R S
Commanding 6th Army Group

1. On the 10th Dec. 1944, Major General ROYCE studied in COGNAC the possibilities of air-raids on ROYAN. He proposed then, to have night bombardments on pointe de Grave (le Verdon) and pointe de la Goubre to destroy their coastal and antiaircraft batteries. These actions were to be carried out by heavy bomber formations that were being trained in Great Britain for night bombing. They could be undertaken even before the period of preparation of the attack, their great strength should enable them to destroy the targets.

I gave my approval to these suggestions, the targets being precise enough and located far enough from my own positions to render a mistake impossible.

At no time was it question of a night attack on the town of ROYAN, which could only have been accepted after evacuating the civilian population and which besides was of very little military value.

Moreover, on the same day, tracing of targets of enemy positions in the ROYAN, GRAVE area, was given to Major General ROYCE - All the main targets are located outside of the town of ROYAN.

Since the 10th of december, no communication was made to me a change in the targets designated for night bombing except that pointe de Grave's

TOP SECRET

~~SECRET~~
2 Pages
Page 2

target was abandoned in favor of the Pointe de la Coubre target.

2. During the night of the 4th to the 5th January, a large bombing formation, in two successive waves, at one hour interval, have dropped 1,600 tons of bombs on the town ROYAN proper, destroying completely the town in its most densely inhabited part.

This bombardment caused the death of about 800 civilians besides 200 more people were wounded.

The German losses seem to be light, as no important military work is located in the bombed area.

3. It is certain that the target assigned to the mission was the town of ROYAN. This is made clear by the results observed, too concentrated to be the result of an error. It is also proved by declaration received in COGNAC from members of disabled crews.

4. Such a mistake seems to me too serious for not having an investigation made to determine the responsibilities and prevent such an error to happen again. I shall be grateful if I were kept informed of the results of such an investigation.

5. I, furthermore, request very earnestly that no bombing operation will be carried out in one of the Western Front areas by an air force not assigned to this Front, without a contact being made between this Force and the Staff of the Atlantic Air Force, that cooperates with my Command, to determine the targets and the timing of the operation.

Without such a liaison, we are exposed to further mistakes of grave consequences on the efficiency of the means employed as well as on the tactical results.

THIS IS A TRUE COPY:

Russell B. Putman
Lt. Colonel, Air Corps
THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

TOP SECRET

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

VII-C

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

00007

copy # 3

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

17 January 1945

MEMORANDUM

TO : Lt. General Jacob L. Deyers, Commanding General, Sixth Army Group,
APO 83, U. S. Army.

1. With reference to the letter from General de LAMINAT regarding the bombing of ROYAN, the following is what occurred as I reconstruct it from memory, from my diary and statements of my Staff.

"On Sunday, 10 December 1944, I visited the headquarters of General de LAMINAT, accompanied by General COMBOLLE-DELLINIE, Commanding the Western French Air Force, Lt. Colonel de CHASSEY, French Air Force, Deputy Chief of Staff, First Tactical Air Force (Provisional) and Colonel CHERRINE (US), Executive for the Deputy Commander for Operations, First Tactical Air Force (Provisional), the latter two members of my Staff.

General de LAMINAT, using a map of ROYAN and vicinity which showed the various German strongpoints and installations, outlined to me in general his intentions. I informed General de LAMINAT that General BOCLITTLE had informed me that a special force was being built up in the Eighth Air Force to undertake night bombing and that he would be glad to take on targets in the ROYAN area for the training of that force. Accordingly, the batteries at POINTE de la COUERE were allocated to that force. I also informed General de LAMINAT that from time to time when weather made it impossible for the medium and heavy bombers to operate to the east that it would be possible to use them against the ROYAN area proper. General de LAMINAT at that time agreed to the use of such a force in that area. I twice brought up the question of the possibility of killing French civilians in the area and he informed me that such a loss was to be expected and that I was at liberty to bomb anywhere in the area after 15 December 1944. Accordingly, a copy of the map used by General de LAMINAT showing the German positions was taken to SHREAF the following Wednesday, 13 December 1944, and presented to the Air Staff, with the request that the area be hit when any strategic Air Force became available. It was also my intentions to hit the area with medium bombers of this Air Force if the opportunity presented itself.

I am inclosing statements by Colonel CHERRINE and Lt. Colonel de CHASSEY.

The town of ROYAN was definitely the target and the strongpoints therein were pointed out to be by General de LAMINAT. There was no error as regards the target area.

Ltr, General Devers, 17 Jan 45, cont'd.

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

When word was received of the impending attack every attempt was made by communications available to contact the Ground and Air Forces in that area. For some reason, the messages were not delivered until after the attack. (See attached statement)

Liason was established with the forces concerned and there was no doubt in my mind then or is there now as to the propriety of striking all the area within the German lines. If the opinions of General de LAMONT change from time to time, it is of the utmost importance that this headquarters be informed.

The distances involved and the poor communications available do not permit that the Ground Commanders be consulted every time it is possible to hit targets in his immediate front. I believe that the best effect can be obtained from the use of the Air Arm if the Ground Commander concerned indicated the results that he desires to accomplish and leave it to the Air man to effect the results, when and if possible. Attention is invited to the fact that three attacks were made by General BOOLITTLE's forces. (See attached message). No previous notice could be given of the intended attack and no exact information was received until yesterday when this message was received."

2. If you desire anything further on this matter, I shall be very glad to prepare same. The letter of General de LAMONT does not, in my mind, present a true picture of the understanding that existed when I left his headquarters on 10 December 1944. There is no desire on my part to get into a long discussion with General de LAMONT as to the attack in question. I personally feel that this is an attempt to pass the responsibility for something that was a results of General de LAMONT's statements.

3. I am making a report of this matter to Air Staff, SHANT, who have also made inquiries regarding the sequence of events.

RALPH ROYCE
Major General, USA
Commanding.

- 4 Incls:
Incl #1 - Statement Col. Crumrine
Incl #2 - Statement Lt. Col. de Chassey
Incl #3 - Statement of messages
Incl #4 - cy telegram 8th AF

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

17 January 1945

STATEMENT ON BOMBING OF ROYAN

1. Conference at COGNAC on 10 December 1944. Present: Major General ROYCE, Brigadier General CORNIGLION-MOLINIER, Colonel C. E. DRUMHINE, Colonel LAUZIN and Lt. Colonel de CHASSEY.

2. Targets discussed;

- a. Gun positions POINT de la COUBRE Area.
- b. Gun positions POINT de GRAVE Area.
- c. Gun positions and strong points in the ROYAN Area.

3. Large scale maps with locations of military targets in these three areas were prepared and presented to SHREY Air for future bombardment by "heavy bombers".

4. It was agreed at the conference that all three areas in paragraph 2 should be attacked by air bombardment.

5. General ROYCE asked General CORNIGLION-MOLINIER if ROYAN would be cleared of French civilians. General CORNIGLION-MOLINIER replied that the French civilians were being evacuated from ROYAN and that it would be alright to bomb ROYAN anytime after 15 December 1944.

6. A subsequent conference was held with General de LAMINAT in his office at COGNAC 10 December 1944. Officers listed in Paragraph 1 were present with General de LAMINAT. Targets listed in paragraph 2 were discussed and it was agreed to attack target areas listed in paragraph 2 with heavy bombardment anytime after 15 December 1944.

C. E. DRUMHINE
Colonel, GSC
Executive to Deputy Commander
for operations

FIRST TACTICAL AIR FORCE

ETAT - MAJOR

La 17 - I - 45

SECTION FRANCAISE

No. 184/ 3
F.S.

Report by Lt-Col de CHASSEY on the meeting which
took place Dec. 10 1944 between Major General ROYCE and
General de LARMINAT

1. I would be unable to repeat exactly the conversation between the various officers who were taking part in it, but I remember very distinctly the spirit in which decisions were taken, especially the following points:-

2. General ROYCE started by informing General de LARMINAT that there was a possibility that the Eight Air Force heavy bombers might make a night attack in the ROYAN area. He added that if weather interfered with medium bomber operations in the east, Allied Command might consider using them in the same area.

3. Considering the danger which civilian populations might encounter during the bombings, General ROYCE asked General de LARMINAT twice what precautions should be taken in the opinion of the French over the matter. General de LARMINAT answered that he considered that the largest part of the population in the ROYAN area had been evacuated, that orders were given several times that the people should not stay there, and that, therefore, there was no reason why operations should be stopped for that reason in the whole enemy-held area. It was settled that bombings would be free to start after 15 December 1944.

4. General ROYCE and General de LARMINAT studied, after that, German positions around the ROYAN area on the map. General de LARMINAT pointed out what possibilities he saw for attack and how, in his opinion, support of these operations by ground, naval and air fire could be done in each case taken up. Maps bearing the same indications, drawn up at General CORMIGLION's Headquarters by Col. CRUMRINE, have been given to SHRAF by General ROYCE.

G.M.A. de CHASSEY
Lt. Colonel, French Air Force
Deputy Chief of Staff

FIRST TACTICAL AIR FORCE

ETAT - MAJOR

SECTION FRANCAISE

N° 184 /3
F.S.

Lc 17 - 1 - 45

Report by Lt-Col. de CHASSEY on the meeting which
took place Dec. 10 1944, Between Major General ROYCE
and General de LARMINAT

1- I would be unable to repeat exactly the conversation between the various officers who were taking part in it, but I remember very distinctly the spirit in which decisions were taken, specially on the following points:

2- General ROYCE starts by informing Général de LARMINAT that there was a possibility that 8 th AF heavy bombers might make a night attack in the Royan area; he adds that if weather interferes with medium Bombers operations in the East, Allied Command might consider using them in the same area.

3- Considering the danger which civilian populations might encounter during the bombings Général ROYCE asks Général de LARMINAT twice what precautions should be taken in the opinion of the French, over the matter.

General LARMINAT answers that he considers that the largest part of the population in the Royan area has been evacuated, that orders were given several times that they should not stay there, and that therefore there is no reason why operations should be stopped for that reason in the whole enemy - held area.

It is settled that bombings will be free to start after 15 December.

4- General ROYCE and General LARMINAT study, after that, German positions around Royan on the map; Général LARMINAT points out what possibilities for attack he sees and how, in his opinion, support of these operations by ground, naval and air fire could be done in each case taken up.

Maps bearing the same indications, drawn up at Général CORNICLION'S Headquarters by Col. CRUMLINE, have been given to SHAEF by General ROYCE.

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

17 January 1945

MESSAGES ON THE BOMBING OF ROYAN

1. Colonel McKinnon called Brigadier General SCHRAMM at 1700 hours 4 January 1945 and told him that the RAF planned to bomb Royan 0400 hours 5 January 1945.

2. Brigadier General SCHRAMM immediately placed phone call to Cognac but could get no answer either from the Air Corps or from the Ground Force Headquarters. Only the operator could be reached.

3. At 1945 hours, 4 January 1945, Headquarters First Tactical Air Force (Prov) sent cablegram to Commanding General Western French Air Forces advising that RAF would attack Royan at 0400 hours 5 January. Records show that this message was received at Headquarters Western French Air Forces at 2053 hours 4 January. No reply was received from this message.

4. At 1940 hours, 4 January 1945, the Sixth Army Group sent a telegram to Commanding General Western French Forces advising that RAF Bomber Command would attack Royan at 0400 hours 5 January. No response was received to this message.

5. Message from Commanding General Western French Air Forces received 8 January 1945 requested that further bombing of Royan be suspended until further notice for purpose of evacuating French civilians wounded in 5 January bombardment.

NED SCHRAMM
Brigadier General USA
Deputy Commander for
Operations.

INCOMING MESSAGE

1ST TAC AF PROV

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

W/C 1/17

From: 8TH AIR FORCE

Ref No. D-60,418

To : 1ST TAC AF PROV

Dated: JAN 161725A

Precedence PRIORITY

Rec'd: JAN 160001A

Security ~~SECRET~~

TEXT OF MESSAGE
EDITED AND/OR PARAPHRASED

DOOLITTLE

TO FIRST TACAF PROV

*Pointe la Coubre
(NW of ROYAN)*

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ REUR AO-3911 DATED 14 JAN, D-60, 418

COASTAL BATTERY AT 238840MAP 4249/SYB M HAS BEEN ATTACKED 3 TIMES BY 8TH AIR FORCE.

FIRST ATTACK 24 DEC 10 B-24 DROPPED 22 TONS. SECOND ATTACK NIGHT 28/29 DEC 7 B-24

DROPPED 18 TONS. THIRD ATTACK NIGHT 4/5 JAN 10 B-24 DROPPED ~~16XXXXXX~~ 16.8 TONS.

ALL RESULTS UNOBSERVED. PHOTOS OF 2 JAN SHOW 12 CRATERS ON SHORE, NO DAMAGE TO

BATTERY. NO PHOTOS SINCE THIRD ATTACK.

PRIORITY

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS
MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

FILE _____

✓ ACTION, D/OPS _____

INFO, A-3 _____

INFO, A-2 _____

... THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526 ...

711-2

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

Headquarters
First Tactical Air Force (Provisional)

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

Copy No. ___

3 November 1944

Operation: INDEPENDENCE

1. General. A military operation will be conducted under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, with the object of opening the port of BORDEAUX. The Commanding General, Sixth Army Group is responsible for the planning and execution of this operation in accordance with instructions issued by SHAEF, and for furnishing the necessary operational support.

2. French Commander. General DeLarminat, by appointment of the French Provisional Government, commands all French forces operating in the HIATUS area south of the LOIRE and west of the RHONE. General DeLarminat will conduct this operation in accordance with orders and directives issued by the Commanding General, Sixth Army Group.

3. Mission. The mission is to reduce the German pockets astride the GIRONDE estuary so as to enable the port of BORDEAUX to be opened by the French. Action will be taken to secure the port of BORDEAUX and safeguard the port installations as soon as possible.

4. Allocation of Forces.

a. Naval forces. The Allied Naval Commander, Expeditionary Force, will arrange for such naval assistance as may be made available on the ATLANTIC coast in support of the operation.

b. Ground Forces. A French Task Force comprising such French forces now under his command as he may consider necessary up to a corps of two divisions, with supporting troops, will be used by the Commanding General, Sixth Army Group for this operation.

c. Air Forces. Air support will be provided by the First Tactical Air Force (Provisional).

d. In selecting naval, ground, and air resources for use in this operation, French units will be used wherever possible.

5. Target Date. The target date for clearing the enemy from astride the GIRONDE estuary is not later than 1 January, 1945.

page two

6. Air Mission. The First Tactical Air Force (Provisional) will furnish air support to this operation, utilizing French air units wherever possible. Air operations required beyond the capabilities of the French air units will be carried out by American air units under the command of the Commanding General, First Tactical Air Force, (Provisional). In addition, recommendations will be made to SHAEF that at appropriate times and places, heavy bombardment will be employed against enemy positions at the mouth of the GIRONDE.

7. Air Units Assigned.

- a. Group Patrie, French Air Forces.
- b. French Air Group, comprising 2 SBD squadrons, one PV squadron, and a service squadron.

8. Intelligence. Aerial photographic coverage of the enemy-held areas will be accomplished as soon as practicable by agencies under the direct control of SHAEF. Interpreted results of this reconnaissance will be distributed as soon as possible.

9. Operations.

a. Group Patrie will provide reconnaissance flights as required by the French Task Force. In addition this group will attack enemy targets to the limit of the capabilities of the available aircraft.

b. The French Air Group will provide close air support by attacking enemy targets with machine guns and bombs. The PV squadron is equipped with rocket rails and will employ rockets wherever practicable.

c. The French Air Units will make appropriate recommendations to the First Tactical Air Force (Provisional) if air missions are required beyond their capabilities.

10. Supply.

a. French Air Units are responsible for providing spare parts and for operational maintenance.

b. 15 day levels of Classes I, III and V and 30 day levels of Classes II and IV will be established by Headquarters, Communications Zone, MTOUSA (Advance).

c. A small supply of rockets will be brought with them by the PV squadron.

d. The Service Command, First Tactical Air Force (Provisional) is responsible for the coordination of logistical support to air units.

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

711-1

0997
1008

- 1 -

IV

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ EO 11652
DOD CASE 77

The Fourth French Group will have the following missions:

- To furnish close support asked for by the First French Army.
- To carry out armed reconnaissance.

First priority: Eastern bank of the RHINE in the neighborhood of the bridges at HUNINGUE, REUSENBURG, and BRISACH.

Second priority: Roads leading from the VOSGES to the ALSACE plain.

- To maintain aircraft ready to go into action over unexpected targets assigned by the First French Army.
- To attack eventually, enemy air fields which have been revealed to be occupied through reconnaissance or photographic reconnaissance.

V

The French Bombardment Wing will carry out destruction of important points along railroads which enable traffic to reach the RHINE River and in particular the following points:

W K	351287	PHOTO	V2-23
WW	492216	PHOTO	X3-20
WW	593117	PHOTO	X3-21
WW	559292	PHOTO	X3-22
WW	149848	PHOTO	X2-903
WW	251244	PHOTO	X2-28
WW	654558	PHOTO	X3-24
WW	075326	PHOTO	X2-27
WW	064332	PHOTO	X2-27

Each day the Wing Commander will choose from the above targets those which will be attacked in coordination with the latest flak information. However, the General commanding the First French Air Corps reserves to himself the right at any time to set other targets as priority targets. Maximum number of sorties will be made on the days when weather conditions will be favorable.

VI

The 11/33 Reconnaissance Squadron will carry out:

First: Visual reconnaissance asked for by the First French Army in order to obtain information on the strength of reinforcements which have crossed or are preparing to cross the bridges on the RHINE River.

Second: The thorough surveillance of the banks of the RHINE River in order to inform Headquarters of attempts to install new bridges or to rebuild bridges previously destroyed.

Third: Photographic missions asked for by the First French Army.

VII

~~SECRET~~

Advanced Fighter Command Post: The Army Corps Command Post No. 1 remains attached to Headquarters, First Army Corps.

The Division Fighter Command Post No. 2 has been attached to the Fifth Armored Division.

The Division Fighter Command Post No. 3 has been attached to the First Armored Division.

Le General de Brigade Aerienne GERARDOT
Commandant le 1er. C.A.F.

Signed: GERARDOT

True Copy by order of General GERARDOT:

Lieutenant Colonel de CHASSEY
Deputy Chief of Staff to Commanding General,
First Tactical Air Force (Prov)

~~SECRET~~

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

VII-5

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

0901
1012

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY GROUP
AG MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING MESSAGE

TO FOR ACTION: FURNISH FRENCH ARMY FOR GENERAL DE LATTRE
FOR INFO : I TAG SIXTH ARMY GROUP HQ
FROM : SIXTH ARMY GROUP ADV
SIGNED : DEVIERS
REF NO : BAX 25303

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

At a conference of all air commanders General ROUCE has arranged matters so that as far as possible communications will be provided in order that close air support may be given your forces in the same manner that is given to the U.S. armies.

The French Air Force will support your I Corps and I have arranged to augment that Air Force by American units if necessary.

Your II Corps will be supported by American Air units.

These measures are only temporary until such time as the COINAK pocket is cleared of the enemy. Thereafter I hope to be able to continue providing you with the full measure of air support that your operations necessitate.

In order that such arrangements may be made it is necessary to know as far in advance as is possible your exact intentions. Advice reaching me lead me to doubt whether General GIRARDOT is at present being kept fully informed of your thoughts so that he can plan the air support and keep General ROUCE informed of his needs if he considers his force inadequate at any time.

I hope therefore that you will invite General GIRARDOT to be present daily at your War Room meetings so that the fullest measure of understanding may be established between the French Army and the French Air Army.

ORIGINATOR : DWS

AUTH: W. P. HARRISON
Maj. FA, JCO

INFORMATION : G-3
I TAG

LLABCS
AG RECORDS

BAX 25303

25 Dec 44 0957A

CS/TF

... THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526 ...

VII-E

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

24 June 1945

INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL BOUSCAT, INSPECTOR
GENERAL AND COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE COMBAT
FORCES OF THE FRENCH AIR FORCE

Interviewing Officer:- 1st Lt. Fain

(At his request, General Bouscat was given a number of written questions, the answers to which he dictated.)

F What was discussed at the October 15 meeting between Generals Royce and Bouscat? What did General Royce ask for specifically for the French section of his headquarters?

B I really can't remember. You'll have to ask de Chasse: he was there, too.

F What does the general think of the manner of functioning of First TACAF -- as an Allied headquarters, from the French point of view?

B I think that it worked very well. The thing that I regret is that the organization did not look farther ahead, and adapt itself to the course of events; in such a way that it would have been

easier, in fact almost automatic, to form a French TACAF. I should have liked it if more and more French officers had been gradually added to the Staff; gradually assuming a greater share of the work, so that on the day of the departure of the Americans, they could have taken over all of the work. Actually it was proposed (to late to be put into practice while operations were going on) to admit the creation of a First Bureau (A-1 section); it was envisaged but not created.

F What about the practical functioning of the TACAF; apart from considerations of the future?

B It, I think, functioned very well: it was built for something which had to be done quickly; it could not be expected that all the considerations I have mentioned should be taken into account.

F What do you think of the three American Generals; as to their relationship with the French Air Force?

B In their three different ways, all three were perfect. I shall try to give a little picture of each, as to what they were to the French.

Royce: What one appreciated most was his perfect commonsense, his courtesy, his perfect understanding of the French problems; and his knowledge of the use of aviation, that is to say his knowledge of his profession.

Saville: His keen intelligence, his sense of problems of organization, his dynamism, his friendship.

Webster: His high courtesy, his desire to give the French aviation every means to permit them to ~~co~~operate at the maximum, and with the greatest independence. In the command of the First TACAF, he brought with him the same spirit of helpfulness which had permitted the French bombardment to grow under the 42nd Wing.

F What benefits did the French Air Force gain; what lessons did they learn, through being under the First TACAF?

B Initially, when the French Air Force began to operate under the Americans, it was in the form of isolated squadrons. But it was the constant aim to make the French Air Force independent. TACAF helped towards this aim by raising us to the echelons of Wing and Tactical Air Command. TACAF did it in training not merely the units, but higher levels, in modern methods. For example, in the methods of controlling the units. Of the use of intelligence reports; requiring the same information of everyone, and consolidating it; the use of statistics and their interpretation.

In problems of the use of aircraft, organization, centralization of responsibility, so that one person was always responsible for a thing, not everybody.

Use of and respect for "channels". An example: When the French First Army wanted close support, they asked the 1st CAF for it; they had to obey channels.

Signals

This was a considerable problem. TACAF trained the French units in this, and were particularly helpful in training them in signal work in connection with the use of aviation in the support of the ground forces. They also loaned them much in the way of material equipment.

F What is the present status of the French Air Force?

B At the moment, we have a unit, the First French Air Corps, at the echelon of "Tactical Air Command." We have also, in embryo, a Tactical Air Force. Our present object is to build this echelon up.

F What will be the function of this air force; defensive, or for use in combat in the eastern theater?

B That is not for me to say.

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

VII-1

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

HEADQUARTERS
FIRST TACTICAL AIR FORCE (PROV)
APO 37h

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

5 January 1945

SUBJECT: Operation and Administration of French Air Force Units.

TO : Commanding General, h2d Bomb Wing (M)(US), APO 37h, US Army.

1. On the occasion of attachment of the Brigade de Bombardement Moyen, FAF, to your command for operations and training the following policies are established for your guidance and for the information and compliance of all concerned:

a. Personnel Administration

(1) All administrative matters affecting personnel of the Brigade such as assignment, promotion, awards, discipline, etc., will be handled by FAF agencies through the Commanding General, First French Air Corps, General Girardot.

(M) (2) Recommendations of the Commanding General, h2d Bomb Wing (US) affecting personnel will be made to this headquarters.

(3) In all matters of administration and supply, the Commanding Officer, Brigade de Bombardement, will follow prescribed French channels and will under no circumstances deviate therefrom without prior permission of the Commanding General, First French Air Corps.

(4) No transfers of key personnel (group commanders, Wing commander and Wing staff) will be made from the Brigade without prior consultation with the Commanding General, h2d Bomb Wing (M) (US). In the event of objections to proposed transfers, decision will be made by this headquarters.

b. Primary Responsibilities

(1) The Commanding General, h2d Bomb Wing (US) is charged with the following responsibilities in priority of importance:

(a) Current operations of the 31st and 34th Escadres at a level of efficiency comparable to groups of the USAAF.

(b) The establishment and operation of a training system adequate to produce qualified combat crews from replacements who have already been trained as individual crewmen.

(c) The organization of a smoothly operating tactical brigade (US Wing) headquarters.

c. Logistics

(1) All logistical matters are a service command responsibility of the French Air Service Command under the general supervision

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

of this headquarters. Supplies of all classes for the Brigade (~~US Wing~~) will be obtained, stored and issued by the French Service Group designated to service the Brigade.

(M)
(2) The Commanding General, 42d Bomb Wing (US) will report directly to this headquarters all shortages of supply which are of such nature as to affect operations, or which for any reason, are not corrected by the supply agencies concerned.

d. Communications

(1) All necessary communications for the operation of the Brigade will be established under the supervision of the Commanding General, 42d Bomb Wing (M) (US).

(2) Requests for changes in long distance wire and radio circuits will be made to this headquarters.

(3) Cryptographic details affecting codes and cyphers in use by USAAF are a responsibility of the Commanding General, 42d Bomb Wing (M) (US) in accordance with established policies.

e. Miscellaneous

(1) The Commanding General, 42d Bomb Wing (M) (US) is authorized to establish at such places as may be necessary, detachments for the purpose of supervising Brigade activities. He will issue such travel orders as may be required for this purpose.

RALPH ROYCE
Major General, USA
Commanding

Gen. Royce:

13 Jan 44
12:00 M

This directive is prepared by Bayle for
issuance by you.

Putman, Bragan + I believe you would
like to get clearance from Gen. Bouscat
on para 1.2 (4) before you publish the
paper.

ECF

proposed change to par 1 a (4)

(4) Transfers of Key personnel (Group Commanders, Wing Commander and Wing staff) should not be made from the Brigade without prior consultation with the Commanding General 42^d Bomb

Wing (M) (US). In the event ^{agreement} ~~of~~ cannot be reached regarding proposed ~~transfers~~ or actual ~~transfers~~ transfers ~~the matter should be~~ which are considered ~~referred to~~ objectionable this head quarters should be fully advised in order that proper representations may be made to higher headquarters.

(4) Transfers of key personnel
(group commanders, wing commanders
and wing staff) ~~should not be~~
from the brigade should not be
made without prior consultation
with the Commanding General,
42d Bomb Wing (M) (U.S.). In the
event ~~of~~ agreement cannot be
reached regarding proposed
or actual transfers, the matter
should be referred to this headquarters
in order that proper representations
may be made to higher headquarters.

DRAFT

HEADQUARTERS
FIRST TACTICAL AIR FORCE (PROV)
APO 374

DRAFT

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

5 January 1945

Subject: Operation and Administration of French Air Force Units.
To : COMMANDING GENERAL, 42d Bomb Wing (US), APO 374.

1. On the occasion of attachment of the Brigade de Bombardement Moyen, FAF, to your command for operations and training the following policies are established for your guidance and for the information and compliance of all concerned:

a. Personnel Administration.

(1) All administrative matters affecting personnel of the Brigade such as assignment, promotion, awards, discipline, etc., will be handled by FAF agencies through the Commanding General, First French Air Corps, General Girardot.

(2) Recommendations of the Commanding General, 42d Bomb Wing (US) affecting personnel will be made to this headquarters.

(3) In all matters of administration and supply, the Commanding Officer, Brigade de Bombardement, will follow prescribed ^{French} channels and will under no circumstances deviate therefrom without prior permission of the Commanding General, First French Air Corps.

(4) No transfers of key personnel (group commanders, Wing commander and Wing staff) will be made from the Brigade without prior consultation with the Commanding General, 42d Bomb Wing (US). In the event of objections to proposed trans-

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

b. Primary Responsibilities.

(1) The Commanding General, 42d Bomb Wing (US) is charged with the following responsibilities in priority of importance:

(a) Current operations of the 31st and 34th Escadres at a level of efficiency comparable to groups of the USAAF.

(b) The establishment and operation of a training system adequate to produce qualified combat crews from replacements who have already been trained as individual crewmen.

(c) The organization of a smoothly operating tactical brigade ^{42d Bomb Wing} headquarters.

c. Logistics.

(1) All logistical matters are a service command responsibility of this headquarters. *The French Air Service Command under the general supervision of the French Air Service Command* Supplies of all classes for the Brigade, will be obtained, stored and issued by the French Service Group designated to service the Brigade. Pending full scale operation of the appropriate French Air Depots, items of Air Corps Supply will be drawn from the same Air Depot that services the 42d Bomb Wing (US).

(2) The Commanding General, 42d Bomb Wing (US) will report directly to this headquarters all shortages of supply which are of such nature as to affect operations, or which for any reason, are not corrected by the supply agencies concerned.

d. Communications.

DECLASSIFIED
10 11652

tion of the Brigade will be established under the supervision of the Commanding General, 42d Bomb Wing (US).

(2) Requests for changes in long distance wire and radio circuits will be made to this headquarters.

(3) Cryptographic details affecting codes and cyphers in use by USAAF are a responsibility of the Commanding General, 42d Bomb Wing (US) in accordance with established policies.

e. Miscellaneous.

(1) The Commanding General, 42d Bomb Wing (US) is authorized to establish at such places as may be necessary detachments for the purpose of supervising Brigade activities. He will issue such travel orders as may be required for this purpose.

RALPH ROYCE
Major General, USA
Commanding

Concurrences:

D/C & Ops: orally (ECL)

D/C & Admin: ECL

A-4

Dir. of Maint: H.W.

Adj. General:

7 Jan 44

This is Dayles original Draft.

... THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526 ...

III-2

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

INTERVIEW WITH MAJOR GENERAL ROBERT WEBSTER
AT HIS HOUSE IN HEIDELBERG, 28 MAY, 1945

Interviewers: 1st Lt. Gratten
1st Lt. Stewart

G General, I have a paper here the date of which I do not know which sets forth the scheme for air support of Ground Forces in France. I should think the date of this paper was probably sometime in September. At any rate it was before the decision was made to leave the Twelfth Air Force and the Fifth Army in Italy.

W (The General examined the paper -- our document No. 1.) What do you want to fool around with a paper like this for? This comes out of a higher level and has nothing to do with First TAC.

G It shows the air organizational planning for the final push against Germany and shows that First TAC was not thought of at that time and it gives some figures on the forces available

in the theater for the support of the Sixth and Twelfth Army Groups and of the five armies -- that is, 23 Fighter Bomber Groups and 3 Recce Groups.

W That's right; but what has that got to do with you?

G Well, it was out of this juggling of available forces in the theater that First TAC grew, so that this paper is a starting point for an explanation of the origin of First TAC. To be specific, did the system of a tactical air force supporting an army group and a tactical command supporting each army work well, in your experience?

W Did it work well? If you go into that, you will call into question the whole organizational setup in the war. This is the way in which the air forces were arranged with regard to one another and there is no point now in questioning that. That's the way it was.

G Well, between the Sixth Army Group and First TAC was there any important friction between air and ground conceptions of how the cooperation was to be worked out.

W No, I am not aware of any friction. What do you mean?

G Well, I have picked up at Sixth AG and, by implication, from Major Selko the idea that there were sometimes conflicting theories about who should select targets.

W (Emphatically) There was never any question about who should select targets. How could there be? There is an Air Commander and he has absolute control of the use of Air Forces. The Ground Commander has nothing to do with that. How could he? The whole idea of command of the Air Forces is that people who understand airplanes the best shall direct them.

G I have gleaned that this position was sometimes questioned by the Ground Forces.

W We worked closely together. Sometimes they would ask that such and such a target be hit. We would give our consent, or withhold it.

G Just like that?

W We understood what the possibilities and best uses of our airplanes were; and if there were more profitable uses of our airplanes than striking at the targets which the Ground Forces people suggested, we would have to take that into consideration and map out our program accordingly.

G I understand that a paper has been prepared at G-3 Air, Sixth Army -- a paper which I have not seen yet, but a copy of which I have been promised -- that deals controversially with the subject of "more profitable targets."

W There are other things that an Air Force has to consider than the targets that are most profitable for a given day to a Ground Force. Besides the tactical targets, we had a big strategic

target program for the Air Forces in Europe as a whole. And consideration of what was most profitable from this latter angle was something which we alone were able to decide. Take the oil program, for instance, and then the communications program. Toward the end of the war the strategic targets disappeared very rapidly. That was the time when people were offering \$25.00 for a good target. At that stage our primary business was to aid the advance of the Ground Forces, to push the armies through. The strategic job was done.

Capt.
Giuliani

Capt. Giuliani, General Webster's Aide who was the only other person present, observed that there was a period towards the end of the war when the 42nd Wing was reporting to Army Fighter Control for decision on targets. He made this observation a propos the degree of cooperation that existed between ground and air.

G

General, is there any paper in existence that would set forth the position which you have just

explained? I have acquired in the last few days, by screening our top secret files, a good deal of important stuff from the early period before you came; but I have no such documents for the later period either on the trend of operations or on these major matters of policy.

W No, I don't know of any such paper. I haven't any.

G General, on March 6 when you first called your Staff Section Chiefs together, you devoted your remarks to three main subjects. I wrote a memorandum that day on the meeting and the first thing that you said was that (reading), "from time to time this headquarters must direct the operations of the combat units, tie them into a bigger picture than those lower down are always in a position to see. Aside from this the only excuse for this headquarters is service. We are here to help our units work out their problems." Then, I wrote in my memorandum the following: "This poses the first historical problem: the

often-asked question, 'Why First TAC, at all?' A documented discussion of this question, based on high policy paper relating to the establishment of the Air Force and the definition of its mission is a prime historical necessity." It was in order to get a fuller discussion of this question of the need for First TAC and of how it filled the need in practice, that I began this evening with the over-all plan for air support of Ground Forces in France. I think that you have added something to my former ideas on the subject by saying that it was the basic organizational idea that there should be an air force to support each of the Army Groups, and so on, and that it is not necessary or profitable to go into that now.

W Yes, that was the basic idea. An air force working at the same level with each Army Group. The success with which it was worked out depended upon the degree of education of the ground people in air matters. If they hadn't learned of the need for absolute control of air forces by air commanders at so late a stage

of the war as the period when I came to First TAC, (February 22, 1945) then it was too bad.

G You open up another big subject when you mention education. This implies a question of our staff education in the future; and presumably the records that we historical people collect now will go into the libraries of the air and staff collections of the future and will become the material from which future ideas of tactics and organization are developed.

W (General Webster nodded.)

G In the meeting of March 6 you devoted considerable time to the presence of French units in the Air Force. You praised their crews and cited their favorable operational record and referred to their difficulties. Would you care to enlarge on the remarks you made at that time?

W Well, I noticed that there was a great disposition towards self-criticism within the command. People in the headquarters were saying, "We are no good; we can't do anything; the French are a

handicap; we have to carry them along as a burden." I wanted to nip that in the bud right away. You can never get anywhere with self-criticism even if you are not so hot. It isn't a bad idea to think that you are good and to be confident in the kind of job you are doing.

G Do you think it was an advantage to have international air forces brigaded within one air force?

W It was more or less a necessity. The French lacked a completely integrated air force. It was not like an American air force. We had to handle it, supply the French. It was a diversion from our own weak resources, especially signal-wise and maintenance-wise. The French had to be supplied by Americans and our air force was the outfit that was charged with getting the supplies to them, setting them up on their feet operationally and getting them up into the air. About the brigading of international air forces, there were obvious disadvantages but as I just said, it was a necessity. We and the British had to help them; or else they wouldn't be able to operate at all.

G Did the French improve, as the war progressed?

W That's a matter of the operational record. They definitely improved.

G Do you have, or do you know the whereabouts of, any reports of a high level nature on French operations and the way in which the liaison worked out at First TAC?

W No, I don't know of any. Colonel Stern might know about that. Perhaps he had the biggest headache of all, in securing signal equipment for the French. And over in the files of the Service Command there may be some papers on the supply and maintenance problem.

G I suppose SHAEF French Air Mission would keep books on everything supplied to the French.

W No, we did all that. So far as I know the French Mission never came down here. They may have done, but I never heard of it. They were working on programs for supplying the French and getting approval of that supply through the two governments.

When they got the approval, it was up to us to secure the stuff, and get it down to the French airfields and put the French units into operation.

G Do you think that our air force detachments with First French Air Force and the First French Bomber Wing worked out pretty well?

W Yes, on the whole. The SHAEP Air Mission supplied the approval for the function of a French Bomber Wing Headquarters. And it was up to our people to procure supplies, train personnel, and to assist with the whole functioning of the Air Force or Wing Headquarters. That is why we sent down a detachment from our headquarters to do that liaison work.

G The third point you brought up in the March 6 meeting was the separation of the Service Command from the Air Force proper. What considerations did you take into account in making that separation as soon as you arrived?

W Having the Air Service Command within the Headquarters was an unwieldy arrangement. We had a deputy for administration in the Air Force who had all matters of personnel and supply and maintenance, etc. to worry about and in addition he was commanding general of the Air Service Command. This was an unwieldy arrangement. By separating the Air Service Command organization from the Air Force we gave ourselves much more flexibility of movement. You must remember we were concerned with the servicing of a tactical air force. Unlike some other kinds of air forces, a tactical air force must be mobile -- the headquarters must be mobile, too. A smaller headquarters can be moved more quickly than a bigger one; so in the interest of flexibility we set up an advance and rear headquarters for the Air Force and a separate headquarters for the Service Command. The justification for this was displayed when we moved to Heidelberg. We moved our forward echelon to Heidelberg, left the rear at Vittel, and also left the Service Command at Vittel but separate from the rear Air Force Headquarters.

Again, the wisdom of this move was demonstrated at the end of the war. What was left of our headquarters after First TAC was dissolved went under Twelfth TAC and the Service Command came under the Ninth Air Force Service Command. If we hadn't made the separation between the two when we did, we should only have had to do it later, anyway. Another advantage, besides flexibility, of having a separate Air Service Command is that you have a fixation of responsibility under a definite command for supply and maintenance. There was nothing unusual about this separation. It is the usual form. It was the arrangement at Vittell that was unusual. That arrangement had been forced upon First TAC by the crowded conditions at Vittell and also by the fact that we were a hastily thought-up outfit operating on a shoe string both so far as personnel and equipment were concerned.

G Thank you very much, General; it is getting late and we have covered some important stuff.

W I don't see how anything that I have told you is going to be of much help to you.

G It may be hard for you to realize how much light is shed upon vital matters by some of the remarks which you have made.

W There is one thing I wish you would tell me. How could anyone be so enthusiastic about history? What good does it do? Everything in the next war is going to be different. New planes, new weapons, new ideas. Everything that we have been using in this war will be discarded. In fact, too close a recording of everything we have done in this war may retard freedom in preparing new devices for the next one. What, then, is the good of all this history?

Capt.
Giuliani

General, the Lieutenant is not really a historian; he is really a P.R.O. You noticed whenever he asked a question about difficulties and errors he always asked what lessons had been learned from

these errors. If he were an objective historian he wouldn't care about the lessons learned, he would just be interested in what actually happened.

G I am primarily interested in what actually happened and it is difficulties and mistakes that I want to know about most, because it is that kind of stuff that is so very hard to get any records on in the Army. But I am not ashamed to attach to my questions something about lessons learned, because I think it is probably true that the reason we are sitting here in Heidelberg now talking about this is that despite all the rough spots and mistakes, we learned quickly from them in many cases and thus have won the war.

W But what I want to know is, how can anyone get so excited about history?

G This is one of the hardest questions in the world to answer, because it involves one of the fundamental impulses of men. Almost from the time of our first records of man on earth we find that he is interested in his past, wants to know where he

came from, and to record his own deeds and those of his family or nation. The Greeks, for instance, laid on nine muses and the chairlady of these muses was Clio, the muse of history.

W But all this history isn't going to do any good. No one is going to profit from it. The fundamental principles of war don't change at all. All that you have to have is a clear knowledge of a few fundamental principles and then to apply them.

Capt. Giuliani But don't you think that the Russians learned a lot in the planning of this war from their study of their former wars?

W No, they just applied the same fundamental plans as before.

Capt. Giuliani But I thought you told me once that the Russian system of logistics in this war was new?

W No, they were just applying to specific problems the same old fundamental principles.

G A lot of the things that the world thought Hitler was introducing to the world for the first time

in 1940 weren't new at all. For instance, his engineers carried with them exactly-measured parts of bridges which could be set up quickly in the field without delaying the advance of troops across water barriers. But William the Conqueror when he crossed the Channel carried with him measured timber for the erection of a fort on his beachhead in England.

W But what I can't see is how you can possibly be qualified to write the history of what happened in this air force when you were only on the side lines all the time -- just an observer; and you didn't get there anyway until about the same time that I arrived.

G I ask myself the same question two or three times every day. The fact is that it is very hard to find qualified historians. There are very few people who have expert military knowledge and who also have historical inclinations and training. Colonel Ganoe, ETO Historian, is a combination of the two, and, now at the end of the War, I understand, he has returned to the States with some-

thing like a nervous breakdown. However, I can arrange what documents I can get my hands on in some orderly fashion and write as conscientiously as I can some commentary upon them. If this work is read by better qualified people than me and it irritates them into correcting what I said, history will have been served to a small extent.

W So you are going to write an irritating history?

G Irritating, in the sense of stimulating.

W That's right, there can be no stimulation without irritation. But why not tell just the plain truth.

Capt. But who shall say what the plain truth is?
Giuliani

G Every individual and every generation has its own attitude toward the past, and its own idea of what is the true view of the past. That's why history has to be constantly re-written. People in some periods are very much more concerned with their past than others. The fact that every unit in the Army has an historical officer in this war and that all sorts of elaborate directives have

been sent out trying to insure that all documents are preserved in an illustration of our tremendous pre-occupation with our past. This was symbolized when we buried a rocket containing a great mass of contemporary documents at the Chicago World's Fair in 1933 -- the rocket not to be opened for 5,000 years. That was just a great publicity stunt geared to our colossal interest in our own past.

Capt.
Giuliani

So you think that this throwing of the shuttle back and forth by historians -- one irritating another into a correction of the record is the way in which history has developed.

G Yes. For instance, an Englishman writes a book setting forth his conception of the development of Europe, and a German is irritated by it into another interpretation.

W Well, I wish you luck with all this and I hope that I shall be able to have a copy of it when it is done.

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

IX-A

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

HEADQUARTERS US COMPONENT
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY AIR FORCE (MAIN)
APO 757 - U S ARMY

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

322

18 November 1944

SUBJECT: Release of Officer Grades.

TO : Commanding General, U S Strategic Air Forces in Europe
(Att: Colonel Bitting)

1. Reference is made to letter 322, your headquarters, 29 July 1944 subject "Reorganization of Hq & Hq Sq, US Component, Allied Expeditionary Air Force" as amended.

2. From the authorized bulk allotment shown in reference letter the following officer grades can be released from Headquarters, US Component, Allied Expeditionary Air Force and made available to other units:

Colonel	3
Lt Colonels	2
Captains	2
First Lts.	1
Second Lts.	2

For the Commanding General:

/s/ D. M. Allison
D. M. ALLISON
Colonel, Air Corps
D/A C of S, A-4

1st Ind.

HEADQUARTERS, US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE, APO 633, 1 Dec 44

TO: Commanding General, US Component Allied Expeditionary Air Force (Main)
APO 757, US Army.

1. The bulk allotment to US Component Allied Expeditionary Air Force authorized in letter, 322, this headquarters, dated 18 October 1944, Subject: Activation and Reorganization of Hq US Component, Allied Expeditionary Air Force (No. 24) is hereby reduced by the grades set forth in paragraph 2 basic communication.

2. It is the understanding of this headquarters that an agreement was reached between representatives of US Component Allied Expeditionary Air Force that the following grades, inclusive of those referenced in paragraph 1 hereof, would be made available for the establishment of Headquarters First Tactical

(Ltr, Hq US Component Allied Expeditionary Air Force, 322, dated 18 Nov 1944)

Air Force (Prov):

Colonels	10	Master Sergeant	1
Lt. Colonel	10	First Sergeant	1
Majors	4	Technical Sergeant	3
Captains	4	Staff Sergeants	7
First Lt.	1	Sergeants	11
	29	Corporals	11
		Private First Class	12
		Privates	8

DECLASSIFIED

EO 11652

54

3. It is assumed that the grades referred to in basic communication are intended as partial consumation of this agreement. It is requested that this headquarters be advised when the remainder can be made available.

By command of Lieutenant General SPAATE:

/s/ R. E. Fecteau
R. E. FECTEAU
Capt, AGD
Asst. Adj Gen

2nd Ind.

Hq US Component, Allied Expeditionary Air Force (Main), APO 757, US Army,
4 December 1944.

To: Commanding General, US Strategic Air Forces in Europe (Main), APO
533, US Army. Attn: Director of Personnel

1. There is no record in this Headquarters of any agreement, verbal or otherwise to surrender grades and/or ratings of this Headquarters to the First Tactical Air Force (Prov). The initial and only agreement between Generals Royce and Schlatter was that the US Component, Allied Expeditionary Air Force would surrender 29 officers, 1 warrant officer, 68 enlisted men, and 7 enlisted WACs in body only. The agreement did not include the surrendering of any commissioned T/O vacancies or enlisted grades and ratings.

2. Subsequent to the surrendering of the bodies referred to in Paragraph 1 above, this Headquarters surveyed its bulk allotment of grades and ratings and found that under the circumstances then in effect certain T/O vacancies could be surrendered and these were offered to the First Tactical Air Force (Prov) and are set forth in Paragraph 2 of the basic communication. It is now desired, due to the fact that Air Staff SHAEF must absorb the personnel in the Air Sections of the SHAEF Missions to various countries, to withdraw this offer to surrender the above-mentioned T/O vacancies. It has been found that it is necessary to request additional grades and ratings in order to absorb the Air Sections of the various SHAEF Missions.

For the Commanding General:

/s/ D. M. Allison

320.2

HEADQUARTERS US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE, APO 633, Dec 17, 1944

TO: Commanding General, First Tactical Air Force (Prov), APO 374.
(Attn: Director of Personnel)

For your information and return to this headquarters.

By command of Lieutenant General SPATZ:

/s/ R. E. Fecteau
R. E. FECTEAU
Capt., AGD
Asst. Adj. Gen.

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

4th Ind.

HEADQUARTERS, FIRST TACTICAL AIR FORCE (PROV), APO 374, U S Army, 27 December 1944

TO: Commanding General, United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe, APO 633,
U S Army.

1. It would appear from the basic letter, and indorsement thereto, that no help can be expected from Headquarters, American Component, USAF, that will relieve the bad situation that exists in the First Tactical Air Force (Provisional) as regards grades and ratings. I have discussed this matter personally with General Schlatter and have been informed that, since the formation of this Air Force, the situation at Air Staff SHAEF has changed, and that every grade and rating it is now authorized is not enough to cover the various air sections of the SHAEF Missions to various allied nations. There does not seem, therefore, any reason for carrying on any discussion as to whether or not an agreement had been reached to transfer any grades and ratings.

2. The needs of this Command have been fully set forth in a Memorandum, dated 3 December 1944, Subject: "Status of Authorization for and Personnel of this Headquarters", from General E. C. Langmead, D/CG for Administration of this Command to me, which was personally delivered and explained by me to the Chief of Staff, USSTAF, who assured me that a study would be made in an endeavor to relieve the situation that exists in this Command.

Signed out by
ECS
for RALPH ROYCE
Major General, USA
Commanding

Concur: *[Signature]* D/O & M
Concur: *[Signature]* 1-1
Concur: *[Signature]* AG
Concur: *[Signature]* D/CG for Adm

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

IX-B

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

HEADQUARTERS
FIRST TACTICAL AIR FORCE (PROV)
AFO 374

DECLASSIFIED D.S.-4
EO 11652

6 May 1945.

The following is copy of signal 1st TACAF (Prov), Ref D 446, 25 April 1945, to CG USSTAF, precedence Urgent, security Confidential:

Reference USSTAF message UAX 577840. The 1st TACAF (Prov) by neutralizing rail facilities, destroying MT and bridges essential for a successful withdrawal contributed very largely to the virtual annihilation during the early part of February 1945 of the German 19th Army in the Colmar pocket. In addition to the actual destruction of personnel and equipment by bombing and strafing and the terrific effect upon morale, not more than 4,000 combat effectives succeeded in escaping across the Rhine. This feat was repeated in a large measure during the opening phases of the current offensive when the 1st and 7th Armies of Army Group "C" were destroyed in the Saar salient. On D Day, 15 March 1945, the rail system in the Moselle-Rhine triangle was completely unserviceable as a result of heavy and continuous attack by both medium and fighter-bombers during the preceding two weeks. Following concentrated attacks by medium bombers and close co-operation from the fighter-bombers the formidable defenses of the Siegfried Line were penetrated and the whole front began to crumble. On the 18th the withdrawal became a mad scramble for the Rhine and the fighter-bombers took full advantage of the situation. During the first four-day period from the 18th-21st, 4,000 vehicles were claimed destroyed or damaged.

West of BAD DUREN there are more than 500 wrecked vehicles of all descriptions scattered along the sides of a short stretch of road where a traffic jam occurred in a narrow mountain pass as a result of the enemy's complete lack of mobility. Having contributed largely to the destruction of the enemy defensive capabilities west of the Rhine, the 1st TACAF (Prov) has been concurrently committed to the task of preventing the re-equipment and reorganization of the scattered remnants of the southern group of armies. 1147 medium bombers sorties have been flown against 19 fuel depots, supply installations, and ammo dumps. The success of these operations is reflected in the rapid advance of the ground forces against dwindling resistance. Statistics relative to the American components of the 1st TACAF (Prov) follows:

	FB	MB	Recess
Sorties	43476	5291	5252
Tons of bombs on targets	16,677	8136	nil
A/C attacking (By type of target)			
Bridges	2519	834	
Troop concentrations	5707	951	
MY	5954	413	
Cities & towns	5442	900	
AF	1137	49	
MT & tanks	4654		
Supply depots	2707	1271	
Factories	379	51	
Gun positions	850	29	
Rail traffic	7048	53	
Water installations	74		

	<u>FB</u>	<u>MR</u>	<u>Recco</u>
Escort	2555		
Sweeps	954		
Total Attacking	41210	4402	4943
EA claims - Air	175-30-110	3-0-0	53-10-28
Ground	434-40-473		3-0-6
Other claims			
Military transport	5780-5885		
Locos	795-1726		
RR cars	9443-17984		
Bldgs.	8226-3542		
Gun emplacements	263-485		
Bridges	50-156		
Tanks	241-291		
NDV	11-8-615		
AFV	173-164		
Barges	70-195		
Dumps	44-42		
Rail cuts	1499		
Rd. blocks	333		
Troops killed	579		
MY attacked	457		
Total Personnel in AF Combat		2273	
Ground *		27503	
A/C Losses	255	39	14
Estimated gal gas consumed:	11,817,007	4,777,966	774,733

The above results were accomplished by anprovisional air force hurriedly thrown together in the middle of a campaign, operating under extraordinary handicaps (including the lack of any provision for promotions) and lacking the essential elements and facilitation normally required by tactical air force operations.

... THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526 ...

MISC.
A

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

0943
1056

INDEX TO
FIRST TACTICAL AIR FORCE ORGANIZATIONAL FILES
ACCOMPANYING MANUSCRIPT

BOX 1: UNIT HISTORIES

Headquarters Units

I Tactical Air Force Service Command
(Prov.), Oct 44 - May 45

Engineer Command (Prov.), First Tac-
tical Air Force, Oct 45 - Feb 45

XII Tactical Air Command,
Jan - June 44, Aug 44

42nd Bombardment Wing (M)
Oct 44 - Apr 45

63rd Fighter Wing
Nov 44 - Mar 45

64th Fighter Wing
Oct 44 - Feb 45

Tactical Air Units

27th Fighter Group (SE)
Feb - Apr 45

522nd Fighter Sq
Feb - Apr 45

523rd Fighter Sq
Feb - Apr 45

524th Fighter Sq
Feb - Apr 45

50th Fighter Group (SE)
Oct 44 - Feb 45

10th Fighter Sq
Oct 44 - Feb 45

81st Fighter Sq
Oct 44 - Feb 45

313th Fighter Sq
Oct 44 - Feb 45

86th Fighter Group (SE)
Mar 45

525th Fighter Sq
Mar 45

526th Fighter Sq
Mar 45

527th Fighter Sq
Mar 45

324th Fighter Group (SE)
Nov 44 - Mar 45

314th Fighter Sq
Nov 44 - Mar 45

315th Fighter Sq
Nov 44 - Mar 45

316th Fighter Sq
Nov 44 - Mar 45

358th Fighter Group (SE)
Nov 44 - Mar 45

365th Fighter Sq
Nov 44 - Mar 45

366th Fighter Sq
Nov 44 - Mar 45

367th Fighter Sq
Nov 44 - Mar 45

371st Fighter Group (SE)
Dec 44 - Jan 45

404th Fighter Sq
Dec 44 - Jan 45

405th Fighter Sq
Nov 44 - Jan 45

406th Fighter Sq
Nov 44 - Jan 45

415th Night Fighter Sq
Oct 44 - Mar 45

82nd Fighter Control Sq
Nov 44 - Mar 45
328th Fighter Control Sq
Nov 44 - Mar 45
Prov Recon Group (XII TAC)
Jan - Mar 45
34th Photo Recon Sq
Nov 44 - Mar 45
111th Tac Recon Sq
Nov 44 - Mar 45
162nd Tac Recon Sq
Nov 44 - Mar 45
69th Tactical Recon Group
Feb - Mar 45
2nd Photo Tech Unit
Mar 45
Engineer Command (1 TAC)
Nov 44 - Feb 45
17th Bombardment Group (M)
Nov 44 - Apr 45
34th Bombardment Sq
Nov 44 - Jan 45, Mar - Apr 45
37th Bombardment Sq
Dec 44 - Apr 45
95th Bombardment Sq
Nov 44 - Apr 45
432nd Bombardment Sq
Nov 44 - Apr 45
320th Bombardment Group (M)
Nov 44 - Apr 45
441st Bombardment Sq
Nov 44 - Apr 45
442nd Bombardment Sq
Nov 44 - Mar 45
443rd Bombardment Sq
Nov 44 - Mar 45
444th Bombardment Sq
Nov 44 - Apr 45

Tactical AAA Units

213th Antiaircraft Artillery Group
Nov 44 - Apr 45

353rd Antiaircraft Searchlight Bn
Nov 44

439th Antiaircraft Artillery AW Bn
Jan - Feb 45, Apr 45

894th Antiaircraft Artillery AW Bn
Nov 44 - Apr 45

Service Units

83rd Service Group
Dec 44 - Apr 45

310th Service Group
Nov 44 - Apr 45

312th Service Group
Nov 44 - Mar 45

319th Service Group
Mar - Apr 45

333rd Service Group
Apr 45

1st Air Service Sq
Nov 44 - Apr 45

51st Air Service Sq
Nov 44 - Apr 45

57th Air Service Sq
Feb - Mar 45

88th Air Service Sq
Nov 44 - Mar 45

98th Air Service Sq
Nov 44 - Jan 45

304th Air Service Sq
Nov 44 - Apr 45

321st Air Service Sq
Feb - Mar 45

340th Air Service Sq
Nov 44 - Apr 45

462nd Air Service Sq
Nov 44 - Mar 45

556th Air Service Sq
Feb - Apr 45

302nd Airdrome Sq
Oct 44 - Apr 45

24th Mobile Reclamation & Repair Sq
Nov 44 - Jan 45, Mar 45

31st Mobile Reclamation & Repair Sq
Nov 44 - Jan 45, Mar - Apr 45

Depot Units

19th Air Depot Group
Feb - Apr 45

86th Air Depot Group
Dec 44 - Apr 45

19th Depot Repair Sq
Feb - Apr 45

22nd Depot Repair Sq
Dec 44 - Apr 45

19th Depot Supply Sq
Feb - Apr 45

98th Depot Supply Sq
Jan, Mar - Apr 45

4th Depot Unit, Army (AAF)
Jan - Apr 45

4th Port Intransit Depot Sq
Jan - Apr 45

Engineer Units

1993rd Engr Fire Fighting Platoon
Nov 44 - Mar 45

2056th Engr Fire Fighting Platoon
Nov 44 - Mar 45

2062nd Engr Fire Fighting Platoon
Dec 44 - Jan 45

2138th Engr Fire Fighting Platoon
Dec 44 - Apr 45

2148th Engr Fire Fighting Platoon
Nov 44 - Mar 45

2151st Engr Fire Fighting Platoon
Jan - Apr 45

Ordnance Units

1444th Ordnance Supply & Maintenance Co.
Dec 44, Feb - Mar 45

1445th Ordnance Supply & Maintenance Co.
Nov 44 - Mar 45

1476th Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance Platoon, Dec 44 - Apr 45

1590th Ordnance Supply & Maintenance Co
Nov 44 - Jan 45

1595th Ordnance Supply & Maintenance Co
Nov 44 - Jan 45, Mar 45

1636th Ordnance Supply & Maintenance Co
Jan 45, Mar 45

1644th Ordnance Supply & Maintenance Co
Nov 44 - Apr 45

1658th Ordnance Supply & Maintenance Co
Feb 45 - Mar 45

1664th Ordnance Supply & Maintenance Co
Feb - Mar 45

1667th Ordnance Supply & Maintenance Co
Nov 44 - Apr 45

1722nd Ordnance Supply & Maintenance Co
Nov 44 - Apr 45

1926th Ordnance Ammunition Co.
Dec 44 - Mar 45

1951st Ordnance Depot Co (Avn)
Feb 45, Apr 45

2014th Ordnance Maintenance Co, AF
Feb - Mar 45

Quartermaster Units

419th Quartermaster Platoon, ADG
Feb - Apr 45

431st Quartermaster Platoon, ADG
Mar 45

440th Quartermaster Platoon, ADG
Dec 44 - Apr 45

111th Quartermaster Co, Service Group
Nov 44 - Apr 45
1125th Quartermaster Co, Service Group
Feb - Mar 45
1144th Quartermaster Co, Service Group
Feb - Apr 45
1242nd Quartermaster Co, Service Group
Nov 44 - Jan 45, Mar - Apr 45
1243rd Quartermaster Co, Service Group
Nov 44 - Mar 45
1244th Quartermaster Co, Service Group
Mar - Apr 45
1933rd Quartermaster Truck Co (Avn)
Nov 44 - Jan 45, Mar 45
1936th Quartermaster Truck Co (Avn)
Feb - Apr 45
1955th Quartermaster Truck Co (Avn)
Nov 44 - Apr 45
1972nd Quartermaster Truck Co (Avn)
Nov 44 - Apr 45
1974th Quartermaster Truck Co (Avn)
Feb - Mar 45
1994th Quartermaster Truck Co (Avn)
Jan - Apr 45
2008th Quartermaster Truck Co (Avn)
Nov 44 - Apr 45
2204th Quartermaster Truck Co (Avn)
Nov 44 - Apr 45
2210th Quartermaster Truck Co (Avn)
Nov 44 - Mar 45
2242nd Quartermaster Truck Co (Avn)
Dec 44 - Apr 45

Signal Units

1st Signal Co Depot (Prov)
Mar - Apr 45
346th Signal Company, Wing
Nov 44 - Mar 45
385th Signal Service Company
Apr 44 - Dec 44

439th Signal Construction Bn (H)
Nov 44 - Apr 45

459th Signal Construction Bn (H)
Aug 42 - Mar 45

562nd Signal AW Bn
Feb - Apr 45

582nd Signal AW Bn
Nov 44 - Mar 45

593rd Signal AW Bn
Dec 44 - Mar 45

878th Signal Depot Co (Avn)
Dec 44, Feb - Apr 45

927th Signal Bn (Sep), TAC
Oct 44 - Mar 45

1016th Signal Company, Svce Group
Feb - Mar 45

1028th Signal Company, Svce Group
Nov 44 - Apr 45

1057th Signal Company, Svce
Nov 44 - Apr 45

1109th Signal Company, Svce Group
Nov 44 - Mar 45

Miscellaneous Units

895th Military Police Co
Jan 44 - Apr 45

1184th Military Police Co
Mar 45

1227th Military Police Co
Oct 44 - Feb 45

692nd Army Air Forces Band
Mar 45

803rd Chemical Co, Air Operations
Jan - Apr 45

873rd Chemical Co, Air Operations
Nov 44 - Mar 45

72nd Liaison Sq
Jan - Mar 45

167th Liaison Sq
Feb - Apr 45

1st Medical Supply Platoon
Dec 44 - Apr 45
13th Photo Intelligence Detachment
Jan - Mar 45
12th Station Complement Sq
Mar - Apr 45
1194th Military Police Co
Jan 45

BOX 2: REFERENCE ARCHIVES

Organization

Organization General, First Tactical Air Force	311
Assumption of Control of "DRAGOON" Forces by Supreme Headquarters . . .	311.1
Organization, French Air Forces . . .	311.2
Organization Charts, First TAF	311.3
Organization Air Disarmament Wing . .	311.4
Airfields -- First Tactical Air Force .	312
General Orders, USSTAF, 1945	313
General Orders, First Tactical Air Force, 1944	314
General Orders, First Tactical Air Force, 1945 (Original and Duplicate).	314.1
General Orders, I Tactical Air Force Service Command (1944 - 1945) . . .	315
Special Orders, First Tactical Air Force (Prov), 1944	316
Special Orders, First Tactical Air Force (Prov), 1945	316.1
Special Orders, I Tactical Air Force Service Command, 1945	317
Organizational Orders	318
Troop Movement Orders, First Tactical Air Force	319
Movement GOLDFLAKES (27th & 86th Fighter Groups from Italy - Feb 45) .	319.1

Assignment and Attachment Orders . . .	320
Numbered Memoranda, First Tactical Air Force (Original and Duplicate)	321
Unnumbered Memoranda, First Tactical Air Force (29 Oct 44 - 18 May 45)	322
Letters, First Tactical Air Force (29 Sep 44 - 31 Dec 44)	323
Letters, First Tactical Air Force (1 Jan 45 - 14 May 45)	323.1
Station Lists, USSTAF	324
Station Lists, Ninth Air Force	325
Station Lists, First Tactical Air Force (Prov)	326
Telephone Directories, First Tactical Air Force (Prov)	327
Misc. Telephone Directories	327.1
Commanders' Meetings and Staff Conferences, First TAF	328

Interviews

Interview with Lt. Col. James W. Flett, 15 Feb 45	329.1
Interview with Col. Gregory, Deputy Commander 42nd Bomb Wing, at Lyons, 20 Feb 45	329.2
Interview with General Langmead, 5 June 45	329.3
Interview with General Webster, 28 May 45	329.4
Conference between Maj. Daniel T. Selko and 1st Lt. Carroll W. Stewart, 21 June 45	329.5
Interview with Lt. Col. Roger Duhaze, French AC/AS, A-2, 1 TAF, 10 June 45	329.6
Redeployment Plan, First Tactical Air Force, 1 May 45	330

Operations

Operation ACCORDION	340
Operation BUGLE	340.1
Operations CHERRYFUL and FLOORLAMP (Reduction of the Colmar Pocket) . .	341.1
Operation CHOKER II	341.2
Operation CLARION I	341.3
Operation CLARION II	341.4
Operation ECLIPSE	341.5
Operation EFFECTIVE	341.6
Operation JUMBO II	341.61
Operation KNIFEEDGE	341.62
Operation OLERON	341.7
Operation OVERLORD	341.8
Operation TINK	341.81
Operation UNDERTONE	341.9
Operation VARSITY	341.10
Operations VENERABLE and INDEPENDENCE and HIATUS	341.11
Operation Air Plan X-RAY	341.12
Counter-Air Force Operations (RIPTIDE)	342.1
Destruction of Rhine River Bridges Program	342.2
Franco-Italian Border Operations . .	342.3
Rail Interdiction Program	342.4
Operations, First French Air Corps .	342.5
Letters of Instruction -- Employment of Anti-Aircraft Defenses	343.1
Letters of Instruction, Sixth Army Group	343.2
Letters of Instruction, First Tactical Air Force	343.3
Daily Consolidated Operational Summary, (Cosum)First Tactical Air Force . .	344.1
A-2 Reports, First Tactical Air Force	344.2

PR News Releases on Operations Stories .	344.3
PR Operations Releases, Nov - Apr 45 . .	344.31
Monthly Operations Reports, First Tactical Air Force	344.4
Daily Operations Summaries and Intentions, First Tactical Air Force . . .	344.5
Weather Data and Daily Weather Memoranda, First Tactical Air Force . . .	344.6
Maps of Vittel, France, Heidelberg, Germany, and operational areas	344.7
XII Tactical Air Command Operations, a report on phase 3 operations, 18 Apr 45	344.8
<u>Intelligence</u>	
Intelligence Organization First Tactical Air Force	351.
Target Information and Objectives, vol. I, 20 Nov 44 - 14 Jan 45	352.
Target Information and Objectives, vol. II, 16 Jan - May 45	352.1
Weekly Counter-Intelligence Summaries .	353.
Sabotage Teams and Offensive Espionage .	354.
History of the German Air Force (P/W Kogler's report)	355.
German Air Force Order of Battle	356.
Monthly Air Intelligence and Operations Bulletin, Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air Force	357.
German Air Force Sightings, Engagements, and Strafings	358.
Sixth Army Group Situation Maps	359.
Sixth Army Group Weekly Intelligence Summaries	360.
<u>Supply and Maintenance</u>	
Supply and Maintenance, General, First Tactical Air Force	361.

Personnel

Biographical Data, Major General Ralph Royce	371.1
Biographical Data, Major General Robert M. Webster	371.2
Biographical Data, Brigadier General Glenn O. Barcus	371.3
Roster of Key Officers, various headquarters	372.
Key Personnel, First Tactical Air Force .	373.
Commendations, First Tactical Air Force .	374.

Signal

Signal Activities	381.
-----------------------------	------

Medical

Medical Department Activities, First Tactical Air Force, 20 Oct - 31 Dec 44 . .	391.
---	------

Background Material

Headquarters Bulletins, First Tactical Air Force	401.
Daily Bulletins, XII Tactical Air Command Composite Detachment	402.


THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

Misc.
B

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION CHART SHOWING CHANNELS OF GROUND-AIR CO-OPERATION

PREPARED BY: G-3, AIR SECTION, SIXTH ARMY GROUP



THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

Misc.
C

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

AIR COOPERATION*

No effort will be made in this short summation to cover in detail the extent of air cooperation with ground forces under control of Headquarters 6th Army Group in the successful campaigns in France, Germany and Austria. Details of the part the Air Arm played in the battering and final defeat of German Armed Forces facing 6th Army Group will be found in Histories of Seventh Army, First French Army, First Tactical Air Force (Provisional) and Twelfth Air Force. Here it is desired only to cover briefly the overall air picture as it affected operations of 6th Army Group and to illuminate some of the broader results obtained.

Planning for air cooperation in ground assaults on the Army Group level was carried out at the Commanding General's daily conference. Contemplated ground plans were discussed with Commanding General, First TACAF (Prov.) or his representative and the overall air plan worked out. Close cooperation between air and ground units was effected at the Army level. Therefore,

* This is Chapter 14, Final Report, G-3 Section, Hq, 6 AG.

records of this office are limited on actual accomplishments of the Air Force.

Air and Ground Forces literally lived and learned together. With each mission flown, the tie between the two Arms became closer and closer until well before the latter stages of the campaign, front line commanders considered the close cooperation planes almost as much a part of their combat team as the supporting artillery. It was this feeling of mutual understanding and confidence that lent immeasurably to the actual results obtained. Throughout the entire operations, confidence in the Air Force grew daily and a feeling of pride in its accomplishments pervaded ground units as they advanced over ground littered with destroyed vehicles, guns, trains and bridges.

In use within this Army Group was an air-ground coordination system brought over from Italy, which initially was not the approved SOP of either Air or Ground Forces. Because it worked so smoothly and brought closer cooperation, however, details of the plan have since been incorporated in the approved regulations on the subject. The system was faster, safer and more effective, assuring Armies of desired

air cooperation with a minimum of delay. So far as this office is able to determine, there was not one soldier in 6th Army Group killed as the result of bombing by our Air Force. In a few of the extremely fluid situations when fighting was close and furious, some instances of cooperating Air Forces strafing our columns have been reported.

Air Support Parties with Corps and Division Headquarters handled close cooperation missions with the general support missions being screened by Army Headquarters in conjunction with their Air Support Control. Prior to taking off on a pre-briefed mission, planes rendezvoused above assigned Corps to report to the Corps ASP. If the Corps ASP had no close cooperation mission within a given period of time, the planes continued on their pre-briefed mission. However, if the Corps ASP had need for air cooperation, the planes postponed or even discontinued their pre-briefed mission to assist the Ground Forces.

Initially, communications between Air and Ground Forces were not all that was desired but, as in other instances, both Arms worked together to perfect their technique and overcome this difficulty. In Seventh Army, "horsefly" planes -- liaison planes -- in

addition to smoke and radio were used as a regular means of guiding high performance planes onto targets. This system provided excellent results and became a fixed part of Seventh Army's SOP for air-ground cooperation.

To cover cooperation of Air Forces in ground missions of 6th Army Group forces, it will be necessary to start with the pre-invasion planning period.

While Seventh Army was commanding Dragoon Forces, Twelfth Air Force, commanded by Major General James Cannon with headquarters at Corsica, was furnishing the air power. Assistance was also rendered by heavy bombers of the Mediterranean Allied Air Force. Planning for air cooperation in the invasion of Southern France progressed as Ground Forces laid out plans of the maneuver. To carry out missions in Southern France in close support of Seventh Army, the following aircraft were available:

Six Groups of P-47's; Three Wings of RAF Spitfires; One Squadron of A-20's; One Squadron of Beaufighters; Two Squadrons of Tac/R Spitfires; One Squadron of P-51's; and One Squadron of Photographic Reconnaissance. These planes composed the XII Tactical Air Command under Brigadier General Gordon P. Saville.

Prior to D-Day, the Air Force undertook a campaign of softening up enemy defenses along the entire Southern Coast of France. These attacks were carried out initially so as not to spotlight this sector as a possible invasion area. They were planned to appear as being in support of the Italian Campaign. As D-Day drew nearer, the attacks were intensified, shifting from place to place along the Southern Coast, and still not concentrating on any particular sector. In the last five days before D-Day, some 5,408 effective sorties were flown against gun positions, defensive positions, radar installations, bridges and communications centers. A total of 6,440 tons of bombs were dropped during this period, the majority by medium bombers. In the period from 0350 hours to 0800 hours D-Day, 610 effective sorties were flown against the actual invasion beaches, dropping 774 tons of bombs. During D-Day 3,936 additional sorties were flown against enemy defenses, supply installations, communication centers and enemy convoys. This was the mightiest air effort ever staged by MAAF. Results obtained can be seen in the light resistance encountered from prepared defenses during the establishment of the beachhead.

During the drive northward up the ^hRhone Valley, Seventh Army, because of the speed of its advance, did not have continuous communications with the Air Force and thus lost some advantage of the air striking power. However, flying pre-briefed missions, the Air Forces spread devastation among the retreating German columns. Tying in with artillery, the Air Arm assisted in bottling up and destroying several thousand enemy vehicles and guns in the Montelimar area. Throughout the entire length of the Rhone Valley escape route, destroyed German equipment was evidenced on every hand.

Initially, Twelfth Air Force furnished support for Seventh Army in its drive to establish a beachhead and then push northward up the Rhone Valley. This Force operated out of Italy, Corsica and Sardinia. However, when Headquarters 6th Army Group assumed control of Dragoon Forces, the Air Command furnishing close cooperation to Seventh Army -- XII Tactical Air Command -- passed to control of Ninth Air Force. On 28 September, the Ninth Air Force Liaison Office was established to coordinate air cooperation for forces under Headquarters 6th Army Group. On 20 October, First Tactical Air Force (Provisional) commanded by Major General Ralph Royce, was established to replace the Ninth Air Force Liaison

Office. First TACAF (Prov.) assumed control of XII Tactical Air Command, operating with Seventh Army, and French Tactical Air Command, operating with First French Army. Brigadier General Saville succeeded Major General Royce as commanding general of First TACAF on 29 January and when he left for a new assignment, Major General Robert P. Webster assumed command of the Air Force.

At the outset, XII TAC was composed of: 324th Fighter Group; 27th Fighter Group; 50th Fighter Group; 111th Tac/R Squadron; 162d TAC/R Squadron; 415th Night Fighter Squadron and 23rd PRU Squadron. A majority of these planes had been transferred from the Mediterranean Theater.

French TAC was composed initially of: 4th Fighter Group; 339th Wing; and 2/33rd Tac/R Squadron.

Later, some additions were made to both Tactical Air Commands. In addition to these planes, First TACAF called on Ninth Air Force for additional support required on the Army Group front.

After Headquarters 6th Army Group became operational, a period of bad weather set in that caused a slackening of the pace of the air offensive, especially in the Vosges Mountain sector during the winter months. However, during the defensive period from 21 December to 6 February,

the Air Force in support of Seventh Army was particularly effective with the limited means available. Despite bad weather, First TACAF flew some 9,000 sorties and dropped more than 8,200 tons of bombs on enemy forming for attacks, supply installations and routes of communication. In these operations 148 locomotives, 1,893 railroad cars, 500 military vehicles, including 61 tanks, and 15 bridges were destroyed. In addition, 301 rail cuts were effected.

In the Colmar Pocket operation also, weather was a limiting factor. Despite this, the Air Force got in some effective and damaging blows. From 20 January to 9 February, First TACAF flew 1,990 sorties in support of First French Army's attack. The offensive was designed to isolate the battle field, prevent enemy movements and soften up defended positions, especially towns. An impressive list of claims was made as a result: 254 railroad cars, 9 locomotives, 114 vehicles, 18 tanks and 403 buildings destroyed were the major items.

As Seventh Army turned to the offensive on 15 March, the Air Arm unleashed its mightiest offensive against enemy movements, communications, supply installations and CP's. In front of the main effort by XV Corps to breach the Siegfried Line, heavy and

medium bombers attacked the prepared fortifications en masse. The fortifications were not destroyed, however, and the main advantage gained was running the enemy indoors and lowering his will to resist. On 15 March, First TACAF flew 1,670 sorties in support of Seventh Army. Two days later a total of 1,699 sorties were flown, a phenomenal number in the light of available airplanes. To accomplish this feat meant that almost every plane must fly an average of three sorties during the day.

After the breakthrough, the Air Force reamed the Saar-Palatinate, attacking enemy columns and making daylight movement almost impossible. Heavy losses were inflicted on the enemy in the Homburg, Kaiserslautern and Bad Dürkheim areas. While these operations were being carried out, other planes were isolating the battlefield and preventing the bringing up of reinforcements and badly needed materiel.

As 6th Army Group stepped across the Rhine, broke through its bridgehead and started exploitation eastward then southward, First TACAF planes patrolled the skies continuously. Impressive claims in destroyed and damaged enemy convoys, supply installations, trains and communication centers were recorded daily as a result of these operations. A majority of the missions flown were close cooperation and on targets of opportunity.

First TACAF outdid itself from 15 March to V-E day, cooperating with ground forces of 6th Army Group in the battle to destroy German Army Group "G". Although having limited means, the Air Force operated continuously in favorable weather and many times during inclement weather. The record of this command in its assigned role is particularly impressive and was one of the most valuable contributing factors to 6th Army Group's ultimate destruction of German Army Group "G".

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

Misc.
D

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY
APO 758 US Army

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

REF No X-2036

WGC/her

AG 373.2 C-Air

18 Apr 45

SUBJECT: Comments on Air-Ground Cooperation.

TO : Commanding General, 6th Army Group, APO W23.

1. In compliance with letter Headquarters Sixth Army Group, dated 3 April 1945, comments by Headquarters Seventh Army and answers to guide questions on Air-Ground Cooperation, are forwarded herewith.

2. The VI, XV, and XXI Corps have also submitted comments and answers to the guide questions on Air-Ground Cooperation, which are forwarded as separate inclosures hereto.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

W. G. CALDWELL,
Colonel, A.G.D.,
Adjutant General.

5 Incls:

1. Hq Seventh Army Comments on Air-Ground Cooperation
2. Hq Seventh Army Answers to Guide Questions
3. Hq VI Corps Comments on Air-Ground Cooperation by Corps Hq and Divisions now attached
4. Hq XV Corps Comments on Results of Air-Ground Cooperation
5. Hq XXI Corps Comments on Air-Ground Cooperation (1st Ind, 370-2 C/S, 15 Apr 45 to Ltr Hq 7th Army, 370.2-C, 5 Apr 45)

A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

HENRY V. GRATTAN
1st Lt. A.C.

- 1 -

COMMENTS ON AIR OPERATIONS BY
SEVENTH ARMY

1. Invasion of Southern France.

a. Nature of Planned Ground Operations.

(1) This operation was an amphibious assault on the Southern Coast of FRANCE in the ST. TROPEZ area with the mission of establishing a beachhead sufficient to support further operations to the north and west. The initial landing was made by the VI Corps then composed of three Infantry Divisions. A French Corps in the immediate follow up was to pass through the VI Corps beachhead and seize TOULON and MARSEILLE.

b. Broad Requirements for Air Cooperation.

- (1) To prevent interference with the operations by enemy air.
- (2) To neutralize the beach defenses including enemy artillery positions.
- (3) To prevent the bringing up of reinforcements by the enemy.
- (4) To neutralize the defenses of TOULON and MARSEILLE, particularly the heavy guns capable of delaying the advance of the French Corps.

c. Final Plan of Operations.

(1) All enemy defensive installations, pill boxes, barbed wire, strong points and gun positions were targeted by the ground forces for attack by air in accordance with priorities deemed necessary to the accomplishment of the Army mission.

(2) Armed reconnaissance routes were also established to protect the initial operations against counter attack in force.

d. Effective Results of Operations.

(1) The attacking troops advanced rapidly inland after a successful initial assault on the beaches. The air effort together with the naval gunfire generally cleared enemy beach installations and largely neutralized enemy gun fire. A number of enemy pillboxes were destroyed by the aerial bombardment. Following the initial naval and air bombardment

B/L Comments on Air Operations by
Seventh Army dtd 18 Apr 45
Page 2, Cont'd:

strong enemy resistance was encountered on only one of the three major beaches.

(2) Immediately following the establishment of the beachhead, the weight of the air effort was employed in assisting the advance of the French Corps. Principal targets were strong coastal defensive installations with big guns in "bomb-proof" positions. These were subjected to almost continuous air and naval bombardment, and if not destroyed were largely neutralized. Both medium and fighter bombers participated.

(3) After the conclusion of the beachhead phase, the main effort was shifted to communications targets and armed reconnaissance along the axis of advance to the north.

(4) Carrier borne aircraft acting as fighters and fighter bombers, participated in the initial assault and in the early stages of the advance to the north. Their assistance was invaluable and materially contributed to the success of the operation.

e. Comments and Recommendations.

(1) In an amphibious assault, forward controllers from the Air Force with adequate communications should accompany assault forces down to and including regiments.

(2) Continuous radio contact should be established between Army Headquarters and all Corps and Division Headquarters and the Air Headquarters from the time of the lifting of radio silence. The failure to provide such communications resulted in a failure to realize maximum benefits from the air effort available.

2. The Advance up RHONE valley.

a. Nature of Planned Ground Operations.

The pursuit of a rapidly withdrawing enemy occupying successive delaying positions.

b. Broad Requirements for Air Cooperation.

Armed reconnaissances to locate and attack the withdrawing enemy columns.

c. Final Plan of Operation.

(1) Due to the lack of forward controllers with advance elements, it was necessary to pre-brief all missions, with the

consequent delay in attacking targets of opportunity. A controller with VHF radio was with Task Force BUTLER, the mobile spearhead of the advance. This arrangement proved of little value due to the lack of communications between the Task Force and Army.

d. Effective Results of Operation.

(1) The advance was continued to the BELFORT GAP and contact established with the Third U.S. Army on the north. Numerous small columns of the enemy were attacked and destroyed by the air during the rapid advance. At MONTBLIMAR in coordination with the artillery, the air bottled up and helped destroy a column of several thousands enemy vehicles.

e. Comments and Recommendations.

The lack of forward controllers with proper communication facilities prevented close cooperation* between Air and Ground. This undoubtedly permitted the enemy to withdraw with more success than he otherwise might have achieved.

3. Elimination of COLMAR Pocket

a. This Army did not participate in the elimination of the COLMAR Pocket. XXI Corps, under command of First French Army, did however, and its report is attached hereto.

4. BITCHE Counter-Offensive

a. The ground operation consisted of the initial defense against the enemy attack, a re-grouping of forces to meet the enemy threat, followed by a withdrawal to the MAGINOT Line and south of the HAGENAU Forest, and the containing and elimination of the GAMBSHEIM Bridgehead.

b. Broad Requirements for Air Cooperation

(1) Destruction of enemy supply installations during the period of enemy build up for the attack and armed reconnaissance to interrupt enemy movement in the rear of the battle area.

(2) Protection of our forces from enemy air attacks, particularly during re-groupment and withdrawal.

(3) Close support missions to attack targets of opportunity immediately ahead of forward positions.

* Close support or close cooperation as used in this report means the attack by aircraft on targets directly in front of forward elements and between forward elements and the bomb safety line. It is controlled in this Army by means of

c. Final Plan of Operation

(1) Prior to the attack and in anticipation thereof, intensive effort against known enemy supply installations in forward areas, all such pre-briefed missions then on armed reconnaissance along enemy lines of communications.

(2) During the initial stages of the enemy offensive, the entire fighter bomber effort was placed at the disposal of the defending troops, through the Air Force forward controllers with Corps. After the attack was substantially contained a limited percentage of the air effort was directed toward enemy communication and supply installations with continued emphasis on targets of opportunity through close support.

d. Effective Results of the Operation

(1) The initial enemy attack was delayed and seriously hampered by the pre-assault missions on supplies and lines of communications.

(2) The availability of the entire fighter bomber effort for targets of opportunity during the first stages of the attack was of material assistance in preventing the enemy from obtaining a major initial success.

(3) After the initial enemy attack had been slowed down and substantially contained, about twenty-five percent of the air effort was allocated to the destruction of supplies and the interdiction of the line of communications, with seventy-five percent continued on close cooperation missions.

5. SAARBRUCKEN - ZWEIBRUCKEN Break-through

a. Nature of planned ground Operation.

(1) To uncover and breach the SIEGFRIED Line and advance northeast to the RHINE river.

b. Broad Requirements for Air Cooperation

(1) Protect against enemy air.

(2) Attack and destroy by D-day all known enemy supply installations.

(3) Isolate the battle area by stopping enemy rail movement with emphasis on the area west of the HARLT mountains.

(4) Attack simultaneously on D-day all known enemy command posts.

(5) Saturation bombing by mediums of selected strong enemy defensive positions in the SIEGFRIED Line.

(6) Close support by fighter bombers of advancing infantry.

(7) Destruction of principal communications centers by medium and heavy bombers.

(8) Attack by fighter bombers on enemy movement in and into the battle area.

c. Effective Results of the Operation

(1) The SIEGFRIED Line was uncovered and breached according to plan. The saturation bombing by the mediums was successfully executed but was of doubtful value except as a psychological factor. Fortifications were not destroyed and the casualties inflicted were apparently negligible. Close cooperation by the fighter bombers during the progress of the assault, was however, effective.

(2) The attacks on enemy command posts on D-day were successful. Enemy communications were disrupted and many higher staffs disorganized. In one German division, twenty-one staff officers were reported to have been killed in one of these attacks.

(3) Many profitable targets of opportunity developed during the enemy's subsequent withdrawal, resulting in the destruction of quantities of equipment and personnel. Medium and heavy bombers attacked major centers of enemy communications during this phase with successful results. In general, the enemy was unable to make an orderly withdrawal.

d. Comments and Recommendations.

(1) The ineffectiveness of the SIEGFRIED bombing by the mediums resulted largely from poor timing. Effective communications between the mediums and the ground forces on an Army and Corps level with forward controllers should result in more satisfactory cooperation.

(2) Close cooperation by fighter bombers in this operation as in the past was greatly enhanced by the use of "Horsefly" (L-5s equipped with VHF radios). This procedure is now a proven and established part of the air support system of this Army. A minimum of three of these aircraft properly equipped should be allocated to each Corps for "Horsefly" purposes. It is believed that they should operate as a part of the Tactical Air Command system and under the operational direction of the senior forward controller with the Corps.

(3) The shortage of night-fighter aircraft permitted the enemy to move under cover of darkness with impunity. This

for concern. In current operations enemy air continues to operate at night at will.

6. Crossing the RHINE River.

a. Nature of Planned Ground Operation.

(1) River crossing and the establishment of a bridgehead preparatory to a further advance to the east.

b. Broad Requirement for Air Cooperation

(1) Protection of friendly troops from enemy air.

(2) Prevent movement of reserves by the enemy to the bridgehead area, by destruction of rails, bridges and vital communication installations.

(3) Close support of assault echelons.

c. Final Plan of Operation

(1) The rapid development of the Third U. S. Army bridgehead resulted in the air effort being diverted from communications targets and directed primarily against targets of opportunity.

d. Effective Results of Operation.

(1) Targets were not numerous and enemy movement during daylight hours was negligible. All observed movement of the enemy in the RHINE valley was promptly attacked but the enemy appeared to have been largely driven from the roads. Enemy air was almost completely neutralized except for night operations

e. Comments and Recommendations.

(1) The enemy was largely dominated by our air during daylight hours.

(2) Adequate night-fighter aircraft could probably have completely paralyzed the enemy's ability to withdraw.

~~SECRET~~

ANSWERS OF SEVENTH ARMY
TO
GUIDE QUESTIONS ON AIR GROUND COOPERATION*

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

A - 1. Yes. There have been a number of cases where a repetition of the attack has been called for by the assaulting unit with eventual successful results.

A - 2a. Thin-skin vehicles

- b. Armored vehicles
- c. Tanks

- d. Strong points (field works)
- e. Pillboxes "bunkers"

f. Artillery placements.

- g. Buildings
- h. Bridges

- i. Troops
- j. Forward depots
- k. Defended villages
- l. Minefields

m. Wire and other defenses

a. Yes.

- b. Yes
- c. Yes, to a limited degree. Effective where tanks are bunched or concentrated.

- d. Yes.
- e. No, except for concussion effect on personnel. Should be closely coordinated with ground attack.
- f. Temporarily neutralizes the position and causes a disruption in communication and usually compels the move of the battery.

- g. Yes
- h. Difficult targets; results generally unsatisfactory.

- i. Yes
- j. Yes
- k. Yes
- l. Usually uncovers mines. Seldom detonates them. Value questionable.

m. Yes

A - 3. Such attacks have generally assisted the assault particularly when the attack has been directed toward the near edge of the village. However, they are usually ineffectual if not followed by an immediate infantry attack.

A - 4. a. While there has been instances of the successful use of "Napalm" alone, the results have been generally inconclusive. However, when used in conjunction with either demolition bombs or artillery fire, the results have been good.

A - 4. b. (1) An instance when "Napalm" bombs were used successfully in connection with demolition bombs as well as artillery fire occurred in the vicinity of ST DIE when some fortified buildings were attacked. 500 pound demolition bombs were dropped, followed by the "Napalm" bombs and artillery fire. The buildings were completely destroyed and offered no further difficulty.

(2) "Napalm" bombs alone, were reported as used successfully, on open entrenchments in the same general area of ST DIE.

(3) "Napalm" bombs in conjunction with artillery fire, were reported to have caused enemy troops to withdraw from the town of STEINFELD.

(4) There are many instances, too numerous to mention, of the successful use of "Napalm" bombs particularly in conjunction with either demolition bombs or artillery fire.

A - 5. The experience of this Army has been that it does not.

A - 6. a. The Third Division reported that during the COLMAR campaign, over a hundred of the enemy surrendered as a result of a close support air mission.

b. In the attack of the 42nd Division on the SIEGFRIED Line, a number of prisoners stated that they had surrendered as a result of air attacks.

c. Many other instances too numerous to report in detail.

A - 7. Generally this Army has received sufficient fighter bomber support to take care of both Army and Corps requests. However, for short periods during last December, January and February, an additional group of fighter-bombers would have greatly aided in the program of the destruction of enemy supply installations on the Army front.

A - 8. In almost all instances enemy artillery fire will cease when friendly aircraft are overhead.

A - 9. No effect except while the aircraft are attacking.

A - 10. Yes, ground commanders are almost unanimous in this belief.

A - 11. It has been the experience of this Army that it has always been practicable for the artillery to fire counter-battery against anti-aircraft positions in coordination with air attacks, when requested. If displacement is required to accomplish the mission, the air should keep in mind that the

A - 12. A combination of the two systems is used in this Army. All close support targets are selected by the Corps with the advice of the air representative with the forward controller. This selection may be and often is delegated to a Division by the Corps, particularly in the case of fast moving armored attacks.

b. General support requests for missions from Corps and Divisions were sifted at the Army level and passed to the Air for approval or rejection. The final selection of targets is made by the Air in consultation with the Army, in accordance with a broad Air Plan geared to the Army's ground plan.

c. In general this system has worked efficiently and has proved satisfactory to both branches.

A - 13. No.

A - 14. Yes, through experience the Air and Ground conception of suitable targets has been modified. It has been proven for example; that while the rolling stock in a station or marshalling yard may be a good target, the station or yard itself is not, since repair facilities are readily available. Pill boxes are not profitable targets but at the start of an attack with the infantry advancing, the concussion effect of bombs on the personnel manning such installations makes the mission worthwhile. Structurally strong, well constructed bridges have been found to be poor targets.

A - 15. No.

A - 16. Yes

A - 17. No.

A - 18. No.

A - 19. a. Fighter bombers 500 yards

b. Mediums 1000 yards

c. Heavies 5000 yards

A - 20. Ground plans on the Army level have been planned and carried out without regard to the availability of air. In local situations a battalion or regimental attack has been held up until certain air targets could be bombed. In one instance, a Corps attack was called off in the vicinity of SAARBRUCKEN when air could not take out certain bridges over the SAAR River, due to insufficient means.

A - 21. Yes. From a morale standpoint as well as from decreased enemy artillery fire.

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

A - 22. No. All missions are briefed for secondary and last resort targets.

A - 23. Yes, an agreed percentage of the daily missions check in with the Corps controller and if he has no close support target the mission goes on to its pre-briefed target. From the ground standpoint, the present system is adequate so far as communications and control are concerned.

A - 24. No.

A - 25. Yes. From the ground standpoint no suggestions can be offered for improvements.

A - 26. Yes.

A - 27. No.

A - 28. Marking targets with smoke shells has generally proved satisfactory. The use of cerise panels on vehicles has also been satisfactory. No satisfactory means acceptable to both the air and ground has been devised for the markings of forward positions of troops. Panels and smoke disclose the ground positions to the enemy.

A - 29 a. No; b. Yes.

A - 30. It is not possible to brief all ground personnel on air intentions but as far as communications allow, this is now being done, down to Division headquarters.

A - 31. Yes. The system could be improved by merging all Army Air dealings in one independent section.

A - 32. No.

A - 33. In infantry units at division level, in armor units at combat command level.

A - 34. On the Army level generally yes, but on the Corps level, no. Recently a new procedure was adopted whereby designated TAC/R flights report into the Corps controller for missions as suggested by the Corps G-2. This has helped to cover the area beyond cub range, but inside the routes generally covered by the TAC/R aircraft.

A - 35. This will be determined not only by the tactical situation but by who may be making the major effort. Generally in a static situation the greater percentage should go to army, in a fluid situation the proportion should be reversed.

A - 36. Yes, principally as a result of communication delays and the distance of the airfield from the ground headquarters. Broadcasting from the air has improved the situation as far as the delivery of photos.

DECLASSIFIED
EO 13526

~~_____~~
from the photo center to the Army and it's components is frequently excessive.

A- 37. Generally yes; particularly since the recent changes outlined above. Broadcasting results has been a great improvement.

A - 38. No.

A - 39. Yes.

15 April 1945

Headquarters VI Corps statement of operations and effect of air support during the invasion of Southern France, the Advance up the Rhone Valley, the Bitch Counteroffensive, and the Siegfried Line Breakthrough.

1. Invasion of Southern France 5 August - 20 August:

2. Advance up the RHONE Valley:

From the standpoint of this Corps, the bulk of the air support was comprised of fighter-bombers on armed run. In addition, the use of forward controller was attempted with BUTLER Task Force, playing its major part in attacks on trapped enemy formations at MONTILLAN; inadequate range of radio equipment prevented successful employment of the controller. The present close-cooperation system was not in effect for this operation and targets were attacked on call from the Divisions on a prebriefed basis.

3. Not applicable to this Headquarters.

4. BITCH Counteroffensive:

a. The ground operations of an initial stand along the LAUTER River line, a regrouping of forces to conform to the points of the enemy's greatest threat, and then successive withdrawals to the MAGNOT Line positions and a line South of the HAGENAU forest. In addition, to the attack from the BITCH area, the enemy established a bridgehead in the GAMBELIN area which was finally contained and subsequently eliminated.

b. Broad requirements of air were attacks on enemy movements and concentration areas, available fighter-bombers for close support attacks and protection from enemy air attacks on our movements during the regrouping and withdrawal phases.

c. Air mission as stated in par b.

d. Ground operations were such as to prevent the enemy from reoccupying the ALSACIAN plain. Air attacks were very successful and played an important part in breaking up the effective coordination of the enemy's effort. Large quantities of rolling stock were destroyed and damaged and the enemy's problem of resupply and evacuation was made very difficult by air attacks, which were carried out under extremely poor conditions of weather.

e. Initially, some difficulty was encountered in obtaining approval to hit certain types of targets such as occupied towns near the front, in which little movement could actually be seen. This difficulty was probably due to the fact that just prior to the counter-offensive, aircraft were being utilized as much as possible to hit communication targets and rail and road movements, thus making the requirements of acceptable targets very high. This was quickly overcome and excellent results were obtained.

The shortage of night fighters and bombers made it difficult to carry out night attacks effectively and since most of the enemy's movement's took place at night, it is felt that a greater number of this type of aircraft would increase the effectiveness of air support.

5. SIEGFRIED Line Breakthrough:

a. The design of the ground plan was to uncover and breach the SIEGFRIED Line, seize the high ground to the East of FIRMENIS and then be prepared to attack E or RE. The main effort was aimed at a break through the HARDT Mountains section of the SIEGFRIED Line.

b. Broad requirements for air support were:

(1) The maximum destruction of the enemy supply system by attacks on all known installations. This was a continuing program.

(2) Attacks on key rail and road centers as well as armed reconnaissance on all principle routes.

(3) Attacks on enemy strong points, CIs and troop reserves in coordination with the ground attack on D Day.

(4) Attacks by both medium and fighter-bombers on SIEGFRIED Line defenses to reduce their effectiveness and disorganize by resultant effects on personnel, communications and open defense positions of the line.

c. Targets were pin-pointed as far as possible and all flights in close support were briefed on targets beyond the BSL as alternates. The attacks were launched before daylight and so no preparation bombing was possible. The medium bomber mission was planned so as to be on call approximately twelve (12) hours notice, detailed photos of the targets having been submitted.

d. The SIEGFRIED Line was breached and the attack

moved rapidly to the RHINE River in conjunction with the attack of the Third Army coming from the North. Fighter-bombers in close support and armed reconnaissance played the biggest part of the air effort once the attack had begun. Weather conditions improved and were excellent on D Day and for several days thereafter, permitting an all-out air program.

As the attack reached the SIEGFRIED Line, several fighter-bomber missions were carried out in coordination with ground attacks and local commanders were very enthusiastic about the results achieved. In some cases, opposing fire was almost completely neutralized even though the pill-boxes were not destroyed. This enabled ground forces to infiltrate and outflank these positions, permitting to advance to continue.

Results of the medium bomber attack on the defenses were inconclusive because the attacking troops did not reach them until two days after the bombing. Ground commanders were reluctant to use medium bombers close to their front line positions. Also, in some cases, the attacks were launched without waiting for the air. This made it necessary to select targets some distance from the front line.

Close support attacks on targets of opportunity were very successful and fighter-bombers were always available for these missions. The all-out effort against enemy communications on D Day achieved some success and in one case, a direct hit was scored on a Division CP on D-Day morning, killing 21 staff officers. There was practically no interference with the ground action by enemy air during this operation.

Shortly after the reaction to the threatened immediate line up of Third and Seventh Armies in the LAUDAU area had begun, the fighter-bombers inflicted heavy damage on enemy troops and materiel attempting to move East to the RHINE. "Horsefly" (L-5 plane equipped with VHF radio) played a very important part in this phase of the operation. Because of the encirclement that was going on, it was difficult to tell where the enemy would show up with respect to our own troops. In this situation, "Horsefly" was able to select the targets and brief the fighter-bombers accordingly. The use of artillery smoke shells was also employed to assist identification. All vehicles displayed panels and thus all steps were taken to ensure safety to our own troops and yet employ the fighter-bombers to a maximum.

e. (1) The shortage of night aircraft again prevented a maximum effort against the enemy since his movements are still largely at night.

(2) It is believed that a minimum of three "Horsefly" planes is necessary for proper employment of this operational aid.

(3) During the course of normal activity, it has been found that more effective use can be made of fighter-bombers if the allotted percentage checks in periodically. When support comes from one unit, there is an appreciable time lag between turn arounds. It is only in cases where a very large percentage of the effort is allotted that a continuous program is maintained, because the turn arounds come at different times. It is believed better to have a continuous program, even though the time between flights may be longer on a normal day. This may deduce somewhat the overall number of sorties in a day, but considered from this level, it is more effective to have the effort on a scheduled basis.

Air support during this operation was superior and ground commanders have expressed great satisfaction.

6. Not applicable to this headquarters since the move was administrative rather than tactical.

DECLASSIFIED
10 1983

15 April 1945

Hq VI Corps answers to questions by AAF Evaluation Board, Hq USSTAF, on Air-Ground Cooperation.

1. Yes, in most cases. Repetition has often been necessary. As an example; in the attack by the 3 DIA on the Siegfried Line in the vic of BUCHELSBURG, several missions were used before any apparent degree of neutralization was effected.
2. Against most of these targets, attacks have been successful. Against artillery emplacements, great difficulty has been encountered in hitting the target. However, a concerted attack will neutralize the position temporarily and often cause it to move. In attacks on pillboxes, maximum benefit can be derived only when the ground troops can quickly follow up the air attack. Attacks on bridges have been found to be very difficult and seldom achieve destruction or complete cutting of this target.
3. The bombing of defended villages in most cases makes them easier to occupy. In many instances, the edges of villages contain flat-trajectory weapons in buildings on the fringes and such attacks often break this defense up.
4. Results from the use of Napalm alone are inconclusive. However, when employed after demolition bombs, heavy fires can be started. When the town of STEINFELD was being attacked by the 14th Arm Division in December, this combination was used and caused the defenders to leave due to the fires. Heavy concentrations of arty were also employed in conjunction with this attack.
5. Results are not conclusive on this type of attack since it has not been used here to any great extent.
6. Yes on a small scale. When the 42nd Inf Div attacked the SIEGFRIED line, 5 missions of fighter-bombers were used on a group of pillboxes. The infantry attacked as soon as the last plane had left the area and the personnel captured stated that they were unable to function. They surrendered in spite of anything their officer could say or do.
- y. Not applicable.
8. Ground commanders have often stated that enemy artillery fire has been materially reduced when Allied planes are overhead. Some have gone as far as to request fighter-bombers overhead for that purpose alone.
9. It is believed that enemy small arms fire is stopped in any sector only when our aircraft are attacking in that particular sector and only during the attack.
10. Yes. Ground commanders are almost unanimous in this belief.

DECLASSIFIED
EO 13526

11. It is considered desirable to divert artillery to counter-flak on all targets where an appreciable amount of enemy flak exists. In the Infantry Division, this is usually possible when ammunition supplies are normal. In the armored division, however, especially when it is widely separate, this is not usually feasible. However, for a concerted and coordinated air attack, it is laid on if at all possible.

12. For coordinated air-ground attacks, targets are selected by ground forces in keeping with the ground plan. However, on a higher level when a broad ground plan requires the denial to the enemy of access to certain areas or the use of certain routes, the detailed targets are selected by the air in accordance with this broad plan. Advantage of ground selection in local area are obvious, ground knows which ones are doing most harm locally.

13. With the fighter-bombers, no. With the mediums, some difficulty has been encountered. This is mainly due to the difficulty in getting marked maps and photos to the unit in time to prepare for briefing. This is being overcome by work now being carried out to simplify the procedure and shorten the time needed to transmit the target information.

14. Yes. It has been found that the following type targets are very difficult and often not feasible; cutting of roads and rail roads, for any length of time, bridges, gun positions, destruction of pillboxes.

15. No. In the present system, all request time lag has been reduced as much as possible. The only way that the time can now be reduced between request and attack times, would be to have aircraft always airborne and available for use.

16. Yes.

17. No, because the BSL can be set for any specific mission, to fit that particular attack, and after its completed revert to the original BSL.

18. There has been some difficulty, but by having flights check in with forward controllers before attacking a doubtful target, danger to our own troops has been cut to a minimum.

19. Between our troops and attacks by (a) fighter-bombers - 500 yards, (b) medium bombers - 1000 yards (c) heavy bombers - have never been used by this command in close support.

20. In our experience, attacks have been carried out whether or not air has been available. For example, the breakthrough of the Siegfried Line was planned when weather forecasts gave every indication of unoperational flying weather. This factor was pointed out to ground commanders during the planning phase. In local situations, however, it has often been the case where a battalion or even regimental attack has been held up until air was available. For example, during one stage of its attack on the Siegfried Line, the 103d Inf Div held off its attack on a series of pillboxes until the proper mission could be laid on. The attack was very successful and the unit attacking (Battalion) was able to outflank the positions.

21. Yes, since this seems to enhance the morale of our own troops. Also, it often causes enemy artillery to decrease.

22. No. Armed rcn is given a list of type targets which they are likely to encounter, in order of priority. In addition to this they are given last resort targets so that no flight is forced to return without hitting a target.

23. Yes. When armed rcn flights are airborne, they can be utilized by the Corps controller requesting such a flight from the Wing Control Center. Normally, a certain percentage of the fighter-bomber support is directed to check in with each Corps, having as alternates, prebriefed targets and armed rcn missions. In addition to this, a percentage has armed rcn as its primary mission. The Wing Control Center, being familiar with the status of these flights, can make them available to fill urgent requests from Corps Controllers.

24. No. There is still much to be done to standardize a procedure for this work. This command has not had an opportunity to use heavy bombers in close support missions.

25. No marker plans have been used except the selection of a bomb line along unmistakable terrain features. The target was marked with arty smoke shells in one instance. This requires very close coordination and excellent communications between ground and air.

26. It is believed that the accuracy of medium bombardment is satisfactory to permit close support. No experience with heavy bombardment in close support cooperation has been had by this Corps.

27. No. There is much that can be done, but a better procedure than now exists for normal medium bombardment requests must be worked out.

28. This Corps has not used panel markers or balloons in connection with medium bombers. The use of artillery smoke has been tried and improvements can be made in this. It is more a matter of technique and coordination than anything else that

actual practice will eliminate most of the difficulties.

29. Adequate communications are available for coordination but it would be desirable to reduce the time required to physically pass the marked maps and photos to the Air Corps unit plus, the time required to then lay on the mission.

30. As far as communications permit, ground units are briefed on air intentions and targets.

31. Yes. Under the provisions of the present T/Os, a G-3 Air is provided for in units down to and including Divisions.

32. Present personnel for these missions are adequate, it is believed, but it has sometimes happened that ground offices with air units have not kept these units properly informed as to the significance of ground operations as pertains to their currently assigned mission.

33. Below Division level; In an an Armored Division, it is necessary for an officer in each Combat Command to assume the duties of S-3 Air when the Division is employed in more than one column.

34. No. There has been a definite lack of Tac/R provided for Division and Corps areas of interest. Some of this has been compensated for by the use of artillery observation planes but there has been an almost constant need for more close in Tac/R beyond the scope of the "cub" planes. A new procedure adopted within the past two weeks whereby designated flights report in Corps Air Support Control for specific missions provided by G-2 Air has remedied the situation to some extent by providing tactical information of immediate value. However, there have not been sufficient missions to completely satisfy Corps and Division needs. Before the procedure outlined above was put into effect, the situation was far worse because the missions were of a very general nature only and unsatisfactory communications coupled with too many intervening headquarters prevented prebriefed requests from being acted on in time to be of value.

35. As Tac/R requirements overlap between Division and Corps, it is desirable that they be consolidated by Corps. The proportion of missions assigned to meet the Corps and Army requirements must necessarily vary with the tactical situation. When the front is stabilized there should be a preponderance of missions to meet Army requirements because the deeper enemy movements will have the greatest effect on the situation. When the front is moving the preponderance should be with Corps because close in enemy activities will vitally effect ground decisions and also the Corps area of interest stretches further forward than in stable or slow moving situations. A recommended proportion is 60 percent to Corps.

36. Yes. The greatest cause for delay is a result of communication difficulties occasioned by the great distance of the airfield from Corps. Under present procedure, instituted within the past two weeks, the Division and Corps requests are consolidated by Corps Air Support Control. This provides Corps and Divisions with the best possible service because an immediate report is broadcast from the air. This avoids the time consumed by the aircraft in returning to base and the necessary processing of the information at the base as well as the time consumed in broadcasting and receiving. Finally, the broadcasting station has been so far away from Corps and Divisions that the greatest difficulty is encountered in receiving complete and accurate messages. Photos would be received in much better time if the airfields were closer to the troops.

37. The procedure of the past two weeks for Tac/R has been satisfactory, i.e., flights checking in with Corps Air Support Control for Corps and Division missions. Broadcasting results immediately of all missions from the field is excellent procedure.

38. The lack of Tac/R is always potentially dangerous. It is one excellent intelligence agency that provides advance information of enemy intentions and whenever it is lacking by reason of weather or otherwise, the enemy is able to move his forces unobserved. One example was the lack of Tac/R at MONTEILMAR, in the RHONE Valley; it would have greatly assisted the commander in estimating the enemy's capabilities there.

39. Yes. We have been unable to obtain night photos though there have been many times when pinpoints of suspected CPs, dumps, bridgesites or similar targets and photo strips of roads would have materially assisted ground operations.

A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

HENRY V. GRATTAN
1st Lt., A.C.

HEADQUARTERS
XV CORPS UNITED STATES ARMY
Office of the Commanding General

Auth: CG XV Corps:
Date: 17 April 45:
Init: /s/ C.R.A.:

APO 436, US Army
17 April 1945

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

SUBJECT: Comments on Results of Air Ground Cooperation.

TO : Commanding General, Seventh Army (Attn: G-3 Air).

Reference: Secret Questionnaire "Guide Questions on Air-Ground Cooperation",
AF Evaluation Board, USSTAF, dated 27 March 1945, the following is submitted:

1. Have the air attacks delivered in response to ground force requests generally achieved the desired degree of neutralization? Have there been instances in which repetition of the attack has been necessary before the desired degree of neutralization has been attained?

Neutralization of targets requested has generally been accomplished with one flight of fighter-bomber aircraft, although there have been many instances in which additional flights were directed to attack a target to complete its destruction or neutralization.

2. Have requested operations against the following types of targets produced the desired results? Quote instances of ineffective attacks with possible reasons for unsatisfactory results:

- a. Thin-skin vehicles - Yes, by strafing.
- b. Armored vehicles - Yes, by bombing and strafing.
- c. Tanks - Same as 2b.
- d. Strong points (field works) - Yes, by using a combination of Napalm and 260# fragmentation bombs.
- e. Pillboxes "bunkers" - Fighter-bombers carrying up to 1000# demolition, had little effect. Direct hits on forts in the Maginot Line resulted in no noticeable damage to the forts, but troops dug-in in the vicinity of the forts were either killed or rendered ineffective through shock.
- f. Artillery placements - in the open, very good results; on concrete bunkers, poor results.
- g. Buildings - Excellent results on all types, using both Napalm and 500# demolition bombs.
- h. Bridges - Very poor results on bridges of all sizes. Approximately 2% of all bombs dropped hit the bridge.

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

i. Troops - Excellent results have been observed on dug-in troops, and on troops in columns on roads, using 260# fragmentation bombs.

j. Forward depots - Same as 2i.

k. Defended villages - Same as 2g.

l. Minefields - Have never used fighter-bomber aircraft to detonate minefields. Medium bombers have been used for this purpose but results have not been reported. (Report has been called for.)

m. Wire and other defenses - Same as 2i.

3. Has the bombing of defended villages made them easier to occupy or has it hindered our advance?

Yes. ASCHAFFENBURG and SCHWEINHEIM are examples. Both places were completely neutralized by fighter-bomber aircraft.

4. Has the use of "Napalm" in close cooperation missions proved effective from the ground forces point of view? Give instances.

Use of Napalm bombs on defended villages has proven very successful. For example (see par 3, above).

5. Do you consider that saturation bombing produces serious enemy casualties?

Unable to determine. Report of bombing of Siegfried Line positions now in preparation by divisions.

6. Can you cite instances where air attacks have reduced the effectiveness of the enemy as a fighting man and increased the rate of surrender?

The bombing of ZWEIBRUCKEN and HOMBURG greatly reduced the effectiveness of the enemy as a fighting man and increased the rate of surrender.

7. Has air cooperation been provided in sufficient quantity to meet army requirements after requests by division and Corps have been screened? Quote instances where operations could have been materially aided by additional air forces. (Exclusive of non-availability imposed by weather).

To be answered by Army headquarters.

8. What is the effect on enemy artillery fire when allied planes are overhead?

Hostile artillery is normally at a reduced scale when aircraft are operating over the area.

9. What is the effect on enemy small arms when allied planes are overhead?

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

When fighter-bombers are supporting a unit, small arms fire is greatly reduced. Allied aircraft passing over the area at high altitude have little or no effect.

10. Is the morale of our troops materially raised when they witness an allied air attack?

Yes, particularly when in close support.

11. To what extent do you consider it practicable to divert artillery to counter flak fire for the purpose of assuring more effective air bombing in conjunction with assault operations?

Whenever the location of hostile flak positions are in the vicinity of the target to be attacked by fighter-bombers, or on the path to be followed by medium supporting the Corps, Corps artillery normally fires counter battery missions just prior to arrival of the aircraft, and during the attack. For example: when fighter-bombers were attacking BITCHE and CAMP de BITCHE, friendly artillery was successful in neutralizing hostile AAA positions. When medium bombers were attacking targets in the ST WENDEL and ST INGEBERT area, counterbattery AAA positions in and around SAARBRUCKEN completely silenced the hostile AAA positions. On several occasions, medium bombers reported receiving no flak, although many hostile AAA guns were located in that area.

12. Are targets for air attack selected by ground forces in keeping with a detailed ground plan or are targets selected by air forces to accomplish the results desired by the ground forces in accordance with an air plan geared to a broad ground plan? Discuss the relative advantages from the ground point of view.

For each operation a detailed air cooperation plan is prepared. Targets are selected by Corps and divisions, and prior to being published, are submitted to Army and TAC Headquarters for approval. The plan includes fighter, medium and heavy bombardment attacks on targets to the front and flanks of the Corps.

13. In a planned operation has the time required by air units to plan the air operation offered any difficulty in arranging a coordinated attack?

No, for fighter bombers. Yes, for medium and heavy bombers.

14. As a result of experience has the conception of suitable targets for air attack been materially modified? If so, what type of targets are involved?

Yes, close cooperation targets.

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

15. Do you consider that the time between the initiation of a request for air cooperation and attack of a designated target can be reduced? (Exclusive of flying time from base to target area.) Can the procedure for processing requests through ground force channels be further abbreviated?

Do not believe the time element can be reduced through ground force channels.

16. Has the existing procedure for establishing the bomb line been satisfactory?

Yes.

17. Has its position restricted requests for air attack?

No.

18. Has there been any difficulty in adjusting the bomb line to the rate of advance during an offensive operation?

No.

19. What is your recommendation for the best safety distance between our troops and air targets when using: (a) Fighter Bombers; (b) Medium Bombers; (c) Heavy Bombers?

a. For troops: In tanks, 300 yards.
Dug-in, 400 yards.
In open, 500 yards.

b. Medium bombers; 1000 yards.

c. Heavy bombers; Unknown.

20. Have there been instances in which ground forces have modified or cancelled their operations due to the non-availability of air cooperation due to weather or lack of forces? Or is it considered more advantageous to undertake an attack as planned without air cooperation? Quote instances.

Yes. Weather prevented medium attack on Forêt de Parroy on scheduled day and attack was delayed until air cooperation was available. It is considered best to attack as planned, whether air support is available or not.

21. During conditions of local bad weather have the ground forces received any advantage by having air forces operating even though close attacks within the bomb line were not practicable. (Morale effect on both friendly and enemy troops).

Yes, local bad weather does not preclude use of fighter-bomber aircraft on targets on Corps front. Aircraft are brought over target by radar and bombs dropped within 5 miles of the troops.

DECLASSIFIED

EO 11652

22. Are there instances where armed reconnaissance could have attacked but did not operate for lack of ground requests?

None known.

23. Do the cooperating air forces normally execute daily armed reconnaissance program coordinated with the ground forces so that requests for "immediate" air cooperation can be executed by airborne units? If so, has this procedure proved effective? Or, is there room for improvement in communications or control from the ground standpoint?

Yes. Has proven very successful and effective. Communications and control at this headquarters are of a superior nature, and under the present tactical situation cannot be improved.

24. Do you believe that the most effective use of heavy and medium bombers in close cooperation has yet been made?

No.

25. Have recent "marker" plans for delineating the safety line for bombing by medium and heavy bombers proven effective? Can further improvements be made?

"Markers" plans used by this Corps have proven satisfactory.

26. Given an effective plan as above, is the general accuracy of medium and heavy bombers satisfactory to meet ground requirements for close cooperation?

Medium bombers, yes; heavy bombers, unknown.

27. Do you consider that the maximum advantage has been taken by ground forces of medium and heavy bombardment air strikes delivered in close cooperation with attacking troops?

No, principally through poor liaison and coordination with the bomber forces.

28. Has the use of tactical aids such as smoke, panels, marker balloons been satisfactory? Is further development along these lines necessary?

Yes. No.

29. Could channels of communications in transmitting requests be reduced? Have adequate communications been established between air and ground units?

No. Yes.

30. Is it possible, and is it being done, to brief all ground units on air intentions and targets?

No, only down to and including divisions.

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

31. Does the present employment of G-3 Air, G-2 Air, GLO and TALO meet the requirements of ground forces for operational liaison?

Yes.

32. Do you believe that the present procedure of liaison with air units can be improved?

Yes/

33. At what subordinate formation do you believe that the use of G-3 Air and G-2 Air ceases to be useful?

Battalion level.

34. Has sufficient tactical reconnaissance been provided by the air forces? Could you have normally used more TAC/R?

Sufficient TAC/R has been provided. In addition, under the plan used by XII TAC, L-5 and fighter-bomber aircraft report to Corps and division controllers and give valuable additional information.

35. What, in your opinion, is the proper proportions of air reconnaissance which should be provided to meet Division, Corps, and Army reconnaissance requirements?

Corps and division requirements should not be separated and should account for 80%; Army 20% of all the TAC/R available.

36. Have you experienced delays in getting the results of TAC/R?

Could any channels of requests be eliminated to reduce the time of delivery of reports and photos?

Delays have been experienced in receiving detailed results of TAC/R missions. Normal lag is about 1½ hours from TOA, which progressively increases during day due to back-lag of messages at air fields and the inability to transmit as fast as observations are received at the senders station. (Important observations, however, are made directly to Corps and division controllers, which is of great value.) Particular effort should be made to push TAC/R and Photo Sq air fields forward to the troops.

37. Has the procedure employed in TAC/R been satisfactory?

Procedure very satisfactory. All TAC/R planes flying within the Corps zone (long range reconnaissance missions exempted) check in to Corps controllers, who may assign a definite mission for Corps reconnaissance or who may turn the flight over to a division or the cavalry, if it is desired. Units have expressed great satisfaction with this method.

DECLASSIFIED

EO 11652

38. Has the lack of TAC/R because of weather or for other reasons produced any serious difficulties in the execution of an offensive or the repulse of an enemy counteroffensive?

No.

39. Do you believe that a material increase in night photo reconnaissance will be an important factor in increasing the effectiveness of air and ground operations?

No.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

PEARSON MENCHER
Brigadier General, GSC
Chief of Staff

370.2 - CofS

1st Ind.

GWGR/ARF

HQ XXI CORPS, APO 101, U. S. Army, 15 Apr 45.

To: CG, 7th U. S. Army, APO 758, U. S. Army.

1. In compliance with paragraph 2 of basic communication comments are submitted pertaining to the "Elimination of the Colmar Pocket" and "Saarbrücken-Zweibrücken Breakthrough, 15-21 March" in paragraph 2 below. Answers to the attached questionnaire are listed in Inclosure #4.

2. a. ELIMINATION OF THE COLMAR POCKET. The general plan of this operation called for very close cooperation between the air forces and ground forces due to the tenacious resistance of the Germans. This battle resulted in a systematic reduction of each village encountered utilizing infantry, artillery, and tanks on the ground and close-in support from the air. This combination spelled disaster for the Germans and greatly reduced the time required for the operation. In one case after a group of woods had been bombed and strafed over one hundred and thirty (130) Germans emerged therefrom to willingly surrender rather than be subjected to further air action.

b. SAARBRÜCKEN-ZWEIBRÜCKEN BREAKTHROUGH, 15-21 MARCH. This operation dealt primarily with the reduction and penetration of the Siegfried Line. Cooperating air forces were used in this action very successfully and included the working over of towns in the area, bombing of strong points, destruction of enemy columns on the roads, destruction of enemy CP's and strafing of enemy fortifications. The combination of the foregoing greatly facilitated the advance of the ground forces and shortened the time required to actually penetrate the Siegfried Line. After the breakthrough was completed results of air participation were evidenced by the fact that the pursuit was very rapidly accomplished until Third Army units were contacted in NEUNKIRCHEN.

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

However, this operation proved again that pillboxes and the like cannot be reduced by air bombing although all personnel can be forced inside or into the surrounding defenses.

3. This Corps has profited greatly from air cooperation in all its campaigns to date. Enemy air attacks have been negligible, troop movements have been made continuously by day, AAA requirements have been reduced, and camouflage requirements have been reduced to a minimum. Close support missions have been successful to the point that front line infantry consider fighter-bomber pilots as intimate members of their offensive team. On the other hand it is believed that our greatest need at present is the institution of night TAC/R and the use of medium bombers somewhat similar to the present use of fighter bombers.

For the Commanding General:

R. VAN BRUNT,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

4 Incls.
1 to 3 n/c
#4 - Questions and answers on
Air-Ground Cooperation
(Duplicate)

... THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526 ...

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

HEADQUARTERS
FIRST TACTICAL AIR FORCE (PROV)
APO 374

E-F-1 405
: :
: :
: AUTH: CG TAGAF :
: DATE: 1 Jan 45 :
: INIT: :
: :
1 January 1945

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

SUBJECT: Medium Bombardment Operations.

TO : Commanding General, XII Tactical Air Command, APO 374, U.S. Army
Commanding General, 42nd Medium Bombardment Wing, APO 374, U.S. Army
Commanding General, First French Air Corps.

1. The following general policy will govern operations of all U.S. and French medium bombardment units when they come under the operational control of the 42nd Medium Bombardment Wing.
2. The Commanding General, First Tactical Air Force (Prov) will issue weekly, in letter form, a list of targets and objectives arranged according to priority.
 - a. Target assignments will be governed by:
 - (1) Intelligence data available.
 - (2) Operational requests of the Sixth Army Group.
 - (3) Directives from higher headquarters.
 - b. Target assignments will be modified by daily signals to meet special requirements.
3. Directives referred to in par. 2, above, will be issued to the Commanding General, 42nd Medium Bombardment Wing with information copies furnished Commanding Generals, XII Tactical Air Command and First French Air Corps.
4. The Commanding Generals, XII Tactical Air Command and First French Air Corps will provide fighter escort for medium bombardment missions. Commanding General, 42nd Medium Bombardment Wing will contact above Commanders direct in arranging details.
5. Operational details such as the following will normally be left to the prerogative of the Commanding General, 42nd Medium Bombardment Wing:
 - a. Force to employ to accomplish mission.
 - b. Route out and back.
 - c. Bomb loading.
 - d. Time over target.

By Command of Major General ROYCE:

NED SCHRAMM,
Brigadier General, USA,
Deputy C.G. for Operations.

OFFICIAL:

RALPH E. FISHER,
Colonel, U.S.C.,
Ass't. C/S, A-3.

HEADQUARTERS
FIRST TACTICAL AIR FORCE (FACAF)
APO 374

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

63485
E-7-1
AUTH: CJ FACAF
DATE: 4 Jan 45
INIT: _____
4 January 1945

SUBJECT: Medium Bombardment Targets.

TO : Commanding General, 42nd Medium Bombardment Wing, APO 374, US Army.

1. In accordance with policy established by this Headquarters in letter dated 1 January 1945, subject: Medium Bombardment Operations, the weekly medium bomber target objectives effective 6 January 1945 will be as follows:

2. First Priority: Maximum effort will be made to reduce the combat effectiveness of the enemy force opposing the Seventh Army. Target Area: (Area "A") to include the area forward of the bomb line bounded on the right by the Rhine River and on the left by the Sixth Army Group - Twelfth Army Group boundary line. Priority of targets in this area will be as follows:

- a. Troop concentrations, barracks.
- b. Supply dumps.

3. Second Priority: Prevent the enemy troops in the COLMAR pocket west of the Rhine from organizing for an attack. Target Area: (Area "B") to include pocket in First French Army area east of bomb line, Rhine River crossings, and area east of the Rhine River from KARLSRUHE to BASSEL and extending east to approximately the ridge line of the SCHWARZKOPF MOUNTAINS. Priority of targets in this area to be as follows:

- a. Interdiction of communications.
- b. Troop concentrations, barracks.
- c. Supply dumps and storage.
- d. Marshalling yards.

4. Alternate Weather Targets: (Area "C") attack targets in area east of ridge line of SCHWARZKOPF MOUNTAINS within radius of action when weather conditions preclude attacks in areas "A" and "B", but offer possibilities in this area. Priority of targets to be:

- a. Troop concentrations, barracks.
- b. Supply dumps and storage.

Ltr, First MACAF, dtd 4 Jan 45, subj: Medium Bombardment Targets (cont'd)

a. Marshalling yards.

By command of Major General ROYCE:

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

WILLIAM H. ROYCE,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Deputy C. in C. for Operations.

OFFICIAL:

RALPH E. FISHER,
Colonel, U.S.A.,
Ass't. C. in C. A-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG, XII Tactical Air Command	1 cy
CG, First French Air Corps	1 cy
CG, Sixth Army Group	1 cy
D/O for Ops	1 cy
Combat Ops	1 cy
Director of Intelligence	1 cy

a. Letter, Hq., First Tactical Air Force (Prov), dated 1 January 1945,
subject: Medium Bombardment Operations.

b. Letter, Hq., First Tactical Air Force (Prov), dated 4 January 1945,
subject: Medium Bombardment Targets.

2. The above directives are designed to outline broad policies, specify target objectives, and furnish information to the Commanding General, 42nd Medium Bombardment Wing whereby he can intelligently employ the medium bombardment effort to best advantage.

3. It is desired that all agencies concerned promptly forward target information to the Commanding General, 42nd Medium Bombardment Wing. Such information, when coming from the Commanding General, XII Tactical Air Command and the Commanding General, First French Air Corps, may in some instances warrant an accompanying request for the employment of medium bombardment on specific targets. When such requests are submitted, the following procedure will govern:

- a. Information copies will be furnished Commanding General, First Tactical Air Force (Prov).
- b. Commanding General, 42nd Medium Bombardment Wing will treat these requests as a source of "Recent target information" and will give them due consideration, consistent with references, par. 1 a. and b., above. These requests do not obligate positive action unless directed by the Commanding General, First Tactical Air Force (Prov).
- c. These requests must reach the Commanding General, 42nd Medium Bombardment Wing before 1200 hours of the day preceding the target date. He in turn must make known his decision by 1300 hours so that bombardment assistance from outside sources may still be requested before the deadline (1530 hours).

4. In submitting requests, it must be realized that medium bombardment has best capabilities for employment against targets with characteristics of stability and immobility. More than normal time is required to execute a mission due to prevailing unfavorable weather conditions and congestion at airfields which slows down take off and assemblies of large formations. The advantage of

Ltr, First IACAF, dtd 6 Jan 45, subj: Request for Bombardment Targets (cont'd).

utilizing dive bombers on targets close to the front lines, which will probably be available as profitable targets for only short periods of time, should always be considered.

5. It is desirable that all requests for bombardment effort be coordinated with Army concerned so as to avoid duplicating and conflicting requests.

By Command of Major General BOYCE:

DECLASSIFIED

100-10672

AND BORRAGE

Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Deputy C.G. for Operations.

OFFICIAL:

RALPH E. FISHER,
Colonel, U.S.A.,
Ass't. C/S, A-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG, Sixth Army Group 1 cy
Deputy C.G. for Ops 1 cy
Director of Intell. 1 cy
Combat Ops Sec 1 cy

HEADQUARTERS
FIRST TACTICAL AIR FORCE (PACAF)
APO 374

U-7-2 03105
AUTH: CG TACAF
DATE: 11 Jan 45
INIT:
11 January 1945

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

SUBJECT: Medium Bombardment Targets.

TO : Commanding General, 22nd Bombardment Wing, APO 374, U.S. Army.

1. In accordance with Directive, this Headquarters, dated 4 January 1945, Subject: Medium Bombardment Targets, the weekly medium bombardment target objectives effective 13 January 1945 will be as follows:

2. First priority: Target area (Area "A").

Priority of targets in this area to be as follows:

a. Armed equipment, vehicles, and troop concentrations.

b. Active supply installations, (POL, ammo, and general supplies in that order of importance).

3. Second priority: Target area (Area "B").

Priority of targets in this area to be as follows:

a. Same as 2. a. and 2. b. above.

4. Alternate weather targets: (Area "C") No change.

By command of Major General ROYCE:

WILL SCHULMAN,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Deputy C.G. for Operations.

OFFICIAL:

RALPH E. FISHER,
Colonel, U.S.A.,
Asst. C/S, A-3.

Ltr, Hdqrs, First T-CAF (Prov), subj. "Medium Bombardment Targets",
dated 11 January 1943, continued.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG, III Tactical Air Command	1 cy
CG, First French Air Corps	1 cy
CG, Sixth Army Group	1 cy
G/CG for Operations	1 cy
Director of Intelligence	1 cy
French Headquarters	1 cy
A-3 Administration	1 cy

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

HEADQUARTERS
FIRST TACTICAL AIR FORCE (PROV)
APO 374

E-P-1

32E
: : : : :
: : : : :
: AUTH: 03 1 TACAF:
: DATE: 25 Jan 45 :
: INIT: :
: : : : :
: : : : :

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652 25 January 1945

SUBJECT: Medium Bombardment Targets.

TO : Commanding General, 42nd Bomb Wing, APO 374, U. S. Army.

1. In accordance with Directive, this Headquarters, dated 4 January 1945, subject: Medium Bombardment Targets, the weekly medium bomber target objectives effective 28 January 1945 will be as follows:

2. First Priority: To eliminate the COLMAR pocket. Target Area: (Area "A"). STRASBOURG east to approximately the ridge line of the SCHWARZWALD MOUNTAINS, south to the Swiss Border, west to BASEL, bomblines to STRASBOURG.

Priority of targets in this area:

- Concentrations of armored equipment, vehicles, and troops.
- Active supply installations (POL, ammo, and general supplies).
- Interdiction targets when they directly promote the objectives of par. 2. a., above.
- Special priority target: RHINE RIVER BRIDGE, CHALAMPE-NEUBURG.

3. Second Priority: Prevent the enemy troops on the right flank of the Seventh Army from organizing for an attack. Target Area: (Area "B"). STRASBOURG east to approximately the ridge line of the SCHWARZWALD MOUNTAINS, north to KARLSRUHE, northwest to LANDAU, southwest through WISSENBURG to bomblines, bomblines to STRASBOURG.

Priority of targets in this area: Same as 2. a., b., and c., above.

4. Third Priority: To reduce the combat effectiveness of the enemy forces opposing the left flank of the Seventh Army. Target Area: (Area "C"). HAGENAU, bomblines to SAARBRUCKEN to MANNHEIM, south to KARLSRUHE.

Priority of targets in this area: Same as 2. a., b., and c., above.

5. Alternate weather targets: (Area "D"). Same as area "C" in Directive, this Headquarters, dated 18 January 1945, subject: Medium Bombardment Targets.

Priority of targets: Same as 2. a., b., and c., above.

26 JANV 1945

Ltr, First TACAF, dated 25 Jan 45, subject: Medium Bombardment Targets (cont'd.)

By Command of Major General ROYCE:

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

NED SCHRAMM,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Deputy C.G. for Operations.

OFFICIAL:

RALPH E. FISHER,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Ass't. C/S, A-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG, Sixth Army Group	1 cy
Deputy C.G. for Ops	1 cy
Director of Intell.	1 cy
Combat Operations A-3	1 cy
French Section A-3	1 cy
CG, XII TAC	1 cy
CG, First French A C	1 cy

HEADQUARTERS
FIRST TACTICAL AIR FORCE (PROV)
APO

2-1600
E-F-1
: : : : :
: : : : :
: AUTH: OG 1 TACAF :
: DATE: 2 FEB 45 :
: INIT: :
: : : : :
2 February 1945

574
132 E

SUBJECT: Medium Bombardment Targets.

DECLASSIFIED

TO : Commanding General, 42nd Bomb Wing, APO 574, U. S. Army.

1. In accordance with Directive, this Headquarters, dated 4 January 1945, subject: Medium Bombardment Targets, the weekly medium bomber target objectives, effective 4 February 1945, will be as follows:

2. First Priority: To eliminate the COLMAR pocket. Target Area: (AREA "A"): CHALAMPE V 8513 east to BONDORF W-4513, north to FREUDENSTADT W-5087, northwest to STRASSBOURG, south along bomblines to CHALAMPE.

Priority of targets in this area:

- a. Concentrations of armored equipment, vehicles and troops.
- b. Active supply installations (POL, ammo, and general supplies).
- c. Interdiction targets and marshalling yards when they directly promote the objective of par. 2. a., above.
- d. Special Priority Target: Rhine River bridge, NEUBURG - CHALAMPE.

3. Second Priority: Hinder and delay the anticipated withdrawal of enemy troops on the Seventh Army Front. Target Area: (AREA "B"): STRASSBOURG south-east to FREUDENSTADT W-5087, northeast to PFORZHEIM R-7133, north through BRETTEN and HEIDELBERG to REPPENHEIM M-6616, west to WORMS, southwest to KAISERLAUTERN, southeast to NEUSTADT, south through LANDAU to LAUTERBOURG, southwest along RHINE RIVER to STRASSBOURG (all points inclusive).

Priority of targets in this area: Same as par. 2. a., b., and c., above.

4. Third Priority: To reduce the combat effectiveness of the enemy forces opposing the left flank of the Seventh Army. Target Area: (AREA "C"): KAISERLAUTERN east to NEUSTADT, south through LANDAU to LAUTERBOURG, southwest along RHINE RIVER to bomblines, northwest along bomblines to boundary between Sixth and Twelfth Army Groups, and then northeast to KAISERLAUTERN (All points inclusive).

Priority of targets in this area: Same as par. 2. a., b., and c., above.

SECRET

Ltr, First TACAF, dtd 2 Feb 45, subj: Medium Bombardment Targets (cont'd).

5. Alternate Weather Targets in AREA "D" (East of AREAS "A" and "B", above and within radius of action of aircraft). To be attacked only when weather prevents operations in AREAS "A", "B", and "C".

Priority of targets in this area: Same as par. 2. a., b., and c., above.

By command of Brigadier General SAVILLE:

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

RED SCHRAMM,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Deputy C.G. for Operations.

OFFICIAL:

RALPH E. FISHER,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Ass't. C/S, A-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG, Sixth Army Group	1 cy
CG, XII TAC	1 cy
CG, First French Air Corps	1 cy
Deputy C.G. for Ops	1 cy
Director of Intelligence	1 cy
Combat Ops A-3	1 cy
French Section A-3	1 cy
A-3 Files	2 cy

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
FIRST TACTICAL AIR FORCE (PROV)
APO 374

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

03105 March
E-P-1
Auth: OG 1 TACAF:
Date: 2 Mar 45
Init: _____
2 March 1945

SUBJECT: Medium Bombardment Operational Objectives, Letter of Instruction No. 1

TO : Commanding General, 42nd Bomb Wing, APO 374, U. S. Army.

1. The provisions of letter, this Headquarters, dated 3 March 1945, subject: Strategic Objectives for Medium Bombardment Aviation, will become effective 5 March 1945.

2. The 42nd Bomb Wing and French units under its operational control will continue strategic missions in the area to the front of the Sixth Army Group area within approximately 550 miles of their radius of action. Left boundary of area of responsibility will be extended to include line MERSEIG 4-2095 - OBERSTEIN L-7025 - MAINE RIVER to BAD MUNSTER M-0855 thence due east. Operational objectives will be as follows:

a. First Priority: Interdiction in the RUINE ROSSLE Triangle designed primarily to disrupt communications to and from the SAAR area. Primary objective is maintaining the unserviceability of the railroad bridge at BAD MUNSTER and disruption of east and west rail communications south thereof. Active rail centers will also be included as targets. This program is in conjunction with a coordinated effort of the fighter-bombers of the XII Tactical Air Command.

b. Second Priority: Active fuel and ammunition dumps, munitions factories and depots will be attacked with the aim of creating shortage of these supplies to enemy troops.

c. Third Priority: General supply dumps, marshalling yards and barracks areas.

By command of Major General WEBSTER:

RED SCHRAEM,
Brigadier General, USA,
Deputy Commanding General
for Operations.

OFFICIAL:

RALPH S. FISHER,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Ass't. G/S, A-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

OG Sixth Army Gp 1 cy OG XII TAC 1 cy
OG First Fr AG 1 cy Dep OG Ops 1 cy
Dir of Intell 1 cy Combat Ops 1 cy
French Section 1 cy A-3 Files 2 cy

HEADQUARTERS
FIRST TACTICAL AIR FORCE (PROV)
Office of the Commanding General
APO 374

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

FRENCH
SECT.
E-P-1 03105
DATE: 3 MAR 45
INIT: 3 March 1945

SUBJECT: Strategic Objectives for Medium Bombardment Aviation.

TO : Commanding General, 42nd Bomb Wing, APO 374, U. S. Army.
Commanding General, First French Air Corps.
Commanding General, XII Tactical Air Command, APO 374, U. S. Army.

1. Effective 5 March 1945, Letters of Instruction will be issued by this Office, prescribing continuing strategic missions for 42nd Bomb Wing and French Medium Bomb units under its control. Copies of these letters will be furnished Commanding Generals, Sixth Army Group, XII Tactical Air Command, and First French Air Corps. Where special operations or other considerations take priority over continuing strategic missions, special objectives and targets will be designated in combat orders issued by this Headquarters.

2. The Commanding Generals, XII Tactical Air Command and First French Air Corps will continue to forward target information to the Commanding General, 42nd Bomb Wing and when such action seems appropriate, they will recommend targets to be attacked. Such recommendations are purely advisory.

3. Commanding Generals, XII Tactical Air Command and First French Air Corps will transmit direct to the Commanding General, 42nd Bomb Wing demands that specific targets be attacked when the situation warrants such action, with information to this Headquarters. The Commanding General, 42nd Bomb Wing will make prompt decision and advise the demanding agency of the action being taken, transmitting a copy of the message to this Headquarters. When demands made for bombardment under this paragraph are not acted upon favorably, the Commanding Generals, XII Tactical Air Command and First French Air Corps will immediately request decision of this Headquarters in the event that they disagree with the action taken upon their request by the Commanding General, 42nd Bomb Wing.

ROBERT M. WEBSTER,
Major General, USA,
Commanding.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG Sixth Army Group 1 cy
Dep CG for Ops 1 cy
Dir of Intell 1 cy
Combat Ops 1 cy
French Section 1 cy
A-5 Files 2 cy
CG files 1 cy

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

COPY NO. 37

~~SECRET~~
HEADQUARTERS XXI CORPS
APO 101, U S Army

MEMORANDUM

AIR RECONNAISSANCE: VISUAL AND PHOTOGRAPHIC

*G-2
Sixth Army
Group*
DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652
Colt

RECEIVED
G-2
100-1000000
100-1000000

File

G-2 SECTION - AIR BRANCH

- 1 -

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

HEADQUARTERS XXI CORPS
APO 101, U S Army

2 March 1945

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

AIR RECONNAISSANCE: VISUAL AND PHOTOGRAPHIC

-CONTENTS-

	Paragraph
Purpose - - - - -	1
Air Reconnaissance Agencies - - - - -	2
Air Organization - - - - -	3
Ground Organization - - - - -	4
Coordination of Reconnaissance - - - - -	5
Joint Agencies for Coordination - - - - -	6
Air Agencies for Coordination - - - - -	7
Ground Agencies for Coordination - - - - -	8
Organization for Photo Production - - - - -	9
Organization for Photo Interpretation: Seventh U. S. Army - - - - -	10
Capabilities of Seventh U. S. Army Units - - - - -	11
Request Procedure: XXI Corps - - - - -	12
Reporting of Information - - - - -	13
Courier Service - - - - -	14

G-2 SECTION - AIR BRANCH

HEADQUARTERS XXI CORPS
APO 101, U S Army

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

AIR RECONNAISSANCE: VISUAL AND PHOTOGRAPHIC

1. PURPOSE

a. The purpose of this memorandum is to outline the organization and functions of the special air and ground components which, operating in mutual support, produce intelligence derived from air reconnaissance to meet the requirements of the XXI Corps in current operations; and further to describe the special procedures which govern the procurement, production, and distribution of such intelligence.

b. Elements of the XXI Corps will comply with the executive provisions of this memorandum. It may be used for information by units associated with XXI Corps.

2. AIR RECONNAISSANCE AGENCIES

a. Tactical air reconnaissance. Visual reconnaissance is used to determine enemy dispositions, movements, and the location of tactical installations. Common types of missions include area search, checking of pin points, locating targets for fighter-bombers, and adjustment of artillery fire. Tac/R planes are equipped with both vertical and oblique aerial cameras to confirm all visual observations of interest. Other uses of Tac/R photography include bomb damage assessment for the air corps, and oblique photography, which, when gridded in the process of development, provides the artillery with a means of executing rapid and accurate fire adjustment, either by ground observers or spotters in liaison aircraft.

b. Photo reconnaissance. Both vertical and oblique facing cameras mounted in high performance aircraft accomplish both tactical and strategic photography of enemy installations, troop and supply concentrations, movements throughout a wide range of photo scales. Most of this type of reconnaissance is accomplished at high altitudes, variations in scale being obtained through the use of different focal length lens cones. Such planes provide strip and area photography, and are used to obtain by far the greater percentage of photo reconnaissance requested by ground and air formations.

c. Air photo interpretation. Trained photo interpreters, with the aid of stereoscopic and magnifying equipment, specialize in converting the information recorded on air photos into military intelligence. The fullest use of this source of information is made through furnishing the interpreters with all possible intelligence gained from other sources. Properly used, it is by far one of the most reliable and positive sources of information available to commanders of military units.

3. AIR ORGANIZATION.

a. Attention is invited to First Tactical Air Force (Provisional)

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

Memorandum 45 - 2 which sets forth reconnaissance organization and procedure for elements of the First Tactical Air Force (Prov).

b. The reconnaissance units of the First Tactical Air Force (Provisional), together with their associated photo technical and photo interpretation facilities, are organized to provide:

- (1) Air reconnaissance, photo laboratory service, and photo interpretation for elements of the First Tactical Air Force (Provisional).
- (2) Air reconnaissance and photo laboratory service for forces supported by the First Tactical Air Force (Provisional).

c. All reconnaissance units of the First Tactical Air Force (Provisional) engaged in flight activities are assigned to the form of a composite reconnaissance group to the XII Tactical Air Command (Prov) which in turn supports the Seventh U.S. Army. The present composite reconnaissance group contains two tactical reconnaissance squadrons and one photo reconnaissance squadron, and is assigned to XII TAC (Prov).

d. The photo technical facilities (film processing and print production facilities) of the First TAF consist of those facilities which are organic to reconnaissance units (squadrons), and, in addition, a photo technical unit composed of one hand processing team and two automatic photo processing teams. Phototechnical teams are capable of operating independently, but are not administratively self-sustaining. The photo technical unit is controlled by the Provisional Reconnaissance Group to which it is attached.

e. The photo interpretation facilities of the First TAF (Prov) consist of the photo interpretation personnel which are organic to reconnaissance units, and, in addition, units of the 13th PID located at the Prov Ron Gp and at Headquarters, First TAF (Prov).

4. GROUND ORGANIZATION

a. The Seventh Army Photo Center serves its Army and is organized to provide photo interpretation and distribution of photo prints to its subordinate ground formations.

b. Liaison aircraft attached to the XXI Corps from the Seventh Army liaison squadron are available for the purpose of delivering prints and reports to subordinate ground formations. A ground courier service will be maintained by the XXI Corps to supplement and/or substitute for the air courier when weather or other conditions prevent air delivery.

c. Photo interpretation teams are attached to Corps and Division headquarters, and the teams at XXI Corps Headquarters will provide photo interpretation required thereat by the G-2 Artillery, and Engineer Sections.

d. A functional chart showing the basic of attachment of photo interpretation teams appears in Section IV, Annex I.

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

5. COORDINATION OF RECONNAISSANCE

a. For the purpose of coordinating the tactical and photo reconnaissance of the XII Tactical Air Command (Prov), so as to produce and distribute promptly and economically the intelligence required by headquarters and units of the XII TAC and the Seventh Army, appropriate coordinating agencies representing respectively the associated air and ground forces are provided, and are located in proximity to each other within echelons. These agencies confer together and act in agreement.

6. JOINT AGENCIES FOR COORDINATION

a. In the XII Tactical Air Command the commanding officer of the Prov Ren Gp acts as the director of reconnaissance, assisted by a representative of the Seventh Army G-2 (Air), coordinates requests for reconnaissance from air and ground sources, and implements the satisfaction of these requests within his command. The coordination of ground requests is accomplished previous to submission by the G-2 (Air) of Seventh Army, who has at his disposal the Photo Center located with the Prov Ren Gp and also ground liaison officers.

7. AIR AGENCIES FOR COORDINATION

a. S-2 Sections. At the headquarters of all reconnaissance units subordinate to the tactical air command, the S-2 sections are charged with responsibility for coordination at their respective levels of command.

b. Air support party officers (ASPO). At the headquarters of ground force elements to which air support parties are attached, the air support party officer advises concerning requests for air reconnaissance. He makes recommendations but is not authorized to deny requests. On reconnaissance matters he works with the G-2 (Air), or other ground officer designated as such.

8. GROUND AGENCIES FOR COORDINATION.

a. G-2 (Air). Seventh Army and XII Corps each has an Air Branch, or Sub-section, headed by a G-2 (Air). At army level the G-2 (Air) is assisted by photo (interpretation) center, by ground liaison officers, and assistant G-2 (Air) officers. At corps the G-2 (Air) is assisted by the photo interpretation teams and some additional personnel from other sections of headquarters. In division the OIC of the attached photo interpretation teams normally will act as G-2 (Air).

b. Assistant G-2 (Air). These officers, together with the group GLO and the commanding officer of the Seventh Army Photo Center (SAPC), filter requests for reconnaissance from subordinate and associated ground units.

c. Ground Liaison Officers.

(1) Group GLO. This officer works with the Assistant G-2 (Air)

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

under the G-2 (Air), and performs in general, duties similar to those of the Assistant G-2 (Air)'s. He is, together with the assistant GLO's, considered a part of the G-2 Section, and is located with the Prov Rcn Gp, where he is responsible for keeping the group informed of the ground situation, disseminating the results of air reconnaissance to the using ground agencies; as well as the training and supervision of the assistant GLO's.

(2) Assistant GLO. Assistant GLO's normally are attached to the reconnaissance squadrons and are responsible to the G-2 (Air). They work with the squadron staff, assist in briefing and interrogating pilots, and keep the squadron informed of the ground situation. They also work with the first phase photo interpreters at the squadrons.

9. ORGANIZATION FOR PHOTO PRODUCTION.

a. For photo production the photo technical teams at present allocated to the Prov Rcn Gp are as follows: One hand photo processing and two automatic photo processing teams to support the XII TAC.

10. ORGANIZATION FOR PHOTO INTERPRETATION. Seventh U. S. Army

a. Seventh Army Photo Center. This unit is made up of air photo interpreters from the U. S., British, and French Armies, accomplishes photo interpretation and associated work for ground units. As an independent unit, the SAFC provides the following:

- (1) Messing facilities for assigned and attached personnel.
- (2) Personnel and vehicles for ground delivery, and attachments of personnel and aircraft for air delivery, of prints and other photographic material to ground units.
- (3) Supplementary communications for the dissemination of first phase photo intelligence to ground units.

b. Photo interpretation teams. Photo interpretation teams consist of two officers and four enlisted men each, are equipped and organized to perform photo interpretation on a 24-hour basis. They will not, as teams or individuals, be used habitually for the delivery of prints, for drivers, for clerks, etc. All photo interpretation teams attached to units will be under the A C of S, G-2, and will work habitually with the G-2 (Air).

c. XII Corps Air Photo Interpretation Section (APIS): Corps are allotted four photo interpretation teams; one to serve the corps engineers, one to serve the corps artillery, and two to serve G-2. The Corps G-2 (Air) is charged with the control, and the responsibility for the full utilization of the work of these teams. In order to obtain the maximum results from the efforts of the PI Team personnel, as well as the greatest economy in the expenditure of photo prints, maps, reference material, and expendable supplies, the teams will work under the Corps G-2 (Air) as an Air Photo Interpretation Section. For a table showing the distribution of personnel within the G-2 (Air) Branch of XII Corps see Section II of Annex I.

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

(1) Corps Engineer Photo Interpretation Team. The photo interpretation team designated to serve the Corps Engineers will work habitually with APIS under the Corps G-2 (Air), who will assist the team in every way so as to facilitate work required by the engineers.

(2) Corps Artillery Photo Interpretation Team. The Artillery photo interpretation team will work at Corps Artillery Fire Direction Center, will normally have first priority on all air photographic cover received by Corps G-2 (Air) for use within the Corps Headquarters, and will maintain its own map and photo libraries. This team remains under G-2 (Air) who will assist the team in every way possible to produce usable intelligence for the artillery section, and will perform such air photo interpretation as is desired by the G-2 of the artillery section. The OIC of this team will be responsible to the G-2 (Air) for coordination and liaison between the G-2 (Air) and the artillery section, and will provide courier service for the delivery of photographic and other material to himself from the G-2 (Air) Sub-section. Written reports of the results of interpretation by this team will be submitted by 1700 hours daily to the G-2 (Air) by special courier for inclusion in the photo interpretation report. The artillery liaison officer with G-2 will advise G-2 (Air) on artillery matters and assist G-2 (Air) to serve best the needs of the Corps Artillery.

(3) G-2 Photo Interpretation Teams. The personnel of the two teams servicing G-2 will be utilized to assist the G-2 (Air) in the screening and placing of reconnaissance requests, the extraction of intelligence from photos, the correlation of this intelligence with information from all other sources available through combat intelligence, and the rapid dissemination of the end product by means of interpretation reports, target lists, defense overprinted maps and/or photomaps, and such other special reports as it may be possible to produce.

11. CAPABILITIES OF SEVENTH U.S. ARMY UNITS.

a. Seventh Army Photo Center. This unit, with photo interpreters, liaison aircraft, etc., is organized to provide first and second phase interpretation for ground units, and will prepare master plots of photos obtained for ground units for reproduction and distribution with other than the rush prints. Upon receipt of photos and copies of plots from the Prov Rcn Gp, photo technical unit, it will address and deliver such material to the appropriate corps which will make any necessary further distribution.

b. Photo Interpretation Teams.

(1) With XXI Corps Headquarters. These teams can perform artillery first phase, and G-2 and engineer third phase interpretations, assemble photos for planning purposes. They can lay simple uncontrolled mosaics and prepare overlays from photos. However, in instances other than the preparation of one or two copies of a hasty mosaic for staff use, such work will be referred to the Corps topographic engineer company for both the laying and reproduction of uncontrolled lithographed mosaics. Where both

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

photos and mosaics are desired, they can be furnished separately at a great saving of time and material.

(2) With divisions. In addition to those capabilities listed for teams in (1) above, teams with divisions can be used to brief from photos any units or patrols within the units, and furnish them with sketches from the photos for use as map supplements.

12. REQUEST PROCEDURE. XXI CORPS

a. Responsibility for coordination. It is the responsibility of the A C of S, G-2, of all ground formations to coordinate and act upon requests, within his own and subordinate echelons, for air reconnaissance, both visual and photographic. He is responsible also for the coordination and action upon requests for any type of photo reproduction to be performed by any air force formation. To assist him in fulfilling these responsibilities he maintains a G-2 (Air) Branch.

b. Conservation of air reconnaissance.

(1) Economy of facilities. Every effort will be made to economize on air reconnaissance missions. Upon exhaustion of all resources, fighter aircraft, when available, may be sent upon reconnaissance missions, but better results may be expected from a conservative use of reconnaissance aircraft and trained observers. Requests should not be made for air reconnaissance when the desired information may be obtained from other sources. New photography will not be flown when existing photography will serve the desired purpose.

(2) Planning for reconnaissance. Every effort will be made by G-2 (Air) Sub-sections of XXI Corps formations to plan their requests for air reconnaissance in advance. Planning photography or basic photo intelligence cover for the Corps should be requested as far in advance as possible. Normally, visual and photographic reconnaissance required in the immediate front of ground units should be planned 24 hours in advance. Urgent requests for reconnaissance to be performed immediately should be kept to a minimum since it overtaxes facilities and breaks down planned reconnaissance.

c. Request forms. All requests for visual or photographic reconnaissance will be made on the form appearing in Annex II, "Reconnaissance request forms". This form will be used in all cases without regard to means used to transmit request. When a request is transmitted by wire or radio, send request item by item, in sequence, and follow up with a written confirmation thereof.

d. Use of photos. Air photos are used by ground forces for three general purposes. Gridded obliques, mapping, and intelligence. While these are different in type and purpose, each may be used to supplement the others.

(1) Gridded obliques. These photos will be taken and es-

DECLASSIFIED

EO 11652

pecially printed primarily for the field artillery. They will be requested through the unit G-2 (Air), and requests will conform to paragraph c, above. Negatives will be filed by the unit which reproduces the photos and a print library as needed will be maintained by the field artillery headquarters receiving the prints.

(2) Mapping photography.

(a) Libraries. Negatives obtained for mapping purposes will be kept in libraries maintained by the engineer unit which reproduces the maps or photomaps. In addition to subsequent mapping photography the engineers will maintain a negative library of basic cover which has been previously photographed. Mapping photograph libraries will generally contain vertical "6 inch cover", the scale of which varies between 1/30,000 to 1/75,000. Requests for prints of existing mapping photographs (from other than engineer units) will be made through G-2.

(b) Requests for mapping photography of limited areas. Requests for mapping photography will be made through engineer channels to the Army Engineer who will filter the request, determine if the photography exists, and if required, forward for implementation to the Army G-2 (Air). From this point the request will remain in air channels for accomplishment.

(3) Intelligence photography.

(a) General. Intelligence photography consists of vertical photography of a larger scale than mapping photography and such oblique photography as may be required to verify visual observation and to supplement vertical photography. Intelligence photography must be current with the operation.

(b) Basic photo intelligence cover. This cover, scale 1/15,000 to 1/30,000 will be kept, so far as possible, ahead of operations. In order to conserve photographic reconnaissance basic cover will be reproduced to fulfill requests where the purpose can be met by other than current photography. Traces or plots of basic photo intelligence cover will be furnished down to include division headquarters by the Corps G-2 (Air). When traces or plots are available basic cover will be ordered by sortie and photo number, and orders should be placed well in advance of anticipated use.

c. Type of reproduction. The reproduction facilities of the air corps were not designed to provide quantities of prints for map supplements or substitutes, but rather to produce an adequate means for the dissemination of photo intelligence obtained from air reconnaissance. Therefore, where photographs and mosaics are not to be studied with the aid of a magnifying glass and are to be given wide distribution, they will be reproduced by lithography. Every effort will be made to conserve contact print paper by utilization of lithography. Where lithographic reproduction will serve the purpose for which the photography is requested it will be so stated in the request form under "Purpose". Arrangements have been made by the A C off, G-2 to have lithographic prints made by the Corps engineer topographic facilities.

DECLASSIFIED
EO 13526

f. Channels for air reconnaissance.

(1) Planned reconnaissance. Requests for planned visual or photographic reconnaissance will be forwarded, after consolidation by the G-2 (Air) Sub-section, through normal intelligence channels (by wire or radio) to the G-2 (Air) Branch at Corps. The latter will consolidate requests and present them to Army for further consolidation and implementation.

(2) Urgent requests. Requests for visual reconnaissance requiring immediate action will be forwarded direct to the Corps G-2 (Air) by the most expeditious means available, and will be cancelled by Corps if necessary. Urgent requests having been covered by previous requests will be answered directly by the Corps G-2 (Air).

(3) XXI Corps requests. Requests originating within the Corps headquarters will all be placed with the Corps G-2 (Air).

(4) Existing cover. Requests for photo cover known to be existent (i.e. basic photo interpretation cover, additional prints, etc.) will be made by sortie number and photo number. These requests will follow the same channels as requests for reconnaissance.

13. REPORTING OF INFORMATION.

a. Air-ground radio. Urgent information obtained by visual observation from the air is reported immediately by air-ground radio; and later confirmed by message from the interrogating headquarters.

b. From airfield. Reports of visual reconnaissance, interpretation reports, and photo cover are forwarded to interested ground force elements from air force stations by the ground personnel located at such stations, using communication facilities as described below.

(1) Reports from interrogation. Positive or negative information obtained from the interrogation of the reconnaissance pilot which is of such a nature as warrants immediate report will be reported by the interrogating GLO's. Interrogating GLO's pass information obtained from interrogations to first phase photo interpreters at the squadron. Where results of the interrogation is such that it should be checked against first phase interpretation of photos, the GLO withholds the report until after interpretation has been made. All such reports are transmitted by the group GLO in a brief form to interested ground headquarters using fastest ground or air communication channel.

(2) Reports from first phase interpretations. Whether or not a report will be made as a result of interrogation, a report will be made after first phase interpretation. The channels used will be those indicated in (1) above. This report will also be made to Corps and Division, normally by radio to Corps and by wire to Division. See (4) below.

(3) Artillery communications. Results of tactical and first

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

phase interpretations of photo reconnaissance are received by radio at Corps G-2 (Air) who will transmit targets of immediate opportunity to Corps Arty FDC and prepare, daily if warranted, target lists for G-3 (Air) and Corps Arty.

(4) G-2 (Air) radio. G-2 (Air), XXI Corps, will monitor air reconnaissance flash broadcasts with a BC 342 receiver, have two-way communication with the Seventh Army Photo Center for passage of first phase interpretation reports and other high priority G-2 (Air) messages via a SCR 193 radio, and two-way communication with the Corps Arty FDC through the Corps Artillery Section. All reception and transmission will be on a 24 hour basis, supplemented by telephonic communication when necessary. Wire communication will be utilized for the passage of requests and other operational and administrative calls.

14. COURIER SERVICE. In general, delivery of prints and reports to ground units is the responsibility of the next higher echelon. As soon as deliveries are made to Corps G-2 (Air), the matter will be checked and distributed to lower formations by the most expeditious means available. An adequate air and ground courier system will be maintained solely for this purpose on the highest priority basis.

By command of Major General MILBURN:

Willis E. Vincent
WILLIS E. VINCENT
COL AGD
AG

2 Incls:
Incl #1 - Annex No. 1 (Confidential)
Incl #2 - Annex No. 2 (Secret)

HEADQUARTERS XXI CORPS
APO 101, U S Army

ANNEX I

to

AIR RECONNAISSANCE: VISUAL AND PHOTOGRAPHIC

ORGANIZATION, DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITY

OF

G-2 (AIR)

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

	Section
Chart of G-2 (Air Sub-section - - - - -	I
Table of Distribution of personnel within G-2 (Air) Sub-section- - - - -	II
Functions of G-2 (Air) Sub-section of XXI Corps- - - - -	III
Functional Chart for G-2 (Air) Sub-sections of Corps and Divisions - - - - -	IV

G-2 SECTION

AIR BRANCH

SECTION I - ANNEX I

PERSONNEL CHART
SHOWING
G-2 (AIR) SUB-SECTION
IN XXI CORPS

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

	OFFICERS	ENLISTED MEN
		(No additional grades and ratings authorized by ETOUSA)
1. <u>Assigned personnel</u>		
G-2 (Air)	1 Lt Col	
2. <u>Attached personnel</u>		
a. From Corps overhead.		
(1) Operations clerks		1 grade 3 1 grade 4
(2) Courier drivers		3 grade 5
b. From Corps Topographic Engr Company		
Engineer draftsman		1 grade 5
c. From MIS, ETOUSA		
4 Photo Interpretation Teams	4 Capts 4 1st Lts	4 grade 1 12 grade 3

SECTION 11 - ANNEX I

The following table shows the allocation of personnel to the various groups of G-2 (Air) Branch, to include the assigned Corps G-2 (Air), the Photo Interpretation Teams (each two officers and four EM) attached to the Corps from HHS, SECUSA, and minimum additional personnel required from Corps headquarters for the operation of the Air Branch office, the production and dissemination of photo intelligence, and distribution of photographic material to lower echelons:

TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION

DESIGNATION - G-2 (AIR) SUB-SECTION														
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
1. Unit	SSN	Tec Gr	Air	Ops	G-2	I	Arty	Engr	Lib	Plot-	ing	Rep &	Reprod.	Dist-
2. Lt Col.		a 1												1
3. Capt.	8503	b 1	c 1	d 1	e 1									4
4. 1st Lt.	8503			1	1	1							f 1	4
5. Total		2	2	2	2								1	9
6. M/Sgt	890			2		1							g 1	4
7. S/Sgt	890				1				h 2				i 1	4
8. Tec Gr 3)														
9. Tec Gr 4)														
10. Tec Gr 5)		Incl	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	3	14	
11. PFC														
12. Photo Interp	890	3		(1)	(2)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)		k(2)		(8)	
13. Clerk, typist	405	4	1(1)										(1)	
14. Clerk, typist	405	5										m(1)	(1)	
15. Draftsman	070	5							n(1)				(1)	
16. Driver, truck	245	5											c(3)	(3)
17. Total			1	3	3	2	1	3	1	2	3	3	22	
18. Aggregate			3	5	5	4	1	3	1	2	4	3	31	

Remarks
 a. G-2 (Air)
 b. Ops C
 c. Chief Interpreter
 d. Chief PI Ops C
 e. Chief Int.
 f. Chief Eng.
 g. Chief Dist.
 h. Chief NCO-
 Plotting
 Sec.
 i. Photo
 sorter,
 wrapper,
 dispatcher.
 j. Map & photo
 librarians.
 k. Clerks for
 reports, re-
 production
 l. Ops Clerk.
 m. Distrib
 Clerk.
 n. Engr Drafts-
 man, from
 Corps
 topo Co.
 o. Courier (P
 I Team
 jeep)
 drivers.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECTION III - ANNEX I

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

FUNCTIONS OF G-2 (AIR) SUB-SECTION
OF XXI CORPS

(To accompany functional chart for above)

1. Coordinate air reconnaissance and photo interpretation planning, operations, methods, procedures, and policies.
2. Liaison with higher, lower, and associated units on all matters concerning air reconnaissance activity.
3. Keep G-2 informed of reconnaissance situation and technical and tactical considerations.
4. Coordinate requests from lower and associated units.
5. Pass on to army all requests from lower and associated units.
6. Expedite flow of information from photos.
7. Supervise Corps Photo Interpretation Teams.
8. Technical Supervision of Division Photo Interpretation Teams in capacity of G-2 (Air) and as a photo interpreter.
9. Recommend promotions and replacements of personnel on photo interpretation teams in Corps and subordinate units and forward recommendations through G-2 channels to JIS, Com Z, ETOUSA.


SECTION IV - ANNEX I

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

FUNCTIONAL CHART

for

G-2 (AIR) SUB-SECTIONS OF CORPS AND DIVISIONS



Composition of all PI Teams

Capt
1st Lt
M/Sgt
S/Sgt
T/3
T/3

OIC
Chief Interpreter
Photo Interpreter
Photo Draftsman
Asst Photo Interpreter
Asst Photo Draftsman

LEGEND

OIC - Officer in Charge
PI - Photo Interpretation

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

HEADQUARTERS XXI CORPS
APO 101, U S Army

ANNEX II

to

AIR RECONNAISSANCE: VISUAL AND PHOTOGRAPHIC

RECONNAISSANCE REQUEST FORMS

G-2 SECTION

AIR BRANCH

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

HEADQUARTERS
APO

U. S. Army

(Date)

SUBJECT: Request for Photographic Reconnaissance

TO : 1-2 (Air) XXI Corps

A. REQUEST NUMBER

B. PRIORITY (See note) C. RECONNAISSANCE REQUIRED BEFORE (Date)

D. GRID COORDINATES: DESCRIPTION OF OBJECTIVE

GSOS series no / : (Place names, whether rail line, road strip,
Sheet no / Coord : along bank of watercourse; in case
: of pin-point objectives tell whether RJ, build-
: ing group, bridge site, etc; give extent or width
: of area to be covered.)

Note U : Urgent
OP : Operational Priority
P : Priority
R : Routine

E. TYPE OF PHOTOS AND SCALE DESIRED O - Oblique, GO - Gridded Oblique

VL - Vertical large scale, VM - Vertical medium scale, VS - Vertical small scale
(1/12,000 or larger) (1/12,000 to 13,000) (1/13,000 or smaller scale)

F. PURPOSE FOR WHICH DESIRED:

(Study of enemy defenses, briefing of patrols, etc - be specific!)

G. SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OF PRODUCTS (OTHER THAN NORMAL)

H. PHOTOGRAPHY TAKEN SINCE (Date) WILL SUFFICE

I. REQUESTED BY

J. REMARKS (Additional information on any of the items above)

REQUEST FOR TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

FROM _____
TO _____ G-2 (Air, XXI Corps)
A. DATE _____ 1945 _____ HOURS
B. REQUESTED BY: _____ (Unit) C. REQUEST NO. _____
D. PRIORITY (See Note) _____ E. DATE AND TIME REQUESTED _____
F. TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE OF THE FOLLOWING OBJECTIVES IS REQUESTED: _____
(Target location, description, incl all possible information which will
give pilot specific mission, time over area (TOA))

NOTE

U Urgent
OP Operational Priority
P Priority
R Routine

G. MISSION RESULTS TO BE TRANSMITTED TO _____
VIA _____

H. REMARKS: Additional information on any of the items

RCN OPERATIONS:

REQUESTED BY:

SENT TO _____
VIA _____ DATE _____
TIME _____ BY _____

HEADQUARTERS
APO U. S. ARMY

(Date)

SUBJECT: Photo Reproduction Order

TO :

1. It is requested that prints be furnished as indicated below:

QUANTITY PRINTS	SORTIE NUMBER	SORTIE DATE	PRINT NUMBERS	DATE PRINTS REQUIRED

2. REQUESTED BY _____ REQUEST NO _____

3. Prints to be sent to _____

Attention _____ VIA _____

4. REMARKS _____

Telephoned to _____
Date & Time _____
Duty Officer _____

Requested by:

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

Misc.
G

THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

0058
1147

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE
Office of the Commanding General

.....
: :
: AUTH: CG: USSFAP :
: DATE: 12 Dec 1944 :
: INITIALS: / :
: :
: :

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

APG 633, US Army,
12 December 1944.

322

SUBJECT: Attachment of Units (No. 84).

To : Commanding General, First Tactical Air Force (Prov), APO 374.

Pursuant to VO, Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, the following listed French Air Force Units are attached, in the manner indicated, to the First Tactical Air Force (Prov), effective, 1 Nov 1944.

FOR SUPPLY AND OPERATIONS

Hq & Hq Sq, 3rd Fighter Group	411th Medical Supply Platoon
I/4 Fighter Squadron	171st Signal Company, Service Group
I/5 Fighter Squadron	13th Military Police Company
Hq & Hq Sq, 4th Fighter Group	Hq & Hq Sq, 2nd Service Group
II/3 Fighter Squadron	84th Service Squadron
III/3 Fighter Squadron	104th Ord Co, Supply & Maintenance (Avn)
II/5 Fighter Squadron	154th QM Truck Company (Avn)
Hq & Hq Sq, 31st Bomb Group, Medium	112th QM Company, Service Group
I/22 Bomb Squadron, (H)	412th Medical Supply Platoon
II/20 Bomb Squadron (H)	172nd Signal Company, Service Group
I/19 Bomb Squadron (H)	12th Military Police Company
Hq & Hq Sq, 34th Bomb Group, (H)	Hq & Service Company, 71st Bngr Avn Bn
II/52 Bomb Squadron, (H)	I/71 Engineer Company Avn
II/63 Bomb Squadron, (H)	II/71 Engineer Company (Avn)
I/32 Bomb Squadron, (H)	III/71 Engineer Company (Avn)
II/33 Tactical Reconnaissance Sq	Hq & Hq Sq, 550th Air Defense Wing
Hq & Hq Sq, 1st Service Group	551st Fighter Control Squadron
83rd Service Squadron	552nd Signal Company, Wing
85th Service Squadron	553rd Signal A/C Warning Battalion
102nd Ord Co, Supply & Maintenance (Avn)	
103rd Ord Co, Supply & Maintenance (Avn)	
152nd QM Truck Company (Avn)	571st Signal Battalion, Tactical Air Command
153rd QM Truck Company (Avn)	572nd Tactical Air Communication Squadron
111th QM Company, Service Group	573rd Tactical Air Communication Squadron
	401st Mobile Hospital

FOR SUPPLY ONLY

III/6 Fighter Squadron	101st Ordnance Co, Supply & Maintenance (Avn)
82nd Service Squadron	151st QM Truck Company (Avn)

FOR OPERATIONS ONLY

Hq & Hq Sq, 1st French Tactical Air Command	I/3 Fighter Squadron (British Designation-327 Squad)
Hq & Hq Sq, 1st French AFM	I/7 Fighter Squadron (British Designation-328 Squad)
Hq & Hq Sq, 1st Fighter Grp (British Designation-339 Wing)	61st Air Stores Park (British Type)

DECLASSIFIED

EO 13526

II/7 Fighter Squadron (British
Designation-326 Squad)

90th Repair and Service Unit (British Type)

Units listed above have been placed at the disposal of the CG, US Strategic Air Forces in Europe, per letter, French Air Ministry, 369/308/1, Subject: "French Units Assigned to United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe", 3 Nov 1944, and are attached as indicated per letter, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Mission (France) Air Section, Rearmament Division, AD/308/2D269, Subject: "Attachment of French Air Force Units", 8 Dec 1944.

By command of Lieutenant General SPATZ:

J. L. GARDIN,
Colonel, AGC,
Asst Adj Gen.

DISTRIBUTION:

TAG (Att: Opns Branch)
CG, AEF (Att: Air AG Pub Branch) (10)
CG, European T of Opns (6)
CG, First Tactical Air Force (Prov) (10)
CG, AEC, US Strategic Air Forces in Europe (5)
CG, Base Air Depot Area, AEC, US Strategic Air Forces in Europe (10)
CG, Supreme Hq, Allied Expeditionary Force Mission, (France) Air Section (B)
CG, 6a unit concerned (3)
CG, 33d TRU
CG, Western Base Sec
D/Pers (2)
D/Intell (2)
D/Supply (2)
D/Spec
D/Sec
Ord, CW, CMA, Surg, Hist, Engr, Stat C, Comm C, Postal Sec
Transp C, B, AEC, US Strategic Air Forces in Europe (2)
W/Quar Head
AG Misc Sec, European T of Opns
AG Misc Sec, US Strategic Air Forces in Europe
AG Central Files

187
15

Dep. Ops

Dep. Adm

Orig. - April

3 sets to all units
List